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1CHAPTER 1: The Beginning of a Relationship
With the Khmer Rouge gaining control of Cambodia in 1975, 
the further development of a relationship between a weak and 
a strong power was to be seen.l The People's Republic of 
China (PRC) would become associated with a regime which 
would prove to be one of the most brutal and inhumane of the 
modern age.
In the 1975-1989 period, the Sino-Khmer Rouge relationship 
would essentially remain an enigma to observers of 
international affairs. While it would appear that relations 
between the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese were in flux, 
neither partner would go so far as to, or perhaps have the 
option of, leaving the other by the wayside; a form of 
dependency would develop. What remains to be seen is 
whether the great power, China, would cast aside the weaker 
ally, Cambodia, in light of great power politics and 
negotiations for a political settlement in Cambodia. To the 
present day the friendship remains cloaked in secrecy, 
leaving politicians and academics alike in the dark as to 
the intimacy of the two partners. Speculation, supposition 
and hypothesis have become part and parcel of any study 
related to Sino-Khmer relations. Unfortunately, even today 
while openness operates in other corners of the globe, this 
researcher is unable to break into the black box of foreign 
policy making, casting all shadows aside.
1. The place names Cambodia and Kampuchea will be used interchangeably throughout this work.
2Within a framework of weak state-great power relations this 
paper will analyse the Chinese-Khmer Rouge relationship 
through the years 1975-1989. Our first chapter will provide 
a theoretical framework as well as a brief background 
history to Sino-Khmer relations preceding the reign of the 
Khmer Rouge. From there we will examine the Sino-Khmer 
Rouge amity in three distinct periods: 1975-1978, 1978-1982, 
and 1982-1989 respectively.
I. Theories of small states
Putting aside the semantics of defining small and great 
powers to those who desire to delve into such contentious 
and perhaps overwhelmingly pedantic areas, I will adopt 
David Vital’s definition of a small state as my own.2 in 
his book The Survival of Small States Vital proclaims that 
the small power:
... is that state which, in the long 
term, in itself and as a satellite and 
client or close ally - can constitute no 
more than a dispensable and non-decisive 
increment to a primary state's total 
array of political and military 
resources, regardless of whatever short­
term, contingent weight as an auxiliary
2. I use the terms small and weak state, as well as great 
and strong state, synonymously. As well, while recognizing 
that the Khmer Rouge explicitly ruled Cambodia for only 
three years, I shall use the terms power and state in the 
same vein, thereby providing a line of consistency in our 
theoretical underpinnings. Recognizing the usage of 
typology and comparatives regarding small states, for our 
purposes we shall accept that Cambodia unmistakeably is 
weaker and smaller than the People's Republic of China.
3
(or obstacle) to the primary power it 
may have in certain circumstances.3
The great power would therefore be one whose actions had a 
definite impact on the international system. If it were to 
shift alliances not only would the regional balance of power 
be jolted but as well the global balance would be affected.
It should not be assumed that because a state is weaker than 
another that it will lack the ability to direct policies of 
its own choosing or become a mere appendage of the greater 
power. Remaining independent, small states can choose 
different paths to ensure their self-preservation. If we 
look at what independence can mean, using Singer’s 
definition, we can essentially exclude any state from being 
wholly independent. Singer writes that a country is
independent "insofar as it has the power to enforce its
freedom of decision making, regardless of which other
countries want to influence it ."4 There is no need to
adhere to such exclusive definitions. A state may be 
independent in its actions, at the same time cognizant that 
it is a part of an international whole composed of 
subjective beliefs which are constantly entering into the 
decision making process. Of course it must be remembered 
that choice is often relative to the environment in which a 
state finds itself.
3. David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in 
Small/Great Power Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 9.
4. Martin Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers (New 
York: The Free Press, 1972), 38.
4
If a state's position is placed on a continuum, there occurs 
a decrease in autonomy as the state moves from maintaining 
an independent position to nothing more than becoming a 
satellite (See chart 1).
The second phase of the continuum finds the state acting as 
a buffer between two or more actors who are generally rival 
states or blocs of power. Trygve Mathisen adds that a state 
may also become a larger part of a buffer rim which serves 
to insulate a power from external threat.5 For our 
purposes, only the first type of buffer is relevant.
As an optional complement to a buffer type policy is a 
position of neutrality. A posture of neutralization, as 
Imogen Pilch suggests, is an "arrangement devised to satisfy 
the functional requirements of the balance of power 
system."6 While a state would necessarily have to 
relinquish political and military ties it could maintain a 
degree of autonomy as long as this was not disruptive to the 
balance of the regional or global systems. The status quo 
is preserved, or a new one is created, allowing for the 
continued existence of the buffer state.
Vital terms a buffer state, an "isolated state". He writes:
it is unlike the 'pawn' because its
policy is one predominantly determined
5. Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States in the 
Strategies of the Great Powers (Oslo: Universitetsforläget, 
1971), 107.
6. Imogen Pilch, Prospects for the Neutralization of 
Kampuchea (Nathan, Queensland: Centre for the Study of 
Australia-Asia Relations. Australia-Asia Papers, No. 43, 
Griffiths University, 1988), 5.
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by others for purposes extrinsic to it, 
nor a protege or client or satellite, in 
the sense that it is not materially free 
to enter into definable relationships 
with one or more of the primary powers.7
David Frei accurately indicates the difficulty in 
establishing and maintaining a neutral stance. According to 
him a state must look at the external conditions of 
neutrality, recognize the credibility of neutrality, and 
determine whether the other aims of the state are compatible 
with neutral behaviour.8
In accordance with Frei's assertions, the isolated or 
neutral state is free to reverse any political liaisons when 
it feels its national interest is being undermined 
providing it has not moved further down the continuum 
thereby losing much of its autonomy.
If a buffer state concludes that neutrality is not 
desirable, then the option of the buffer state leaning to 
one side is available. In doing so the buffer risks attack, 
a punitive measure, from the opposing side. Presumably 
however, the buffer chooses an associate which is powerful 
enough to dissuade such encroachments on one's sovereignty. 
This is a dangerous position to be in as it can lead to 
further dependency on the ally, decreasing the sovereign 
state's decision making ability. Even though a state may
7. Vital, 9.
8. Neils Armstrup, ''The Perennial Problem of Small States: 
A Survey of Research Efforts," Cooperation and Conflict XI 
(1976):171.
6
desire to remain autarkic it can very easily become the 
'pawn' which Vital referred to.
The third option for the buffer state is to involve a third 
party which, while being remote from the buffer's borders, 
maintains the buffer's independence in the system. The 
third power may not wish to dominate the buffer but rather 
prevent the buffer's neighbours from expanding, thereby 
maintaining the status quo.9
A fourth, and final choice for the buffer state is a fusion 
of the second and third options, whereby the buffer relies 
both on one neighbour and a third power. The developing 
dependency relationship which existed when there was sole 
reliance on the third actor, does not disappear but rather 
is dispersed between the two external helpers which are 
often acting in concert.
As the buffer state relies more on external assistance, a 
dependency relationship solidifies. The weaker power now 
becomes enmeshed in what can lead to a patron-client 
relationship.
According to Michael Handel there are four characteristics 
to a patron-client relationship. First, relations exist 
between unequal powers. Second, the relationship is 
mutually valued and both voluntarism and coercion are 
balanced. Third, the patron has greater bargaining power 
than the client. Finally, the client's position is affected
97 Pilch, 17.
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by the availability of other patrons of equal help as well 
as the extent to which the patron needs the client.10
Chong Li Choy goes further and explains the patron-client 
relationship in terms of reward and recipient powers. 
However, in their relationship the reward power is as 
dependent on the recipient as the latter is on the rewarder. 
If the great power is the supplier of the reward, then the 
weaker power possesses strengths which the greater power 
needs.11 What unfolds is a Hegelian master-servant 
relationship.12
The recipient of the reward, nevertheless can become 
dependent on it. This leads us into the classic dependency 
model where A, say the weaker power, is dependent on B, the 
greater power, for some benefit. B sustains A's dependency 
because it accrues benefits from the relationship. The 
problem for A is that if B is no longer satisfied with the 
benefits from A, then A must seek out an alternative or 
perish. Thus A is much more dependent on B than B is on 
A.13
A.J.P. Taylor claims that when one state is totally 
dependent on another, it is the weaker which holds the
10. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System 
(London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1981), 132-33.
11. Lim Joo-Jock, Territorial Power Domains, Southeast Asia
and China: The Geo-Strategy of an Overarching Massif
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984),
169.
12. Handel, 148.
13. Singer, 45-46.
8
balance in the relationship. The weaker state can threaten 
to collapse if not upheld by the greater.14 Taylor is 
correct in his assertion insofar as the stronger is gaining 
a sufficient amount of benefit from its liaison with the 
weaker power - as would occur in the ideal patron-client 
relationship. However, if the weaker has no bargaining 
chips, it will be left out in the cold. The small power's 
interests are served as long as its policies benefit the 
greater actor. If the weak power is determined in the 
pursuit of its interests, the costs incurred by the 
continuance of a relationship with it, augment for the 
greater power. As the relationship with the small power is 
often seen in a short-term perspective, if the costs of the 
association outweigh the benefits, the relationship will be 
toned down or done away with altogether.
In becoming dependent upon the strengths of another actor, 
the weaker associate's growth may be hampered. As Mathisen 
indicates:
It may occur that a great power offers 
assistance to a small state merely to 
encourage it to resist a rival even 
though it well knows that it is unable 
to provide anything like adequate help, 
and consequently exposes the smaller 
partner to a needlessly hard fate, and 
perhaps reduces the chances for 
organized passive resistance to the 
aggressors.15
14. Armstrup, 171.
15. Mathisen, 129.
9
This type of policy illustrates the use of power by a great 
power in the pursuit of its own interest at the expense of 
the lesser power.
If the dependency of the weak state increases to a level 
whereby the great power can manipulate the smaller without 
restrictions, then all autonomy is lost and a satellite 
state arises. The state as an independent body no longer 
flourishes nor is able to develop along lines other than 
those dictated by the major power.
II. HISTORICAL OUTLOOK:SINO-KHMER ROUGE RELATIONS TO 1975
Historically the Khmer people have only been of minor 
interest to the Chinese. Nevertheless some aspects of the 
Sino-Khmer relationship prior to the coming to power of the 
Khmer Rouge are worth mentioning as they will shed light on 
events in the 1975-1989 period.
Sino-Kampuchean relations date back to the third century 
A.D. It was, however, not until the sixth century that the 
various chiefdoms of Cambodia united together in order to 
send tributary objects to the Chinese and seek their help in 
security matters. Relations between China and Cambodia were 
most sporadic and were always initiated by the Cambodians. 
Although the Khmer Empire was the centre of a great 
civilization, Cambodia was one of the few countries in 
Southeast Asia which never experienced Chinese incursions or
subjugation.
10
The mercantilist sector of Cambodian society was keen on 
pursuing economic relations with China. By the 13th century 
the Chinese were busily trading with Angkor, capital of the 
Khmer Empire.
With the rise of Siam and Vietnam in the mid-15th century, 
China focused more on these two rising powers neglecting 
Cambodia (now in decline) all the more. Nevertheless, there 
were some 3,000 Chinese in Phnom Penh by the 1540s.
The Vietnamese having finally defeated the Chinese occupiers 
in 939 A.D. became a formidable force by the late 15th 
century, challenging Cambodian power and occupying large 
areas of Cambodian territory. According to Chang Pao-min, 
between the Vietnamese who thought themselves superior and 
the Thai who "sought to eclipse Kampuchea from the west,"16 
the Khmer Empire came under seige, engendering bitter 
memories which remain to the present day.
The Vietnamese at times sought to control Cambodia, and at 
other times regarded it as a buffer state, whereas the Thai 
looked down on the Khmer as dependent children. As David P. 
Chandler states:
The Thai wanted the Cambodians to be 
loyal; the Vietnamese wanted Cambodia's 
land and, incidentally, its recognition 
of their superiority. The Thai demanded 
service and friendship, but they were 
usually unable - given the way they 
organized their armies and the distance 
between Bangkok and Phnom Penh - to
16. For a discussion of the Thai-Vietnamese desire for 
Cambodian territory see Chang Pao-min, Kampuchea Between 
China and Vietnam (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1985), 5-7.
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provide protection. The Vietnamese on 
the other hand, provided protection of a 
sort, but their actions led to the 
disappearance of Cambodia as an 
independent state.17
Because of China's great interest in Vietnam, and because of 
Vietnam's patronistic attitude towards the Khmer people, it 
was logical, as Chang asserts, that somewhere down the road, 
the Chinese and the Khmer would assume an alliance against 
the hostile Vietnamese.18
It was French intervention which saved Cambodia from 
annexation by Vietnam. The intervention, however, had the 
effect of adding legitimacy to the idea of a unified 
Indochina, drawing attention to Vietnam as the principal 
regional actor. By the time imperialist China faded into 
the annals of history and the People's Republic of China was 
born in 1949, the lines of division between the various 
Southeast Asian protagonists were set in the players' minds, 
if not in reality. China continued to uphold the existence 
of Laos and Cambodia as separate, independent states and 
looked with increased interest to Southeast Asia as a whole.
Since 1949, as Shao-chuen Leung indicates, China has sought 
the formation of a "safe-belt" around its borders. Rather 
than a sphere of influence whereby China would have a direct 
role in the management of regional affairs, through the
17. D.P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1983), 115.
18. Chang, 15.
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creation and strengthening of friendly, non-aligned regimes, 
the PRC would promote its aims and goals from afar.19
At the 1954 Geneva Conference, China called for the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina. Beijing 
pressured Vietnam to withdraw from territory it occupied in 
Laos and Cambodia, and to acknowledge the 17th parallel 
rather than the 14th which Hanoi had initially wanted as the 
cease-fire line to the Vietnamese conflict.20 China for 
pragmatic reasons, favoured neutralist governments in Laos 
and Cambodia over communist insurgencies; exemplified in the 
PRC's call for a dismantling of the relatively small-scale 
communist resistance forces in Cambodia. Such a demand 
might indicate that China would uphold a neutral Cambodia 
and not necessarily a communist one.21
However, one month after the Bandung Conference in 1955, 
which underscored neutrality and the right for a state to 
act independently, Sihanouk signed an agreement with the 
United States which made the Americans the exclusive 
supplier of military aid to Cambodia. China sensing 
betrayal, condemned the agreement and warned Sihanouk that 
there might be reprisals from leftist forces in Cambodia. 
An alarmed Sihanouk moved to reassure Beijing when on 24
19. Donald G. McLeod, Systems and Process in Southeast 
Asia: The Evolution of a Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986), 177.
20. Eugene K. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 56.
21. See the statement by David Mozingo in Lawson, 58. Also 
see Pilch, 21; and Chang, 15-17.
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April 1956, he signed a trade agreement between Cambodia and 
China, the first between the PRC and a non-communist 
country. In return for recognizing China's importance, 
Prince Sihanouk in 1956, on his first visit to communist 
China, was assured of Beijing's support in the event of 
difficulties with the Vietminh.22
As Armstrong observes, China's reaction to 
overtures with Washington, "had shown that its 
Cambodian neutrality was somewhat stricter 
conventional legal understanding of the term."23
Sihanouk's 
notion of 
than the
In 1957, the Cambodian government enacted the self-declared 
Neutrality Act. As Milton Osborne suggests:
By proclaiming Cambodia to be neutral, 
despite strong pressure from the US to 
join the anti-communist camp, Sihanouk 
sought to have his country's security 
assured, by accepting aid from both East 
and West... Basic to Sihanouk's 
calculations was the belief that should 
a major crisis develop, Cambodia would 
have the support of China.24
By August 1958, diplomatic relations with China were 
formalized, and in December 1960, the Treaty of Friendship 
and Non-Aggression with Cambodia was signed by the Khmer and 
the Chinese.
22. J.D. Armstrong, "China and Cambodia," in Revolutionary 
Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front 
Doctrine, ed. J.D. Armstrong (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 187-188.
23. Ibid., 188.
24. Pilch, 23. For a similar assertion see Armstrong, 191.
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Close cooperation between the Khmer and the Chinese was 
evident in 1963, with both Cambodia and China opposing the 
nuclear test ban treaty. In that same year Beijing signed a 
military aid agreement with Cambodia, pledging to assist 
Phnom Penh in the event of armed aggression by the United 
States and "its vassals".25 In September, Sihanouk 
announced that Cambodia would remain neutral but if it had 
to, Phnom Penh would ally itself with China "for she alone 
would take the trouble to fight."26
The Chinese recognizing both the strategic importance of 
and, to a lesser degree, an economic compatabi1ity with 
Cambodia, sought relations with the Khmer people to ward off 
Vietnamese aggression and more importantly in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, American hegemony.27 With the Khmer 
remaining suspicious of Vietnamese intentions, the Chinese 
attempted to bring Phnom Penh on side.
During the Second Indochina War, in the early 1960s, Beijing 
strongly backed the North Vietnamese-supported resistance in 
the south. It was also thought that Cambodia could be used 
as a neutral rear for communist activities in South Vietnam. 
At the same time, wary of Soviet overtures and offers of 
assistance to the Vietnamese, and fearing Soviet hegemony 
and Soviet plans to encircle China, the PRC offered in 
excess of US$1,000 million per annum in aid to Hanoi if it
25. Chang, 195.
26. Armstrong, 195.
Ibid., 188.27.
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would refuse Soviet assistance.28 In effect a dual struggle 
was being waged. Both the Soviet Union and China would 
attempt to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry, which came to a 
head with the 1968 border clashes on the Ussuri river, in 
order to gain Vietnamese sympathy.
Despite what appeared to be a legitimate desire on the part 
of Beijing to come to an arrangement with Hanoi, relations 
eventually deteriorated. Due to a negative historical 
association and what Lawson calls "global strategic 
considerations," an accommodation could not be reached.29
While the Chinese, Cambodians and Vietnamese pursued their 
respective policies, a group of Khmer students in France 
were determined they would change the face of Cambodia.
In 1951, the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was broken 
into three separate national parties, one being the Khmer 
Issarak (Khmer Independence) which was later ordered 
disbanded under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Conference.
Former members of the French Communist Party of Khmer 
origin, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) and Ieng Sary joined by Son 
Sen, clandestinely took up the cause of Khmer communism. 
Within the chauvinistic Khmer Students' Association (KSA), 
Pol Pot and Ieng Sary pushed for a reorganization of the 
communist party breaking free from the Vietnamese control 
under which it had fallen. Members of the 1956 Paris Khmer
28. McLeod, 178.
29. Lawson, 4. For the Sino-US nexus see page 20-21 of 
this chapter.
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Students’ Union (KSU), including Hou Yuon, Thioun Mum and 
Khieu Samphan, supported Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.30
In Cambodia in 1961, Pol Pot became secretary of the newly 
formed secret party, and he and the other revolutionaries 
went underground. During this period the Paris students 
were divided between the hardline, ultranationalist group of 
Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Son Sen, and the moderates of Khieu 
Samphan, Hu Nim, Thioun Mum and Hou Yuon. The hardliners 
wanted to undertake armed struggle against the Sihanouk 
regime whereas the moderates desired to work within the 
ranks of Sihanouk's government.31
Hanoi advised Pol Pot in 1965, to follow the moderate line 
within his party and support Sihanouk's anti-imperialist 
policy. In late 1965 and early 1966, Pol Pot spent five 
months studying in China.32 While there, at the birth of 
the Cultural Revolution, he undoubtedly was injected with a 
revolutionary fervour which helped establish the ideology 
which would drive many of his policies in 1975, which called 
for a raising of the peasantry to power, the re-education of 
intellectuals, and party purges.
30. The above section is taken from Nayan Chanda, Brother 
Enemy: The War after the War (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Publishers, 1986), 57-60; "The Rise and Fall of 
the Khmer Rouge, Part I" in Wilfred Burchett, The China- 
Cambodia-Vietnam Triangle (Chicago: Vanguard Books, 1981); 
and Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic 
Kampuchea (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 31-56.
31. Etcheson, 57 and Chanda, 59-60.
32. Chanda, 62.
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Etcheson claims that the Chinese leadership found it 
difficult to choose between the hardline Pol Potists and the 
moderate Sihanoukists. In the 1960s, Zhou Enlai is said to 
have supported the moderate line, wanting to maintain 
friendly relations with Sihanouk. Zhou's opponents however, 
according to Etcheson, promoted amicable party-to-party 
relations with the Cambodian communists.33
In March-April 1967 in Samlaut, following a peasant 
uprising, Pol Pot founded his revolutionary army and began 
an armed struggle against Sihanouk's government, thereby 
rejecting the Vietnamese advice of 1965.34 While radical 
Chinese may have promoted party-to-party relations with the 
some 2,000 members of the Cambodian Communist Party, it was 
to Sihanouk's military leaders, notably Lon Nol, that arms 
were being delivered.35 On 4 January 1968, the leaders 
received jet fighters, bomber aircraft, cargo and training 
aircraft, artillery, automatic weapons, ammunition and 
explosives.36
But by 1968 Sihanouk renewed overtures to the United States, 
as a means of strengthening his position against the 
Vietnamese revolutionaries. Concerned with China's 
vacillating position, Sihanouk asserted: "The war has been
33. Etcheson, 57.
34. Chanda, 63.
35. The estimate of Khmer Rouge numbers is provided by 
Robert Scalapino in Sheldon W. Simon, War and politics in 
Cambodia: A communications analysis (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1974), 119.
36. Etcheson, 82.
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imposed on us because I have not agreed to become the ally 
or satellite of China, the NLF [National Liberation Front], 
and the DRVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam].”37
Sihanouk was correct in assuming that his authority was 
under s^&ge. While visiting Moscow on 18 March 1970, the 
Prince was deposed as Cambodia’s leader by his right-wing 
dominated National Assembly. Power was placed in the hands 
of Prime Minister and Defence Minister Lon Nol.
The take over by Lon Nol who followed a pro-American line, 
brought about the uneasy association of Vietnam, Sihanouk, 
the Khmer Rouge and China. Such a relationship for the 
Khmer Rouge was fruitful, allowing them to build up their 
forces and test out their options among their new found 
allies.
On 23 March, from Beijing, Sihanouk announced the formation 
of the National United Front for Kampuchea (FUNK). He 
appealed to the Khmer Rouge to join him in resisting Lon 
Nol’s forces. In "A Statement of Support to Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk,” released 26 March, the Khmer Rouge agreed to help 
Sihanouk fight Lon Nol.38 The Khmer Rouge were rewarded by 
having important positions within Sihanouk’s government-in­
exile: Khieu Samphan as Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence, Hu Nim as Minister of Information and Propaganda, 
Hou Yuon as Minister of the Interior, Communal Reforms and 
Cooperatives, and Ieng Sary as executant and chief liaison
37. Armstrong, 207.
38. Etcheson, 130.
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officer with Beijing and Hanoi. Pol Pot controlled the 
army.
The Vietnamese also agreed to support Sihanouk, while at the 
same time making private overtures to the Khmer Rouge. In 
April, in private talks with the Khmer Rouge, Hanoi 
suggested that the two parties establish a mixed military 
command. The Khmer Rouge fearing Vietnamese domination 
declined the offer. Tension would remain high between the 
Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge, with reports of Pol Pot’s 
forces firing on the Viet Cong from behind in skirmishes 
with Lon Nol troops.39
It was not until 5 May 1970, that the Chinese denounced the 
Lon Nol regime and recognized FUNK. Their hesitancy could 
be due to Chinese uncertainty concerning the direction of, 
and success of, Lon Nol’s policies. As well, there may have 
been some doubt as to the abilitiy of FUNK to work as a 
cohesive unit.40
What can be derived from the PRC’s recognition of FUNK is 
China’s possible desire to bring the Khmer Rouge under some 
form of control. With Sihanouk at the helm of FUNK, and due 
to his diplomatic efforts, China could hope that some of the 
radicals within the Khmer Rouge would be tamed.41 As well, 
in line with Chinese support for revolutionary movements,
39. Chanda, 67.
40. Chang, 29.
41. Etcheson asserts that it was Zhou Enlai's influence 
that persuaded Sihanouk to accept the Khmer Rouge into 
positions of power within FUNK. See Etcheson, 175.
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Beijing might want to bring an ideological partner into 
power. Thus the PRC would, without at the same time wishing 
to offend Sihanouk, suggest the entrance of the Khmer Rouge 
into the decision making process with the private intent of 
them eventually taking control of the FUNK leadership.42 
Sihanouk would provide the PRC with the needed diplomatic 
legitimacy whereas the Khmer Rouge supplied military clout 
through guerrilla forces.
China nevertheless continued to maintain that its preference 
would be the establishment of neutral regimes in Indochina. 
At a meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur 
21 November 1971, the ministers issued a declaration calling 
for the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). China supported the declaration, 
especially the neutrality clause, as it would slow any 
penetration into Southeast Asia by Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union.
Beijing's perception of the Soviet threat stemmed in part
from the bitter polemics of the Sino-Soviet rivalry as well
as an increased danger of Soviet armed retaliation,
following the "Brezhnev Doctrine's" justification for
military intervention against Czechoslovakia in 1968. A
visit to Hanoi by Soviet President Podgorny on 3 October
1971, increased Chinese anxiety about the Soviet-Vietnamese
friendship. Vietnam was driven closer to the Soviet Union
42. Sihanouk's presence in FUNK permitted Beijing to send 
supplies directly into Cambodia, by-passing if necessary the 
NLF and DRVN. Such accessibility would facilitate support 
of the Khmer Rouge.
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when in the 1972 Shanghai Communique, China and the United 
States agreed to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia. 
The Vietnamese feared Sino-American collusion as an attempt 
to prevent the realization of their major aim - the 
reunification of Vietnam.
Prior to the Paris Ceasefire Agreement of January 1973, the 
Vietnamese and Americans separately tried to push the Khmer 
Rouge into an accommodation with Lon Nol. Throughout a 
number of meetings in 1972 and finally at the Paris 
Ceasefire meeting, the Khmer Rouge consistently rejected 
such a proposal.43 They, believing that they controlled 90 
per cent of the country, were backed by a China which 
promoted a policy of "no negotiation, no compromise and no 
coalition government."44 At the same time Beijing endorsed 
a declaration, made in February by Khieu Samphan and 
Sihanouk, which reiterated their joint determination to 
overthrow Lon Nol's regime.45 The now anti-Lon Nol stance 
indicates that there was a jockeying for power between 
China's hardline radicals and moderates.
Just previous to the Paris Ceasefire Agreement, China signed 
on 13 January 1973, two agreements with the Sihanouk 
government-in-exile for the supply of economic and military 
assistance. Concurrently there would be a diminution of aid
43. Interestingly, the Soviets apparently encouraged a 
rapprochement between Hanoi and Lon Nol to the exclusion of 
Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. See Lawson, 276.
44. Chang, 34.
45. Ibid.
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to Vietnam. The significance of the agreements was not what 
they provided for Sihanouk, but that the Chinese now clearly 
supported the Khmer Rouge ascension to power. At a 10 
April Hanoi reception, Sihanouk conceded that his position 
was symbolic and that real control of the insurgency 
remained with the Khmer Rouge.46
In April and May 1974, Khieu Samphan was invited to Beijing 
where he was guaranteed a donation of Chinese military aid 
for the Khmer Rouge insurgency. At the same time, the 
Chinese government provided Khieu Samphan with a plane to 
visit other parts of Asia and Africa. Although China’s 
charity was appreciated, Khieu Samphan stressed in a Beijing 
address that the Khmer Rouge were not ’’the slaves or 
satellites of anybody.”47
Six months later Ieng Sary was Zhou Enlai's guest in 
Beijing. Relations between the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese 
entered a period of friendship.48
The fortified assurances to the Khmer Rouge were undoubtedly 
enacting what China had termed its Three Worlds Theory. In 
1974, China deemed the first world that of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the second world comprised Japan,
46. Simon, 59. Simon also notes that from August 1972 
Peking's media linked the Cambodian government in exile with 
Khieu Samphan as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
National Defence rather than with Sihanouk as leader; 
Simon, 97.
47. See Sheldon W. Simon, "The Role of Outsiders in the 
Cambodian Conflict," Orbis XIX, no. 1 (Spring 1975):217.
48. Burchett suggests that while the Khmer Rouge needed 
their association with the Chinese, Pol Pot "secretly 
despised them." See Burchett, 66.
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Europe and Canada, and the third world included the 
developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The 
second and third world would collaborate in opposition to 
the superpowers. China considered itself an integral part 
of the third world in its struggle against Soviet 
hegemony.49 The Three Worlds Theory was the precursor to 
post-Mao pragmatism which would help shape Sino-Khmer Rouge 
cooperation.
Both China and the Khmer Rouge relied on each other. The 
Chinese in order to stop Soviet and Vietnamese expansion in 
Southeast Asia needed to bolster the new rulers of Kampuchea 
as an obstacle to Moscow and Hanoi. The Khmer Rouge had no 
choice but to turn to the Chinese for assistance. Because 
of the Soviet Union’s de facto alliance with Vietnam, and 
the American’s support of Lon Nol, China was the only 
alternative. What must now be determined is whether the 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea came in on the coat-tails 
of China and if so, would it be a dependent country, 
subservient to its larger donor.
49. As Michael Yahuda indicates, the Three Worlds thesis 
was the most significant regression from ideological 
conformity in the pre-1978 period by the Chinese. See 
Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism: Chinese Foreign 
Policy After Mao (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 86. 
As well, for China's shift to realpolitik and the Three 
Worlds Theory see Samuel S. Kim, ’Normative Foreign Policy: 
The Chinese Case" International Interactions 8, no. 1-2 
(1981):62.
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CHAPTER 2: In Power?
17 April 1975, was to be a day Cambodians and the world were 
never to forget. This was the day the Khmer Rouge stormed 
Phnom Penh. In achieving their goal of gaining rule over 
the Khmer people, the Khmer Rouge hoped to purify and 
transform a society which they believed had been polluted by 
external forces. Over the following three years in 
cleansing operations, more than a million Kampuchean 
citizens were to perish at the hands of their leaders in an 
effort to take Kampuchea back to year zero; a time when 
Kampuchea was free from foreign influence.
The newly proclaimed Republic of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) 
was guided by a strong xenophobia and ultranationalism which 
would place it in direct conflict with its neighbours and 
more specifically, Vietnam. Promoting a traditionalist 
perspective of reuniting the Khmer people of Indochina, 
Kampuchea would essentially rely on what Kiernan considers 
to be a Maoist ideology for the attainment of its goals.1 
At first, China and Kampuchea would adhere to a similar 
ideological line and therefore could be seen as natural 
allies. However, as time passed, ideology was replaced by
1. See Ben Kiernan’s statement in Burchett, 58. 
Nationalism can be defined as a patriotic attachment to 
one’s homeland and culture leading to a policy of national 
independence. Franz Schurmann defines ideology as a 
systematic set of ideas used for the attainment of specific 
goals with action related consequences; see Schurmann, 
Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966), 18-25. Nationalism 
can be a driving force within one's ideology. For a 
synthesis of the Khmer Rouge’s declaratory ideology see 
Etcheson, 28-32.
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national interest as the principal factor guiding Sino-Khmer 
relations.
In this chapter covering the 1975-1978 period of the Sino- 
Khmer association we will indicate that although the Sino- 
Khmer amity rested on the bounds of a patron-client 
framework there were differences of opinion between the two 
parties. Neither the Chinese nor the Khmer Rouge leadership 
should be viewed as monolithic. According to Kiernan, 
policy platforms slowly evolved from being ones of strict 
ideological conformity to ones increasingly based on 
national interest and self-preservation.2 The Sino-Khmer 
outlook was transformed as the various political factions of 
the respective partners vied for political authority.
By 1975, the Khmer Rouge consisted principally of two 
factions. One group comprised Pol Pot and his followers 
Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Khieu Samphan. Khieu Samphan, a once 
claimed moderate, had somewhere along the road been co-opted 
by the Pol Potist group. This faction can be seen in the 
mid-1970s as toeing a line similar to that of the leftist 
radicals in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, 
such alliances were not static. As the balance of power 
changed within the CCP, the Pol Potists reassessed their 
friendships. While the Pol Potists were greatly influenced 
by Maoism and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, their 
nationalistic tendencies prevailed with the Khmer Rouge 
desiring their own form of communist society distinct from
2 . Burchett, 58.
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that of the Chinese, Soviets or Vietnamese. Even the 
Chinese mentors were to be looked down upon. Wilfred 
Burchett asserts that "there is evidence that, while fawning 
on Chinese leaders and depending heavily on them for 
material support, Pol Pot secretly despised them."3 The 
Chinese were not held to have successfully attained the 
ideal state of communism.
The second faction of the Khmer Rouge consisted of Hu Nim, 
Hou Yuon and those who, as did the Pol Potists, applied the 
Chinese Cultural Revolutionary model to Kampuchea (of which 
Khieu Samphan was once a member). The difference between Hu 
Nim’s supporters and those of Pol Pot was that Hu Nim and 
Hou Yuon looked more to the Chinese model of communism as a 
base and, according to Burchett, were supported by the right 
wing of the CCP as opposed to the radicals.4
Mao Zedong himself is considered by Nayan Chanda to have 
supported the Pol Potists. On a visit by Pol Pot to Beijing 
on 21 June 1975, Mao praised the Khmer Rouge stating: "You 
have achieved in one stroke what we failed with all our 
masses."5 Later that year Mao advised a visiting Vietnamese
3. Ibid., 66. Etcheson in his Rise and Demise of 
Democratic Kampuchea is sadly mistaken when he suggests that 
the Pol Potists or Stalinists are allied with the right of 
the CCP. While the Pol Pot faction later associated itself 
with Deng Xiaoping, this was done out of power politics type 
motivations rather than ideological conviction.
4. Burchett, 66. Etcheson is again incorrect as he places 
the Hu Nim faction with the left of the CCP. See 
Etcheson, 28-32.
5. Chanda, 16.
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leader to "learn from the Khmer Rouge how to carry out a 
revolution."6
As Chanda indicates, the Gang of Four, the radical group 
tied to Mao, was also supportive of the Pol Potists. The 
favourable relationship between Pol Pot and his followers 
and members of the Gang of Four - Qiang Qing, Zhang 
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen - extended back to 
the days of the Cultural Revolution.7
Although the influence of the Gang of Four predominated up 
to the mid-1970s, there was some evidence of factionalism 
within Chinese ranks. The Chinese government mouthpiece, 
the Xinhua News Agency in July 1975, pitted Ieng Sary, and 
thus Pol Pot, within a pro-Moscow grouping. The Agency, 
states Lawson, wrote that the Vietnamese had "intimidated 
elements friendly to Peking in the Khmer Rouge and bolstered 
the position of the pro-Moscow factions led by Ieng Sary."8 
Doubtful that such a statement would be supported by the 
Gang of Four - one that condemned their long time friend 
Ieng Sary - it may be assumed that a faction unfavourable to 
Pol Pot would have promoted such ideas.
Chanda’s depiction of Chinese internal politics in 1978, 
leads one to believe that Zhou Enlai could have pushed for a 
denunciation of Ieng Sary and his cohorts. Zhou, desiring a
6. Ibid., 17.
7. Ibid., 74-78.
8. Lawson, 308. Unfortunately Lawson does not explain
this allegation.
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more pragmatic policy in the conduct of Sino-Soviet 
relations was probably joined by Deng Xiaoping in 
criticizing the left-wing elements of the Khmer Rouge. Zhou 
believed that Pol Pot and his followers were moving much too 
quickly and possessed too much zeal to be successful 
revolutionaries. In 1975, Zhou warned Khieu Samphan and 
Ieng Thirith not to attempt to achieve communism in one full 
sweep but rather in progressive stages.9 While ideology may 
provide a basis for revolutionary action, the means to the 
implementation of a proposed plan must be done carefully, 
not hastily. But Zhou was to die in 1976, leaving a free 
hand initially to the Gang of Four. Meanwhile, Deng was 
purged while Hua Guofeng was confirmed in the premiership.10
Hua however was not supportive of the Gang of Four; its 
members were subsequently arrested by him on 6 October 1976. 
Although Hua could be seen as a Maoist, Chinese politics 
moved to the right of the political spectrum with the 
rehabilitation of Deng as Vice-Premier. As Burchett 
suggests, the fate and fortunes of the Pol Pot and Hu Him 
groups followed the battleline of Deng's struggle with the 
radicals.11
In Kampuchea, Pol Pot recognized that he would have to
distance himself from the Gang of Four if he were to
9. The Khmer Rouge thought that communism could be
attained without the long and arduous process of going
through various stages.
10. Chanda, 37.
11. Burchett, 77.
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guarantee a continuation of Chinese support. Denouncing the 
"counter revolutionary Gang of Four anti-Party clique" on 22 
October 1976, Pol Pot would capitalize on China's antagonism 
towards the Vietnamese, playing on Chinese sentiments by 
condemning Vietnam.12 Pol Pot executed Hu Nim and his 
associates, decreasing significantly any opposition, and 
alternatives to Pol Pot's extremism, from within the ranks 
of the Khmer Rouge. The Chinese leadership did not approve 
of Pol Pot's radicalism; but it was increasingly obliged to 
go along with his leadership for "national interest" reasons 
i.e. opposition to Vietnam. If Beijing wanted a foothold 
in Kampuchea it would have little choice but to support the 
Pol Pot faction.
Alfred Burchett epitomizes the predicament the Chinese 
leadership was facing with regard to Pol Pot and the Khmer 
Rouge when he writes:
If the Peking leadership had been more secure they 
would surely have done more to avoid such a risky 
course. But in early 1977 the Chinese Politburo 
was deeply divided. Deng was only in the first 
stages of a comeback that threatened more than one 
member of the ruling 'group' and, none was willing 
to risk his position by contradicting Maoist 
policy on an issue such as this. Thus the two 
weak and divided governments of Phnom Penh and 
Peking became locked in their disastrous course. 13
Nevertheless, it was still in China's interest to continue 
backing the Khmer Rouge because of its perception of Vietnam 
as a Soviet proxy. Yet, even though China appeared to
12. Etcheson, 176.
13. Anthony Barnett, "The Chinese Invasion" in Aftermath: 
The struggle of Cambodia and Vietnam eds. John Pilger and 
Anthony Barnett (London: New Statesman, 1982), 22.
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support the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot was suspicious of 
Sihanouk’s influence and thus would try to ensure that 
Beijing would stay loyal to the Khmer Rouge. Relations 
between Prince Sihanouk and the Chinese leadership although 
distant, remained cordial. It was not at all evident that 
Sihanouk would be excluded from any Chinese involvement in 
Kampuchea. Following the Pol Pot takeover, Sihanouk was to 
reside in Beijing, remaining titular head of Democratic 
Kampuchea.
Mao believed that Sihanouk should work in union with the 
Khmer Rouge, as in Mao's view their differences were 
marginal.14 In September 1975, the Khmer Rouge invited 
Sihanouk to return to Phnom Penh. Before Sihanouk left 
Beijing, Mao personally asked that the Khmer Rouge not send 
the Prince and his wife "to the cooperative."15 While not 
sending their Highnesses to the cooperative, upon their 
return to Phnom Penh, it became evident that the differences 
between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge were so "marginal" that 
following Zhou Enlai's death in 1976 and Sihanouk's 
resignation as titular head of the DK on 2 April 1978,
Sihanouk was placed under an undeclared house arrest in
Phnom Penh!16 The Chinese thought the Khmer Rouge were
being exceedingly harsh with the Prince and would have
preferred greater cooperation between the two leaderships.
14. Chanda, 104.
15. Barnett, 22.
16. Chanda, 43.
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The Khmer Rouge were to prove intransigent concerning 
Sihanouk’s freedom of movement and access to the outside 
world. On a visit by Zhou Enlai's widow, Deng Yingchao, to 
Phnom Penh in January 1978, the Khmer Rouge turned down a 
request for this longtime friend to visit Sihanouk. The Pol 
Potists were adamant that they would determine who could 
see Sihanouk.17
However, as Pol Pot's and his follower's international 
standing declined they were persuaded by the Chinese to 
allow Sihanouk increased freedom. He would be used to woo 
the international community into giving the Khmer Rouge 
greater respect and sympathy.18
Chinese relations with the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk 
exemplify an interesting point in small-great power 
relations. When the small power perceives itself as having 
the ability to forge ahead with its policies, it can dismiss 
any minor demands that a greater power may make. However, 
this can only occur when the greater power receives some 
benefit from its friendship with the smaller state. Once 
the smaller power founders in its internal and external 
decision making ability, it is no longer able to disobey 
even the most minor of demands made by its greater associate 
for fear of antagonizing it.
17. Ibid., 210-211, and Chang, Kampuchea Between China and
Vietnam, 59
18. This point shall be expanded upon in Ch. 3.
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Although important to the Chinese for diplomatic reasons, 
Sihanouk, because he did not hold power in Kampuchea, was 
effectively of peripheral interest - a second option so to 
speak. The main focus was on the Khmer Rouge. In August 
1975, the PRC promised the newly declared Democratic 
Kampuchea approximately one billion dollars in aid over a 
five year period. Almost US$20 million was given as an
outright grant, and Chinese technicians were sent into
Kampuchea to assist in post-war reconstruct ion.19 In
addition, Wang Shangrong, Deputy Chief of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) met with DK's Defence Minister Son Sen
on 10 February 1976, at which time they signed an agreement 
on non-refundable aid.20
Chanda asserts that China supplied the Khmer Rouge with aid 
in the hope of transforming the guerrilla army into a 
standing one. While not desiring direct military 
confrontation between the numerically far superior and 
better equipped Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge, China wanted 
to ensure that the Khmer Rouge could stand firm against the 
Vietnamese.21 Vietnam would not be allowed to expand into 
what China saw as its domain. China would, according to Mao, 
Zhu De, and Hua Guofeng, "fight shoulder to shoulder and
19. Chanda, 17. The following section dealing with the 
Sino-Khmer Rouge association is drawn from Chanda, Brother 
Enemy and Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam. Chang 
claims that the loan was of US $150 million not US $1 
billion. See Chang, 44.
20. Chanda, 18. See Appendix 1 for a listing of Chinese 
aid noted under the agreement by General Wang in 1976.
21. Chanda, 18.
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march forward" with the Kampuchean people to ward off 
hegemony and expansionism.22
Although the Khmer Rouge were no doubt appreciative of 
China's support, they maintained that the programme under 
way in Kampuchea was their own and that they alone should 
guide the country's destiny. On the first anniversary of 
the Khmer Rouge victory, on 17 April 1976, Ieng Sary 
pronounced: "A country's defence should be the work of its
own people, and revolution in a country should be completed 
by the people of the country independently."23 Ieng Sary 
was in essence calling for a posture of self-reliance 
whereby a state has full control over, and gains self- 
sufficiency in, the politico-strategic, economic, and 
military spheres. Ironically, the Chinese were to later 
criticize the Khmer Rouge for not being self-reliant enough, 
depending too much on China to come to their assistance.
At a Beijing banquet, given in Ieng Sary's honour on 31 
March 1977, the presence of General Wang indicated that 
military links between the DK and the PRC were firm. At 
the same gathering, Ieng Sary was urged to seek better 
relations with ASEAN.24 Beijing's strategy was to rally 
ASEAN and the DK in a united front against Vietnamese (read 
Soviet) "hegemony" attempts. As well, China perceiving 
increased international disgust with the Khmer Rouge record 
of brutality inside Kampuchea, believed it better that the
2 2 . Ibid.
23. Ibid., 9.
24. Ibid., 90.
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DK government improve its legitimacy by making conciliatory 
gestures to ASEAN rather than remain inward-looking.
In Beijing, at the celebration of the 28th anniversary of 
the PRC’s existence, Pol Pot revealed his position to the 
world. At the celebration, CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng told Pol 
Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders that they ’are not only 
good at destroying the old world but also good at building a 
new one.”25 In turn, Pol Pot praised Mao for leading China 
down the right revolutionary track opposing those that 
wished to betray the cause of Marxism-Leninism.26 In return 
for the Khmer Rouge leader's warm words of praise, on 5 
October, the Chinese signed a protocol with Democratic 
Kampuchea promising more Chinese arms shipments to 
Cambodia.27
In January 1978, following Madame Deng’s, (Zhou's widow,) 
visit to Phnom Penh, in a Radio Phnom Penh broadcast the 
Khmer Rouge asserted that they were fighting principally "by 
relying on their own efforts."28 As well, the radio 
announcement promulgated:
We distinguish between good and bad friends. We 
respect and love friends who are good to us, who 
respect the independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of Cambodia, and who deal
25. Etcheson, 176.
26. K.K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The
Politics of Accommodation (Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra 
Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 30, 1984), 93.
27. Chanda, 220.
28. Ibid., 211.
35
with us on an equal footing. But our friendship 
making criterion is not based on whether this or 
that friend can provide material aid. It is based 
on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and 
mutual benefit, on sentiments of solidarity in 
accordance with the principle of respecting and 
protecting the rights of each country, be it large 
or small to manage its own destiny.... 29
The Khmer Rouge while accepting - as a matter of necessity - 
Chinese material aid, clearly wished to lay claim that 
Democratic Kampuchea was a sovereign, independent state. 
True independence, that of self-reliance also recognizing 
the limitations of one's place in the regional and global 
systems, could not be maintained indefinitely while taking 
with one hand and not giving enough in return with the 
other.30
Subsequent to Madame Deng's visit there was a massive 
increase in Chinese aid to Cambodia. The PRC sent long- 
range 130mm and 150mm artillery pieces, MIG-15 fighters, 
assorted anti-tank weapons, and amphibious vehicles to 
Kampuchea through the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). 
As well, there was an increase in the number of Chinese 
advisers sent to the DK, with an estimated 5-6,000 
consultants in Kampuchea by September 1978. In addition, the 
Chinese were believed to have been training Kampuchean 
pilots to fly MIG-jet fighters.31
29. Ibid.
30. See the discussion in Ch.l, p.3 of this work.
31. Chanda, 212, and Chang, 59 & 70.
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Vietnam
The Sino-Khmer Rouge friendship while having an ideological 
component to it, was basically sustained by antagonism 
towards a common foe - Vietnam.
Both Kampuchea and China were in dispute with Vietnam 
concerning territorial jurisdictions. Kampuchea and Vietnam 
laid claim to a number of islands in the Gulf of Thailand. 
As well, Vietnam and Kampuchea disagreed on the location of 
their respective borders. China and Vietnam also conflicted 
over island claims, specifically over the Paracel and 
Spratley groupings. As Kampuchea did, China disagreed with 
Vietnam as to the delineation of their common border.
Shortly following the Khmer Rouge takeover of 17 April 1975, 
the Vietnamese found the Khmer Rouge asserting their 
independence and laying claim to the Gulf of Thailand 
territories. Invading Phu Quoc and Poulo Panjang islands in 
early May, the Khmer Rouge faced a counter attack, with the 
Vietnamese protecting territories they saw as their own.32
The attack on the islands should not singly be seen as a 
quest for territory which once belonged to Kampuchea. The 
skirmishes must also be recognized as part and parcel of a 
longer term Khmer Rouge scheme to remove all Vietnamese from 
Cambodian territory.
Khmer antagonism towards the Vietnamese was historical. 
Later on, as stated in the 1978 Livre Noir, resentment of
32. Chanda, 12-13.
37
the Vietnamese continued with the Khmer Rouge believing that 
Hanoi sought to prevent the consolidation of power by the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). In a mid-1977 tour to a 
number of Southeast Asian countries, Ieng Sary accused the 
Vietnamese of having ulterior motives concerning Southeast 
Asia and of interfering in Kampuchean internal affairs. 
Ieng Sary's fears were typical, with Cambodians historically 
concerned with being swallowed up by Vietnamese expansion 
unless they resisted any encroachment. The border 
skirmishes and eviction of Vietnamese must therefore take 
into account the prevailing Khmer Rouge suspicions as well 
as land claims themselves.33
In addition to confrontation over island claims, the 
Cambodians and Vietnamese were at odds over border 
demarcation. Throughout the 1975-1978 period, Khmer Rouge 
and Vietnamese troops were to face each other at the 
Vietnamese-Cambodian border many times.
On 4 May 1976, Vietnamese and Cambodian officials met for 
two week talks on the border issue. The Vietnamese, much to 
Khmer Rouge dissatisfaction, adhered to the border as 
delineated in a pre-1954 French map, which gave Cochin China 
to Vietnam and ignored maritime boundaries. To the 
Kampucheans, Hanoi's position was evidence of Vietnam's 
desire to engulf Cambodia. Because of the Khmer-Vietnamese
33. Nair, 92.
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inability to agree on minor matters concerning the border 
issues, a proposed June summit was cancelled.34
From January 1977 onwards, a new series of Kampuchean 
attacks on the Vietnamese border began. The incursions were 
designed to place pressure on the Vietnamese to give up 
territory which Kampuchea laid claim to in the May 1976 
talks.35
In April 1977, the number of Khmer Rouge attacks on
Vietnamese territories augmented. This followed a decision 
by Pol Pot to end any "pretext to normalcy with Vietnam."36 
On 30 April, there were a number of attacks on Vietnamese 
villages and townships in An Giang Province in the Mekong 
Delta.
On 24 September, prior to Pol Pot's October 1977 visit to 
Beijing, the Khmer Rouge moved into Vietnam's Tay Ninh 
Province. Looking at why the Khmer Rouge committed such 
brutality which led to the killing of hundreds of
villagers, Chanda asserts that the Khmer Rouge, on the 
external level, wished to prove their resolve in combatting 
the Vietnamese, indicating to the Chinese the compatabi1ity 
of interests China and Kampuchea had concerning Vietnam.37 
For the Chinese however, Vietnam was seen as an agent of 
Soviet "social imperialism." As well, Hanoi's regional
34. Chanda, 32-33.
35. Pilch, 29.
36. Chanda, 86-87.
37. Ibid., 195.
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ambitions were perceived as a threat to ASEAN, which Beijing 
wished to support against Soviet hegemony. Stephen Heder 
brings out a domestic reason for the events, suggesting 
that the Cambodian Eastern Zone leaders wished to prove 
their loyalty to a highly suspicious Pol Pot.38
The Vietnamese would not sit idly but rather retaliated. In 
October, they pushed their forces as far as 15 miles into 
Cambodian territory. In an even greater show of force in 
mid-December 1977, Hanoi sent 50,000 troops with hundreds of 
armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and air cover into 
Kampuchea. The Vietnamese goal was to remove the Khmer 
Rouge from Vietnamese territory and make them realize that 
Hanoi would not remain passive in the face of Kampuchean 
aggression. Hanoi achieved its goal making significant 
territorial advances; occupying much territory until 
February 1978.39
The Khmer Rouge reacted to the Vietnamese attack by 
condemning them internationally; denouncing them for 
aggression, claiming that they attempted to stage a coup 
d'etat in Kampuchea and, in February 1978, breaking formal 
diplomatic relations with them.
Following their withdrawal from territories gained in the 
December 1978 incursion, the Vietnamese proposed a 
conference with the Khmer Rouge on the border problems, 
mutual withdrawal from the frontier, and an arrangement for
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 203; Chang, 54; and Pilch, 29.
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international guarantees and supervision of the border. The 
Kampucheans declined the offer indicating that there would 
be no negotiations between the two warring parties. The 
Vietnamese proposal put forth to the United Nations was 
unequivocally blocked by the PRC.
China's newly proclaimed opposition to negotiations was a 
major policy change. While initially urging negotiations, 
political reality dictated a more forceful stance on the 
part of the Chinese. Geng Biao, Secretary General of the 
CCP's military commission indicated that,
...the divergence between Vietnam and Cambodia 
could no longer be covered up. Our efforts to 
prevent the contradiction between them from coming 
out into the open since the liberation of Cambodia 
in 1975 finally failed. Therefore, in December, 
the Party Central Committee decided to give 
energetic support to Cambodia, strengthening it so 
that it might cope with the possible new situation 
when negotiations fail to solve the problems.40
The Chinese policy reversal is a significant, pivotal point 
in Sino-Khmer relations in the 1975-1978 period. With the 
severance of diplomatic relations between Democratic 
Kampuchea and Vietnam, the Chinese had realized that the 
Khmer Rouge had excluded any compromise with the Vietnamese. 
Military aid was the only way China could sustain the Khmer 
Rouge and serve Chinese interests against the Vietnamese. 
Obviously the Khmer Rouge knew this and played on it.41
40. Chanda, 202.
41. As well, China's position was altered due to an 
increasing role played by the Soviets, see p.45 and the 
reference made to them by Hua, p. 49 of this work.
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Vietnamese Diplomacy
It was not Vietnamese intransigence that left insoluble the 
Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict. Strong nationalism and what 
Burchett terms as Pol Pot’s megalomania alienated the 
Vietnamese from the Khmer Rouge.42 Ironically, it was 
Vietnam that promoted Khmer nationalism into 1976 so as to 
ensure Cambodian independence from China.43 Hanoi was 
unhappy with the Cambodian communist party's movement away 
from relations with other Indochinese communist parties and 
the desire by Cambodia to develop a foreign policy distinct 
from Vietnam's. Displeased with an assertive, nationalist 
anti-Vietnamese grouping in Cambodia, the Vietnamese 
nevertheless tried to maintain a dialogue with the Khmer 
Rouge.
Chanda asserts that it was not until the fall of 1977 that 
the Vietnamese had become certain of the extent of China's 
aid to the Khmer Rouge.44 Hanoi then became convinced that 
Beijing's support for the Khmer Rouge formed part of a 
policy of "encircling" Vietnam.
Before 1977 however, calling for solidarity among the three 
Indochinese countries and the strengthening of the countries 
"special relationship", Vietnam, in a joint communique 
signed by Laotian and Vietnamese officials on 12 February
42. Burchett, 69.
43. Barnett, "Interview with Le Duc Tho," in eds. Pilger 
and Barnett, 55.
44. Chanda, 199.
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1976, beckoned for long term mutual aid and coordination.45 
But the proposed scheme was couched in language which would 
coyly extend nothing but friendship and brotherliness, with 
Vietnam playing the role of the elder sibling, to the 
Kampucheans. A wary Khmer Rouge discounted the proposition 
as a Vietnamese plot to establish an "Indochina Federation" 
to dominate the smaller Khmer nation.
In July 1976, a number of Vietnamese journalists visited 
Kampuchea at the invitation of the Kampuchean government.46 
Although their stay could not be considered a success, the 
visit indicates, at least, a semblance of civility between 
Hanoi and Phnom Penh.
Neither the Chinese nor the Kampucheans sent an official 
delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party in December 1976, even though invitations 
requesting their attendance had been extended. The 
Kampucheans as a token gesture did send a group of seven 
journalists. At the Congress, the Vietnamese again called 
for the strengthening of cooperation and the defence of the 
three Indochinese states. 47
In February 1977, as Chanda indicates, Vietnam sent a 
delegation of women to Phnom Penh to promote the Vietnamese- 
Khmer amity. As well, from 15-17 February, Vietnamese
45. Ibid., 31.
46. Ibid.# 34.
47. Ibid., 84.; Chang, 47; and Barnett, "The Chinese
Invasion," in eds. Pilger and Barnett, 21.
43
Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Van Loi travelled to Phnom 
Penh to persuade the Khmer Rouge to participate in a meeting 
of the Indochinese states - tantamount to what the Khmer 
Rouge considered to be an Indochina Federation. To coax the 
Khmer Rouge into the talks, Loi offered Vietnamese 
assistance in the repatriation of Khmers who had fled 
Kampuchea in the previous few months. February proved a 
chilling month as both offers were rejected.48
Even though it became quite obvious, following Pol Pot’s 
October visit to Beijing, that the PRC was increasing 
assistance to the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese never gave up 
hope of luring Kampuchea away from China. While Pol Pot was 
still in Beijing, Vietnamese top negotiator Phan Hien asked 
China to set up a meeting between the Khmer Rouge and 
Vietnamese officials. The request can be interpreted in two 
ways. First, Vietnam may still have hoped for some form of 
accommodation between itself and Cambodia. Second, 
according to Chanda, Vietnam was ascertaining what amount of 
power China could wield over the Khmer Rouge. The 
Vietnamese were disappointed to find that the Chinese were 
able to organize the meeting, convincing the Khmer Rouge to 
meet with Hanoi officials.49
Although Vietnam made conciliatory overtures towards the 
Kampucheans, the Khmer Rouge relentlessly continued an 
internal purge of Khmer Rouge, especially in the Eastern
48. Chanda, 85.
49. Ibid.. 199.
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Zone, who were suspected of sympathizing with Vietnam. On 
17 April 1977, the date of the second anniversary of the 
Khmer Rouge takeover, Ieng Sary admitted to anti-Vietnamese
purges in Cambodia, despite elements of the Cambodian
Eastern Zone vowing that there could not be a political
solution so long as the Vietnamese were in Kampuchea.50
Although unadmitted, by July 1977, the Khmer Rouge had
gained Chinese support for their purges. In a confidential 
report, Huang Hua justified the Khmer Rouge purges because 
they "purified its army and fortified its fighting 
ability."51
Believing that Pol Pot’s hostility to Vietnam could no
longer be tolerated, and that the Chinese-Kampuchean
alliance posed a threat to Vietnam's security, on 25
December 1978, in a dry season offensive which would place
in power a regime sympathetic to Vietnam, the Vietnamese
attacked Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge could not have done more
to provoke Hanoi. As John Pilger put it:
Pol Pot increased his attacks on the ricelands [of 
Vietnam] to a level of almost daily atrocities in 
Vietnamese border villages; and finally the
Vietnamese, who had offered the Khmer Rouge a 
demilitarized border with international
inspection, had little choice but to 'invade’ Pol
50. Even though in May 1978 the Eastern Zone leaders 
affirmed the need to eradicate Vietnamese elements from 
within their ranks, many of the leaders were themselves 
executed, being considered traitors. This is only one 
indication of the unpredictability and volatility of Khmer 
Rouge politics. See Chanda, 248-251.
51. Ibid., 91-101.
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Pot’s charnel house...,in so doing, [putting] an 
end to the genocide of the Khmer people.52
John Spragens Jr. finds three reasons for the Vietnamese 
invasion of Democratic Kampuchea. First, he suggests that 
Vietnam faced domestic considerations. The constant barrage 
of Cambodian attacks on the Vietnamese border, more frequent 
after the December 1977 Khmer Rouge invasion, intimidated 
those Vietnamese who resided in the New Economic Zones 
(NEZs) which were consequently crippled. Thus in order to 
maintain the population's support Vietnam had to act.
Second, Vietnam feared, because of deteriorating relations 
with China, a two-front war with both the PRC and the DK. 
By removing one front it would be easier for Vietnam to 
engage China should it attack.53
Third, there could have been a humanitarian factor to the 
invasion. Both Vietnamese and Khmers were being slaughtered 
by the Khmer Rouge. The only way of stopping the executions 
would be by removing the Khmer Rouge from power.
A fourth factor behind the Vietnamese invasion might have 
been Soviet encouragement. Wishing to gain influence in 
Indochina, the Soviets would advocate a pro-Vietnamese 
regime in Cambodia. Such a regime could help counter the 
Soviet Union's socialist foe, China. The Chinese certainly
52. Pilger, "Only the allies are new," in eds. Pilger and 
Barnett, 93.
53. See Etcheson, 193-194. I have reversed the order of 
Spragen's latter two points believing that the humanitarian 
factor was much less important for Vietnam than the power 
politics reasoning concerning the threat posed by China.
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emphasized the Soviet factor. In fact, the Soviet- 
Vietnamese friendship treaty of November 1978, gave the 
Vietnamese assurances of Soviet support which were needed if 
Vietnam were to launch its attack on Kampuchea.
If Cambodia were simply a proxy of China then there really 
only need be one factor fuelling Cambodian aggression 
Chinese economic and military backing. However, as Etcheson 
indicates, Cambodian hostility in the mid-1970s, in addition 
to Chinese stewardship, was due to: first, leadership
pathology, characterized by ’’malignant paranoic
schizophrenia”; second, the Khmer Rouge xenophobic
nationalism and the Khmer Rouge desire to consolidate and 
maintain party control independent of the Vietnamese party 
apparatus; and third, fear of Vietnamese intentions and 
power.54
To underline that Cambodia was not a mere proxy of China we 
must look at the divergence of views between the Khmer and 
Chinese concerning the Vietnamese.
The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship
Anthony Barnett aptly indicates the predicament both Vietnam 
and China were in, and the role Kampuchea and Vietnam were 
to play, when he states:
The conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia was 
never a 'proxy war’ between the USSR and China as 
Brzezinski has claimed. On the contrary, the 
determining conflict was between Vietnam and 
China, with all other conflicts organized around
54. Ibid 187.
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that focal point. Neither Peking nor Hanoi 
however wanted open antagonism: both feared it 
would have incalculable consequences (as indeed 
they are now beginning to discover). It was 
against their better judgement that developments 
in Cambodia, which were of secondary importance to 
each of them, detonated a major confrontation 
between the two countries.55
In this next section we will briefly look at the Sino- 
Vietnamese relationship. Both China and Vietnam mutually 
attempted to maintain cordial relations even in the face of 
the Kampuchean imbroglio. Unfortunately, stemming from 
Khmer Rouge provocations, the conflict's scope broadened, 
forcing China and Vietnam to harden their positions.
As had Kampuchea, China disputed its border and the 
sovereignty of a number of islands with Vietnam. In the 
continuing saga over the Paracel and Spratley islands, in 
January 1974, China took over the Paracels. In turn, on 11 
April 1976, Vietnam proclaimed that it had "liberated" six 
islands of the Spratley archipelago from the Chinese. On 
the Sino-Vietnamese border itself, the number of border 
incidents increased from an estimated 100 in 1974, to 
approximately 1100 in 1978.56
China and Vietnam, respectively, believed that the other 
opponent was intent on expansion of its territory. The 
Vietnamese asserted that the Chinese wished to gain favour 
in, if not access to, what it called its Nanyang. China
55. Barnett, "The Chinese Invasion," 22.
56. Gary Klintworth, "China's Indochina Policy," paper 
presented to the joint seminar of International Relations 
and Northeast Asia Programme (Canberra: RSPacS, The 
Australian National University, 13 April 1989), 6.
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voiced its concern over the perceived Vietnamese desire to 
form an Indochina Federation. Nevertheless, although fear 
and antagonism existed between the two neighbours, neither 
desired an intensified Kampuchean conflict which would 
prejudice its respective interests or allow, in the case of 
China's trepidation, Soviet involvement, or of concern to 
Vietnam, Chinese regional preponderance.
On 25 September 1975, Vietnamese Communist Party Secretary 
Le Duan and top Vietnamese planner Le Thanh, travelled to 
Beijing on an aid seeking trip. While the visit was made at 
a time when Vietnamese leaders still wished to maintain 
their wartime cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, the mission 
was only partially successful with Hanoi receiving a meager 
interest-free loan to finance Vietnamese imports of oil and 
consumer goods.57 The assistance could hardly be considered 
generous from a fellow socialist brother. Nevertheless, 
although Sino-Vietnamese relations were to increasingly 
deteriorate, there was no desire to induce a final schism 
between the two nations.
1976 proved to be a year of scarce contact between Vietnam 
and China. While the Soviet Union extended its hand to 
Vietnam, a wary Hanoi purposely established political 
distance between itself and Moscow so as not to antagonize 
China and other Southeast Asian nations.58 Internal 
political turmoil, as various factions vied for power in
57. Chanda, 25-28.
58. Sheldon Simon, The Asean States and Regional Security 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 50.
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China with the passing of Mao Zedong and Zhao Ziyang, 
prevented China from making any major initiatives in 1976.
In talks held by Chinese President Li Xian and Vietnamese 
Premier Pham Van Dong on 10 January 1977, China listed seven 
major areas of dispute between itself and Vietnam. They 
were:
1) Vietnamese slanderous comments against China;
2) land boundary differences;
3) maintenance of their common railroad;
4) claims for the Spratley and Paracel islands;
5) Beibu Gulf Sea claims;
6) poor treatment of overseas Chinese (Hoa) by 
the Vietnamese;
7) economic aid to Vietnam.59
Conspicuously absent was any reference to Sino-Vietnamese 
relations with the Khmer Rouge.
The Chinese through to 1977, did not forthrightly commit 
themselves to assisting the Khmer Rouge. Rather, they wooed 
the Vietnamese, alerting them of the Soviet presence, hoping 
that Vietnam would side with China. However by July 1977, 
Huang Hua in Beijing's strongest statement to Vietnam, 
warned that China supports,
...the stand of Kampuchea and her people against 
Soviet revisionist social imperialism and will not 
watch indifferently any intervention in Kampuchean 
sovereignty or coveting of Kampuchean territory by 
social imperialism...[and would] support Kampuchea 
and her people in their struggle and in their 
actions to protect Kampuchea's territorial
59. R.R. Subramanian, "China as a threat to Southeast Asian 
Security," in The Troubled Region: Issues of Peace and 
Development in Southeast Asia ed. Parimal Kumar Das, (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987), 201.
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integrity and national sovereignty by giving all 
possible assistance.60
No doubt the latter statement was made for Soviet benefit as 
much as for the Vietnamese.
With increasing Kampuchean and Vietnamese offensives and 
counter-offensives in 1977, Le Duan and a Vietnamese 
delegation still not totally certain as to China’s position, 
travelled to Beijing on 20 November 1977, in the hope of 
avoiding a final split.61 However, following the meeting 
China, with seeming regret, confessed that the split between 
itself and Vietnam could no longer be hidden.
The December 1977 Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea 
sparked only minor reaction by China. Xinhua News Agency 
reported the Khmer Rouge allegations as well as the 
Vietnamese counter-charges. In January 1978, China as 
usual, signed its annual agreement on the supply of goods 
and payments with Vietnam. As Chanda asserts, Beijing could 
have delayed the signing of the agreement if the Chinese 
wished to show their displeasure of Vietnamese actions.61 
Nevertheless in a statement made to visiting French Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre, the Chinese affirmed their belief 
that Cambodia had "fallen victim to aggression by 
Vietnam."62
60. Chang, 50; and Lawson, 313.
61. Chanda, 209.
62. Chang, 59.
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Chanda asserts that the Khmer Rouge December 1977 decision 
to suspend ties with the Vietnamese, following the latter's 
successful military campaign, had been planned to pressure 
China into greater action. The Khmer Rouge believed that 
China needed to be prodded into speeding up the granting of 
China's aid promises. As well, Deng who had once been 
branded a counter-revolutionary, had to be brought on-side. 
He had to be persuaded that Chinese involvement was 
necessary because the conflict could not be resolved through 
negotiation.63
It would appear however, that Cambodian pressure was not 
enough in and of itself. The small power could not push the 
greater into action. It would prove to be Vietnamese 
policies and the belief that the Soviet Union was behind 
them, that spurred China into siding, more than ever, with 
the DK.
Whereas prior to 1977 one can say that Vietnam did much to 
avoid conflict with China, the same cannot be said about 
Vietnamese actions in 1978. Soviet-Vietnamese relations 
were part of the catalyst which helped ignite Sino- 
Vietnamese relations into a burning problem for both the PRC 
and Vietnam. In February and March, there were high level 
contacts between military leaders of the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam. In June, Vietnam unilaterally withdrew from Sino- 
Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Ministerial talks on territorial 
disputes.
63. Chanda, 209.
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Although the Chinese statement at the Sino-Vietnamese 
meeting of January 1977 made no reference to Kampuchea, on 
17 June 1977, the Vietnamese lashed out at the Chinese 
stating that Beijing had:
...ceaselessly given all-round support to the 
Kampuchean authorities in launching their border 
war of aggression against the Vietnamese 
people...and in carrying out an anti-Vietnamese 
policy aimed at... sabotaging the tradition of 
solidarity and friendship between Vietnam and 
Kampuchea.64
Hanoi accused Pol Pot and his followers of colluding with 
China in destroying the cooperative relationship between the 
three Indochinese parties. China rebuked Hanoi and linked 
the Vietnam-Kampuchean border conflict to: the Sino- 
Vietnamese territorial dispute, the malign treatment of 
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and other anti-Chinese 
provocations.65
Vietnam's ties with the Soviet Union were strengthened when 
the Vietnamese joined the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) on 30 June 1977. China was quick to 
claim that Vietnam had become a puppet of the Soviet Union. 
On 2 July the Beijing Review charged:
The Soviet superpower with its own hegemonist aims 
provides cover and support for the Vietnamese 
authorities' regional hegemonism, while the 
Vietnamese authorities serve as a junior partner 
for the Soviet Union.66
64. Chang, 63
65. Ibid., 64
66. Ibid., 65
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The Vietnamese, while not an appendage of the Soviet Union, 
certainly did come to rely on Soviet aid. With an 
increasing number of skirmishes on the Sino-Vietnamese 
border, by the end of August the Soviets were massively 
airlifting military hardware to Hanoi, providing offensive 
missiles to be used against China. By mid-September some 
4000 Soviet personnel were in Vietnam and in mid-October 
Hanoi had been supplied with the most advanced MIG-23 jet 
fighters.67
It is true, as Chang Pao-min pronounces, that if Vietnam had 
not been supported by the Soviet Union, Hanoi would have 
been more cautious in its dealings with China and perhaps 
Kampuchea.68 Vietnam however, as did Kampuchea, had a mind 
of its own and chose the route to be followed by calculation 
and assessment of its options. With hostility between China 
and Vietnam, the latter was obliged to ally itself with the 
Soviet Union. While there is no doubt the Soviets coaxed 
the Vietnamese, Vietnam was most certainly not railroaded 
into the Vietnamese-Soviet friendship.
On 3 November 1978, the Vietnamese-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship was signed; the relationship was solidified. 
With the promotion in December of two pro-Soviet military 
men, Vietnamese Defence Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Army 
Chief of Staff Von Tien Dung to Prime Minister and Minister
67. Ibid., 68-69; and Chanda, 258.
68 . Chang, 66.
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of Defence respectively, Soviet influence in Vietnamese 
politics was to be felt for quite some time.69
China perceived the Soviet Union as inducing Vietnam’s 
internal policies. Ill-treatment by Hanoi of the Hoa, 
Vietnamese of Chinese origin, was seen as a part of the 
larger Soviet plot of encirclement. While harassment of the 
Hoa was not uncommon the Vietnamese move against Cholon, the 
business center of Ho Chih Min City, on 24 March 1977, was 
of an unprecedented scale. Following pro-Mao demonstrations 
on 20 March, the Vietnamese arrested many of the Vietnamese 
Chinese in Cholon and seized their property.70 A decree 
ordering 30,000 Hoa private businessmen to cease operations 
led to the fleeing of some 70,000 Chinese from Vietnam.71
China reacted to the Vietnamese internal actions by 
decreasing contact between Hanoi and Beijing to a minimum. 
On 12 May and 30 May 1977, China cancelled a number of aid 
projects to Vietnam. On 16 June, all three Vietnamese 
consulates in China were closed. On 3 July, any additional 
aid programmes were cancelled and all Chinese technicians 
were withdrawn. Total aid withdrawal amounted to some US
69. Simon, The Asean States, 51.
70. For an overview of China's overseas Chinese policy and 
the implications of it for its relations with Vietnam, see 
Chanda, ch. 8, "The road to war," 231-247.
71. See respectively, Bilveer Singh, "The Development of 
Moscow-Hanoi Relations Since the Vietnam War: The View from 
Singapore." Canberra: SDSC Working Paper 54, (June 1982), 
21; and Chang, 60.
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$900 million. Finally, on 11 July, the Sino-Vietnamese 
border was closed.72
Not only were diplomatic sanctions imposed but as well, at a 
July Politburo weekly meeting, the Chinese decided that 
Vietnam should be dealt with forcefully, exerting physical 
pain on them, with Vietnam to be "taught a lesson."73
Perhaps justifiably reacting strongly to Vietnam's anti- 
Chinese actions in early 1978, the Chinese wrongly rejected 
earlier motions by Vietnam for a closer relationship. 
Cutting off all aid to the Vietnamese, the Chinese 
inevitably drove the Vietnamese to the Soviets. With a 
closer Sino-American arrangement in 1978, encouraged for 
example by the Carter administration's agreement to export 
military-related technology to China, Beijing dashed any 
hopes of reconciling its differences with the Soviet 
Union.74 The Soviet Union became the main instigator of 
conflict in China's eyes and consequentially Vietnam 
suffered.
Although China was no longer treating Vietnam with kid 
gloves this did not preclude that the Khmer Rouge were to 
receive unequivocal support. On the contrary, because China 
now took a greater interest in the Vietnamese-Kampuchean
72. Chang, 61; and Nair, 109.
73. Chanda, 261.
74. James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, China in the Global 
Community (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 222.
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debacle, the Chinese felt freer to speak their mind and even 
criticize the Khmer Rouge.
In 1978, China had agreed to send the Khmer Rouge more 
supplies; however the Chinese would not send advisers as 
Beijing had promoted the view that each country must conduct 
and wage its own battles.75 During a Beijing visit by Son 
Sen at the end of July 1978, Deng heavily criticized the 
Khmer Rouge, reinforcing the view that the Khmer Rouge must 
become self-reliant, not constantly looking to China for 
help, and form a united front of those who oppose Vietnam. 
China urged the Pol Potists to work with Sihanouk, to 
reinstate him as Head of Government and to improve 
Kampuchea's international reputation.76 In August, China 
warned the Khmer Rouge that should Phnom Penh become engaged 
in a full-scale military operation against Hanoi, the PRC 
would be unable to help mi1itarily.77
Regardless of declaratory policy when it came to actual 
policy China did in fact provide great assistance to the 
Khmer Rouge in the latter part of 1978. As well as the 
twice weekly flights from China across Laos, Beijing 
provided an additional five Boeing 707s which flew between 
Canton and Phnom Penh. By the end of 1978 an estimated
75. Chanda, 260.
76. Ibid., 261. In 1976, returning from a visit to 
Kampuchea, PRC Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign 
Countries Fang Yi told the Romanian ambassador in Beijing 
that the Khmer Rouge "have gone too far in promoting self- 
reliance," probably meaning they were too inward-looking. 
See Chanda, 79.
77. Chang, 73.
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5,000 Chinese personnel were in Kampuchea.78 Although Deng, 
in a November meeting with Thailand’s Prime Minister,
stressed his dislike of the Khmer Rouge, he stated that
China could not allow such a strategically important area
fall to Vietnam.79
It appears that following China's advice in the fall of
1978, the Khmer Rouge began "opening" to the world. The
Khmer Rouge invited many international delegations and
officials to visit Kampuchea. Ieng Sary on a visit 
throughout Southeast Asia called for closer ties with 
Thailand and Malaysia, desiring the formation of a united 
front to combat Vietnamese hegemony.80 Pol Pot reportedly 
stated in a Xinhua News Agency interview on 11 December 
1978, that rather than attempt to overthrow Vietnam in one- 
blow, recognizing their constraints the Khmer Rouge were 
prepared, if necessary, to engage in protracted war, as the 
Chinese model promoted.81
Nair claims that Kampuchea was a pawn in the politics 
between Hanoi and Beijing.82 Singapore's Foreign Minister 
S. Rajaratnam went one step further and claimed that Vietnam 
and Kampuchea were proxies of their client states, the
00r** Chanda, 262
79. Chanda, 325
00 o Ibid., 331.
81. Ibid. , 344 .
82. Nair, 105.
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Soviet Union and China respectively.83 Both Nair and 
Rajaratnam are incorrect in their assertions. If we look at 
our continuum Kampuchea would more accurately have played 
the buffer state for the 1975-78 period. The DK clearly 
stated and exercised its independence often to the PRC's 
chagrin. Maintaining a belligerent posture was something 
the Kampucheans deemed necessary whereas the Chinese saw it 
as a potentially explosive stance. Of course, it must be 
remembered that Kampuchea could play the buffer insofar as 
the regional balance was not disrupted. Thus in 1978 when 
Vietnam decided to side with the Soviet Union, Kampuchea was 
required to slide into the Chinese camp bringing the 
regional balance back into a state of equilibrium.
It is at this latter stage that one can begin speaking of a 
patron-client relationship developing. With no ally 
available and the augmenting bargaining power of China, the 
DK became increasingly dependent on China. However, Beijing 
also relied on the Khmer Rouge to assist China promote its 
own regional strategy.
Thailand
Evaluating relations between China, Thailand, and Kampuchea, 
will help illuminate the transition of the DK moving from 
their stance as a buffer, to falling into the precarious, 
yet reassuring position of becoming a client for a much 
greater patron.
83. Nair, 97. Rajaratnam feared that if the Vietnamese- 
Kampuchean conflict was a proxy war such a conflict could be 
initiated anywhere else in Southeast Asia
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In the hope of severing links between Beijing and the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), an internal threat to 
Thailand which the Chinese assisted, Bangkok established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC on 1 July 1975.
The Khmer Rouge also supported the CPT. They did so to
uphold a fellow communist movement with the desire to
prevent Vietnamese influence over it. And, China encouraged 
the Khmer Rouge to support the CPT, curbing Vietnamese 
hegemony and pressuring Bangkok to join Beijing in 
combatting Vietnamese expansionism.
Friction in Khmer Rouge-Thai relations is not only 
accredited to the Khmer Rouge relationship with the CPT, but 
to other factors as well. Due to charges of smuggling 
activity, Thailand and Kampuchea engaged in a number of 
border clashes, with the DK asserting land claims over areas 
where smuggling occured. Although negotiations between 
Khmer and Thai leaders over the antagonisms were held, they 
came to a halt with the October 1976 military coup followed 
by the appointment of Thanin as Thailand's Premier. With 
Thanin in power the Khmer Rouge believed that the Thai might 
aid anti-communist rebels opposing DK forces.
Beijing's influence was paramount in ameliorating relations 
between Kampuchea and Thailand. However, the success of 
Beijing's influence depended upon the policies and aims of 
the Thai leadership at any given time.
China was able to persuade Thanin to consider a Thai- 
Kampuchean rapprochement. Nevertheless, Thanin also sought
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to entertain friendly relations with Vietnam, endeavouring 
to de-escalate border clashes with Vietnam, end a blockade 
of trade with Laos, and open embassies in Phnom Penh and 
Hanoi.84
On 20 October 1977, General Kriangsak Chomanan took over 
control of Thailand following a successful coup against 
Thanin. Kriangsak proved to be less willing to accept the 
Chinese position. He found it difficult to believe that 
Vietnam was as intent on expansion as Beijing had painted it 
to be.85 On 2 December 1977, an agreement was signed to 
normalize relations between Hanoi and Bangkok.
On a 3 January visit by Thai officials to Phnom Penh, DK 
Deputy Premier and Foreign Secretary Ieng Sary warned that 
Kampuchean and Thai security were inextricably linked. If 
Kampuchea did "not enjoy peace and security...other 
countries in Southeast Asia [would] also not enjoy peace and 
security.M86 Ieng Sary’s statement was absolutely correct; 
after the opening of conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, 
Thailand was to find Vietnam violating Thai air-space and 
shelling refugee camps within the Thai border.87
84. Hair, 83-84.
85. Ibid., 88-89.
86. Tim Huxley, Asean and Indochina: A Study of Political
Responses,____1975-81 (Canberra: The Department of
International Relations, RSPacS, The Australian National 
University, Canberra Studies in World Affairs 19, 1985), 39.
87. Nair, 95.
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Thailand increasingly perceived the Vietnamese conflict with 
Kampuchea as, first, part of a Soviet-Vietnamese expanionist 
plan. And second, as fuelled at least in part by what were 
considered to be hostile Vietnamese-Khmer historical 
relations. By late 1978, stemming from Soviet overtures to 
Vietnam, Thailand determined that the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam were a greater threat to its security than 
Thailand's longtime foe, China, and the PRC's friend, 
Kampuchea.88
Thailand both willingly and because of Chinese pressure 
began to permit PRC arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge 
through Thai ports of entry. Thailand appreciated that with 
Vietnam siding with the Soviet Union, the regional balance 
had to be stabilized meaning a closer Sino-Thai friendship; 
hence a less antagonistic Thai-Khmer Rouge association.
With the formation on 2 December 1978, of the Vietnamese 
backed Kampuchean National United Front for National 
Salvation (KNUFNS), and the subsequent Vietnamese attack on 
Kampuchea of 25 December 1978, the political lines of 
allegiance had been drawn. While in the 1975-77 period the 
Khmer Rouge were relatively independent and aggressive, by 
1978 political circumstance and Chinese influence encouraged 
a less erratic posture by them. Recognizing the need for 
legitimacy, the DK government sought closer ties with the 
outside world.
88. Ibid., 113.
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The Thai-Khmer Rouge amity not only indicates the importance 
and relevance of the balance of power concept in modern 
history, but also the power that a larger state such as 
China can wield over an increasingly weak and isolated state 
such as Kampuchea for its own end. The new Sino-Thai- 
Kampuchean amity would lead the Khmer Rouge into a 
dependency relationship whereby they would rely on both a 
contiguous and non-contiguous power.
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CHAPTER 3: The Intricacies of Puppetry
Following the successful invasion by the Vietnamese of 
Democratic Kampuchea, and the establishment of the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea, the Chinese government would be 
confronted with supporting the Khmer Rouge as a military 
opposition force rather than as a governing body.l
In this chapter we will look at the evolving relationship 
between the PRC and the Khmer Rouge in the 1979 to 1982 
period. We will see how China, along with a majority of the 
international community, stood behind the ruthless Khmer 
Rouge in the formation of the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), as opposed to recognizing the 
Vietnamese installed PRK regime. China increasingly became 
the key to the Khmer Rouge's survival, able to influence 
this strongly nationalistic group more than ever, and by 
doing so implicate itself in an alignment of forces that 
would, at a later time, cast suspicion and doubt on the PRC. 
We shall observe how the Khmer Rouge and the Kampuchean 
conflict increasingly became only a part of regional power 
rivalry in the game of power politics.
On 7 January 1979, the Vietnamese installed an eight member
Revolutionary Council in Kampuchea under the leadership of
Heng Samrin as President and Pen Sovan as Premier. China
1. The CGDK will be deemed a ''government in exile" rather 
than the actual government. Although the PRK has yet to be 
recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate governing 
power in Kampuchea, we will assume that it is, with the help 
of the Vietnamese, the principal policy maker and law 
enforcer there.
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had been humiliated by a tributary power. While diplomats 
hurriedly fled from Cambodia across the Thai border, the 
Khmer Rouge were chided by their Chinese helpers.
At a 13 January 1979 meeting, Deng scolded Ieng Sary and the 
Khmer Rouge for "being too excessive". As soon as the 
Chinese perceived the effect of a Vietnamese fait accompli 
in Kampuchea they began urging the creation of a united 
front with Sihanouk. Beijing would help the Khmer Rouge if 
they would agree to a coalition whereby Sihanouk would be 
Head of State, with Pol Pot as Minister of National Defence 
and Supreme Commander. Deng warned Sary not to "put the 
Communist party in the foreground; rather [to] emphasize 
patriotism, nationalism and democracy."2 Clearly Deng hoped 
that there would be a resurgence of ancient Khmer antagonism 
against the Vietnamese. The making of Chinese foreign 
policy would concentrate on power politics and the Chinese 
national interest as opposed to any ideological conviction.
An alignment of forces was to come about that would pit 
China and her followers against Vietnam and her allies. In 
Utapao on 14 January 1979, senior Chinese policy makers met 
with Thai Premier Kriangsak. The beginning of a de facto 
alliance which would last for the next decade was at hand. 
Thailand tacitly agreed, at China's request, to participate 
within a strategic triangle which would link Thailand with 
the PRC and Khmer Rouge forces. Cambodian personnel were 
provided by the Thai government with transport and transit
2 . Nayan Chanda, 348.
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facilities, and Thai territory was used to supply the Khmer 
Rouge. In addition, Khmer Rouge leaders were allowed to use 
Thailand as a stepping stone for foreign excursions.3
Increasingly, it became evident that the Chinese would not 
be content simply trying to tame the Khmer Rouge by bringing 
them into a united front, or by helping them through the 
Thai connection. Here was a golden opportunity to teach 
their long-time subject, Vietnam, a lesson. In Beijing on 8 
January 1979 a high ranking official of the People's 
Institute of Foreign Affairs, emphatically stated:
The Vietnamese are crazy. They believe 
they have defeated the French and 
Americans and now the Kampucheans, and 
now they think they can defeat China.
They must be taught a lesson. There 
will be a war.4
Deng, while speaking to the U.S. Senate in Washington on 29 
January 1979, submitted that "We cannot allow Vietnam to run 
wild everywhere.... We may be forced to do what we do not 
like to do.... Vietnam must be taught some necessary 
lessons."5 Deng continued along the same lines when he 
asserted during a 7 February state visit to Tokyo: "Vietnam 
must be punished severely, if we remain inactive the 
military action (in Kampuchea) might spread to ASEAN."6 
Linking of the Chinese campaign to ASEAN security was a way 
3~. Ibid., 348-49 .
4. Chang, 86.
5. Ibid.
6 . Pilch, 35.
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of legitimizing China's actions and placing its policies 
next to ASEAN's in the formulation of a united front against 
Vietnam and its backer, the Soviet Union.
The Chinese followed up on their warnings. By the end of 
January some seventeen regular divisions, or approximately 
225,000 men had been massed against the Sino-Vietnamese 
frontier. As well, over seven hundred fighter aircraft and 
bombers had been brought closer to the border.7
With many of the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh on a state visit, 
the 16 day lesson began 17 February, with the Chinese 
attacking the Vietnamese all along their mutual frontier. 
The same day of the attack the new Cambodian leadership 
signed a 25 year ''Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam." While teaching Vietnam a 
lesson, Deng condemned the meddling of Vietnam in the 
affairs of the Indochinese states. On 26 February, he 
stated that "China could not tolerate the Cuba of the Orient 
[i.e. Vietnam] to go swashbuckling in Laos, Kampuchea or 
even on the Chinese border. "8
Was China acting out of concern for the ASEAN and 
Indochinese states when attacking Vietnam? Certainly it was 
important for China to gain influence in Southeast Asia for 
strategic, political and economic reasons. Therefore, if 
China's interests coincided with those of ASEAN and the 
Southeast Asian states, it would be in China's best interest
7. Chanda, 350.
8. Chang, 87.
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to promote the policies of those countries. However, there 
was much more to the border conflict. The Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia provided the Chinese with the 
opportunity to punish one of China's many children in the 
protection of another. Perhaps reminiscent of a period 
where China made its claim as the Middle Kingdom, it had to 
maintain, according to traditional values, control over the 
happenings and developments around its periphery. Had 
Beijing not reacted to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 
the PRC would have lost its credibility as a great power in 
the eyes of the world.
Domestically, as Copper indicates, the Chinese believed that 
if they had not reacted to Vietnamese border encroachments 
and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese 
leadership may have been seen as weak by its own people, 
inviting internal disorder.9 Moreover, harassment by the 
Vietnamese forced the Chinese to allocate resources to the 
Sino-Vietnamese border thereby impeding the implementation 
of China's 1978 "Four Modernizations" programme.10
Of course one cannot ignore China's obsession with the idea 
of encirclement. Vietnamese aggression was seen as a piece 
in a larger puzzle wherein the Soviet Union was attempting 
to encircle China, curbing any further development of a
9. John F. Copper, "China and Southeast Asia," in 
Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis, ed. 
Donald E. Weatherbee (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 48.
10. Takashi Tajima, "China and Southeast Asia: Strategic 
Interests and Policy Prospects." Adelphi Papers, 172. 
(London: IISS, Winter 1981), 14.
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China which could challenge Soviet regional and global 
influence.11
Last but not least and central to the thesis of this work, 
was the Chinese need to defend a smaller power, namely 
Cambodia, from a regional baron, Vietnam. Although as 
already mentioned, having scolded the Khmer Rouge for past 
transgressions, Cambodian security was still fundamental to 
China's interests in Southeast Asia. As Sheldon Simon 
appropriately states:
... the distinction between domestic and 
foreign affairs blurs in great power 
policies toward the third because the 
former views the latter's domestic 
political systems as important 
components of great power security...12
The attack on Cambodia by the Vietnamese could not, 
therefore, be ignored. Deng himself admitted that part of 
the purpose for the Chinese attack on Vietnam was to pull
11. However as Devendra Kareshik suggests, Soviet 
involvement in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict was 
minimal. A 15-ship contingent of the Soviet Pacific Fleet 
had been sent to the Vietnamese coast to intercept Chinese 
operational plans and communicate them to the Vietnamese - 
hardly staunch support of the Vietnamese effort. See 
Devendra Kareshik, "Soviet Policy Towards Southeast Asia: An 
Overview." in ed., Parimal Kumar Das, 169-181. For further 
discussion of Soviet aid see pp88-89 of this thesis.
With regard to American involvement, contrary to John 
F. Copper's claim that the US denied even moral support for 
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, what one saw as Chanda 
indicates was tacit approval of Chinese actions by the US 
and the beginning of Sino-US defence coordination. See 
Copper, 49-50; and Chanda, 358-60, respectively.
12. Sheldon. W. Simon, "Davids and Goliaths: Small Power- 
Great Power Security Relations in Southeast Asia," Asian 
Survey XXIII, no.3 (March 1983):303.
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Vietnamese troops away from Cambodia.13 In a 6 March 
official PRC document, "The Invasion" of Cambodia by 
Vietnam, Beijing admitted a connection between the Chinese 
attack on Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of 
Kampuchea.14
China's escapade, the attack on Vietnam, costing US $2-3 
billion, made the point in the name of Cambodia and other 
Southeast Asian states that intervention was not an 
acceptable way of carrying out foreign policy, and it 
indicated to the Vietnamese that they would not have a free 
hand in the rule of Indochina.15 Moreover, as Sola 
intimates, China's action in the end would save the 
Democratic Kampuchean resistance allowing it to preserve its 
legitimacy and exist on its own national territory.16 This 
arguably could have been a faux pas on the part of the 
Chinese.17 Recognition of the Vietnamese installed regime 
although sanctioning the right to intervention, may have
13. Chanda, 358. However Chanda indicates that the 
Vietnamese did not dispatch their regular Vietnamese 
divisions on the Cambodian border to the Sino-Vietnamese 
frontier but rather sent militia and regional forces. See 
Ibid., 361.
14. Richard Sola, "Chine-Indochine: De 1'intervention a 
1'antagonisme; Premiere Partie-La Chine en Guerre: Le 
Conflit du Tonkin en 1979," defense nationale. 42e annee 
(Paris, Oct. 1986):119.
15. The cost of the war was taken from Gary Klintworth, 
"Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia." (Canberra: Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper 117, January 
1987), 11.
16. Sola, 122-123.
17. See concluding chapter.
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saved the Khmer from, or at least reduced the duration of, 
war on Kampuchean territory.18
Were the benefits of China’s hostilities enough to 
counterbalance the costs of her engagement? The Vietnamese, 
as Chang Pao-min asserts, undoubtedly became more determined 
to remain in Kampuchea. If they had withdrawn it would 
appear as though they were yielding to Chinese pressure.19 
By stating that the attack on Vietnam was initiated to pull 
the Vietnamese back from Cambodia, the Chinese provided 
Vietnam with the ultimate argument to remain in Kampuchea. 
The Chinese action could be seen as legitimizing the claim 
that the Khmer Rouge were a Chinese toy used for China’s own 
hegemonial interests. Thus the Vietnamese felt that they 
had as much a right to stay in Cambodia as did the Chinese.
Moreover, China's action helped bring another power into the 
fore - the Soviet Union. Following the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict the Soviets sent long-range maritime patrol 
aircraft on reconnaissance flights over the South China Sea. 
As well, the Soviets established bases at Da Nang and Cam 
Ranh Bay, and Soviet aircraft carried stores into Vietnam 
and Kampuchea.20 Also, the Soviets upgraded Vietnamese
18. Although it could be argued that the Chinese attack on 
Vietnam caused damage and hardship to a failing Vietnamese 
economy, the fact that Vietnam remained in Cambodia for 
another decade, would indicate the weakness of such an 
assertion.
19. Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over Kampuchea," 
Survey 27 (Autumn-Winter 1983) : 198 . A similar statement is 
made in Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 107.
20. Takeshita, 30. The establishment of Soviet military 
bases in Vietnam at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay were not 
necessarily direct results of Chinese actions but could have
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forces in Kampuchea with late model Soviet T-54 and T-55 
tanks, 130mm canons and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 2s 
and 3s.21
Although Deng tried to tie the Chinese attack on Vietnam, 
indicating the Soviet connection, to the preservation of 
ASEAN security, at least in the short term, ASEAN was not 
supportive of Chinese policies. While the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia brought such states as Malaysia and 
Indonesia together with others such as Thailand, China's 
invasion of Vietnam caused some division among ASEAN member 
states. Fortunately a United Nations Security Council 
resolution tabled by ASEAN in March 1979, condemning both 
Vietnam's involvement in Kampuchea and China's harassment of 
Vietnam, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Had the resolution 
not been vetoed one would have probably seen Thailand (and 
Singapore) voting alongside China, thereby dividing ASEAN 
once again.22 ASEAN had become a major player in the 
Kampuchean conflict, which China and Vietnam would try to 
woo.
Maintenance of the Khmer Rouge, the entrenchment of Vietnam
in the Cambodian war, and giving the Soviet Union more cause
been influenced by the Sino-Soviet rift in general, as well 
as other factors.
21. Sheldon Simon, "The Two Southeast Asias and China: 
Security Perspectives," ASIAN Survey XXIV, no. 5 (May 1984): 
524. Takeshita indicates that such buildups and aid in arms 
by the Soviet Union would only strengthen China's view of 
Soviet encirclement whereby there existed a Soviet strategy 
in Asia to "cordon off the continent from the Mediterranean 
through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and up to 
Haishenwei (Vladivostok)" See Takeshita, 31.
2 2 . Nair, 120.
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to play a greater role in the Indochina conflict are 
certainly not positive results eminating out of the Sino- 
Vietnamese conflict. In addition, it was not at all certain 
that ASEAN would side with China. Hence it could be 
surmised that all that the Chinese attack had accomplished 
was a flexing of Beijing's muscles at the expense of Chinese 
internal reforms. Once China had committed itself to the 
Kampuchean cause there would be no turning back without 
losing face - something China would not do.
Central to Beijing's support of the Khmer Rouge were 
continued calls for the formation of a united front 
comprising the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese groups. 
Such a coalition of forces was in the Chinese leaders' minds 
the "magic weapon for victory" in the campaign against 
external aggress ion.23
Not only would Chinese leaders have to encourage the 
formation of such a coalition by the various parties, but it 
would also be necessary to persuade the international 
community that such a grouping was the legitimate 
representative of the Kampuchean people. Beijing couched 
its argument, according to Chang, in a legalistic framework. 
Starting from the March 1979 United Nations Security Council 
Meeting onwards, the Chinese continuously invoked Vietnamese 
action in Kampuchea as open aggression. Heng Samrin and his 
regime as parties to this aggression, should not, said the 
Chinese, represent the Kampuchean people. Because of the
23. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 119.
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Khmer Rouge atrocities, as Chang asserts, "only by adhering 
to the legalistic principles could China expect to muster 
credible international sympathy for the ousted Khmer 
government and at the same time justify her own support for 
it."24 Recognition of Democratic Kampuchea was a matter of 
principle, not any approbation of its policies.
Because China was pursuing a legalistic approach concerning 
Vietnam’s intervention in Kampuchea, it was important that 
Beijing propose its own initiatives in establishing peace 
between itself and Hanoi, so that China would appear sincere 
in its foreign policy endeavours. Peace talks between the 
two warring parties began in April, with China emphasizing 
Vietnamese regional aspirations and, searching for an 
overall solution to all the issues of the conflict. 
Vietnam, on the otherhand, viewed the Sino-Vietnamese border 
problem as the root cause of tension. Because of these 
perceptual differences the talks were destined to failure.25 
It is probably true that China was not all that interested 
in easing tensions between itself and Vietnam. For as long 
as Hanoi was forced to expend its resources in both 
Kampuchea and on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, there was the 
possibility of Vietnam having to rethink its strategy and 
succumb to the pressure of its greater neighbour, China.
24. Ibid., 113-114 and 116 respectively.
25. See Chang for an outline of the Chinese proposal, in 
Ibid., 97. For a discussion of the peace negotiations see 
Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over Kampuchea," 198.
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The complexity of the Kampuchean situation did not only 
preclude the involvement of the Kampucheans, the Vietnamese 
and the Chinese. China's support of the Khmer Rouge meant 
the inclusion of Thailand and ASEAN into any Chinese foreign 
policy decision making process, and a greater role played by 
the Soviet Union in attempting to influence Southeast Asian 
politics.
Thailand
With the loss of Kampuchea to the Vietnamese, the 
traditional buffer zone which protected Thailand from 
Vietnam no longer existed. For this reason, Thai Premier 
Kriangsak Chomanan visited Moscow 21-27 March 1979, with the 
hope of gaining a Soviet guarantee that Vietnam would leave 
Thailand alone.26 As Tim Huxley suggests, Kriangsak 
although opposed to Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea 
nevertheless privately shared with the Vietnamese the long­
term strategic objective of preventing China from expanding 
southwards.27 The fact however, that Moscow supported 
Vietnam's position in Kampuchea and the new status quo, and 
that China had already gained assurances from Thailand
26. Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand, the Soviet Union and the 
Kampuchea imbroglio," The World Today 38, no. 2 (1982): 67.
27. Kriangsak preferred a compromise solution whereby 
Vietnam would still have an influence in Kampuchea helping 
to keep the PRC at bay. In effect Thailand wanted a return 
to the previous balance of power. See Huxley, 48-49.
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allowing the use of Thai territory to assist the Khmer 
Rouge, quashed any hope of Soviet sympathy at this point.28
Besides economic incentives China played a game of give and 
take with the Thai in another area.29 In mid-May 1979, the 
China-based Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) radio
station, a Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) medium,
condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the
Soviet backing of Vietnam.30 The CPT, a threat to the
stability of the Kriangsak regime, could be used by China as 
a bargaining chip to gain concessions from Thailand. 
Although material aid to the CPT was at a minimum by 1979, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still maintained contact 
with its Thai counterpart. Effectively, if the Thai were 
unwilling to help China and the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer Rouge 
might be convinced to link up with the CPT, and/or China 
would reinstate its direct support of the CPT, making the 
latter a force to contend with.31
28. For the Soviet perspective refer to Leif Rosenberger’s 
insightful article, "The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance and 
Kampuchea," Survey 27 (Autumn-Winter 1983): 207-231.
29. China provided Thailand with a number of economic 
incentives to gain cooperation with it. For example, 
shortly following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia China 
signed a five year crude oil contract with Thailand. See 
Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security. (Stanford: 
Hoover Institute Press, 1982), 66 and 118. Chanda states 
that in return for allowing arms shipments to pass through 
Thai territory, the Thai were allowed to keep a portion of 
the arms. See Chanda, 381.
30. Huxley, Indochina and Insurgency in the ASEAN States 
1975-1981. (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, Working Paper No. 67., 1983), 36-37.
31. Ibid., 43-44, and Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 47. 
Much of Thailand’s concern dealt with China’s
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While the Vietnamese 1979 White Paper declared Vietnam's 
peaceful intentions towards Thailand, the Vietnamese also 
warned the Thai not to harbour the Khmer Rouge on Thai 
territory nor to supply arms to the Khmer Rouge. As well, 
if there was any collusion with the Chinese against Vietnam, 
the responsibility would lie with Thailand.32 Because the 
Thai did not heed the Vietnamese warning, by late April, 
shortly after the commencement of Sino-Vietnamese peace 
talks, Vietnam had already driven some 60,000 Khmer forces 
into Western Kampuchea and began to cross the Thai border in 
pursuit of others.33
The Chinese stood behind the Thai with Deng proclaiming, 
"Any threat to Thailand is a threat to China."34 In 
October, speaking to Thai Air Chief Marshall Harin 
Hongskula, Deng in effect pledged Chinese support to all of 
Southeast Asia in the event of Vietnamese aggession. He 
said, "China will stand on the side of the ASEAN countries 
if Vietnam attacks them. It will stand on the side of
differentiation between party-to-party relations and state- 
to-state relations. On a visit to Malaysia in December 
1978, Deng proclaimed that "party-to-party relations should 
be kept separate from state-to state relations." Thus 
China's government could still maintain official diplomatic 
relations with the Thai government while the CCP and CPT 
could continue their friendship as well. Thailand therefore 
sought assurances that the CPT would not be supported by the 
Khmer Rouge or the CCP. See Donald Hugh McMillan, China in 
Asian International Relations♦(Canberra: Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 
Working Paper, No. 67., 1983), 123.
32. Nair, 123.
33. Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over Kampuchea," 203.
34. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 109.
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Thailand if Vietnam attacks it."35 Not only was China 
providing support, at least on the moral plane if not the 
physical, to the Southeast Asian states but the PRC was also 
saying that support of Democratic Kampuchea need not entail 
a risk of provoking Vietnam because of confirmation of 
Chinese support.
Thai cooperation with the Chinese did increase. In 1979, 
there were an estimated 190,000 Kampucheans who had sought 
shelter on Thai territory.36 In December, Kriangsak moved 
the border refugee camps further into Thai territory, 
forming four regional holding centres with a capacity of 
40,000, supported by a national holding centre capable of 
providing for some 200,000 refugees. The camps endorsed by 
the Chinese were perceived by the Vietnamese as existing to 
supply the Khmer Rouge with rear support, medical supplies 
and sanctuary.37 Pol Pot himself admitted that "Thailand 
and our guerrilla units have trade contacts with each 
other."38 Thai officials however insisted that they were 
not supporting Pol Pot to empower the Khmer Rouge, but 
rather were seeking international support for the 
neutralization of Kampuchea.39 Yet as Simon suggests, the 
Thai had previously admitted that an independent Cambodia, 
even under the Khmer Rouge, was not any real danger to
35. Ibid., 118.
36. Nair, 121.
37. Ibid.# 137.
38. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 77.
39. Ibid., 96.
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Thailand, but a Cambodia which would be an integral part of 
a Vietnamese bloc, would be.40
From late 1979 onwards, the number of Chinese delegations to 
Thailand increased. A high powered group led by Deng 
Yingchao, the widow of Premier Zhou Enlai, visited Phnom 
Penh in February 1980.41 The Vietnamese were suspicious of 
the Chinese visits and told the Malaysians that "they had 
proof of meetings held in Bangkok among Pol Pot, Chinese and 
Thai officials, of Pol Pot living in Thai territory and in 
receipt of Chinese arms supplied through the Thai 
government."42
In March any apprehension on the part of the Thai towards 
closer cooperation with the Chinese on the Cambodian 
question dissipated. General Prem Tinsulanond replaced 
Kriangsak as leader of the Thai government. As Kriangsak 
left office also went, according to Huxley, any desire for a 
broad negotiated settlement: "opposition to Vietnam's role 
in Cambodia became an end in itself."43 Collaboration with 
the Khmer Rouge was firmly established and Thailand now 
openly exposed itself to the perils of the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict.
On 10 June 1980, the Thai government announced that any of
the Khmer refugees residing in Thailand could return to
40. Ibid., 67.
41. Nair, 143.
42. Ibid., 96.
43. Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 50.
79
Kampuchea. A large-scale voluntary repatriation of the 
refugees began amidst cries from Vietnam and Phnom Penh that 
the repatriation was a recruitment drive for the Khmer 
Rouge. On 22 June, Khieu Samphan announced that a number of 
those repatriated from Thailand had reached the Khmer Rouge 
camps.44 The Vietnamese increased the number of military 
exercises in the frontier region and, on the same day as 
Khieu Samphan's statement, the Vietnamese People’s Army 
(VPA) forces crossed the border at Non Mark Moon, fighting 
on Thai territory for three days, overrunning two large 
encampments, seizing two Thai border towns, shelling others, 
and causing 60-75,000 refugees to flee their camps.45
During his July 1980 Beijing visit, Thai Foreign Minister 
Sitthi Sawetsila harshly criticized Vietnam. At the same 
time, Beijing reaffirmed its support of Thailand and 
suggested that should Thai sovereignty and neutrality be 
disrespected, Vietnam might require a second lesson.46 The 
Vietnamese actions in June filled the final cracks in the 
Sino-Thai relationship, cementing it.
ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
another important broker in the Kampuchean conflict. Both 
China and Vietnam heeded the demands of ASEAN. ASEAN,
44. Nair, 150.
45. Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 51; Nair, 148-150; Simon, 
The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 69 and 109; and 
Buszynski, 68.
46 . Nair, 148 .
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although opposed to both the Vietnamese intervention in 
Kampuchea and the subsequent Chinese lesson, would find it 
difficult to maintain an equidistant stance. If ASEAN 
recognized the PRK regime as legitimate ruler of the Khmer 
people, this could open the way for further Vietnamese 
incursions into its member countries. Conversely, if ASEAN 
sided whole-heartedly with the Chinese, Vietnam might take 
it upon itself to teach its own lessons to its Southeast 
Asian neighbours.
As Weatherbee suggests, ASEAN's principal objective was to 
free Southeast Asia from great power conflict and 
domination.47 The question was how, without jeopardizing 
its own position. Nair presents us with ASEAN's four point 
strategy. First, ASEAN would support the Khmer Rouge and 
the continued existence of Democratic Kampuchea's seat at 
the United Nations. ASEAN saw the Khmer Rouge as the only 
effective opposition to Vietnam's dominance of Kampuchea and 
regional hegemonial intentions. However, ASEAN did 
emphasize the distinction between Pol Pot the leader, and 
Democratic Kampuchea the regime. Second, ASEAN would work 
towards diplomatic and economic isolation of Vietnam 
condemning the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea. Third, 
as we shall see, ASEAN promoted the creation of an anti- 
Vietnamese coalition, pressuring China and the Khmer Rouge 
to consider such a proposal. Fourth, while chastising
47. Donald E. Weatherbee, ed., Southeast Asia Divided: The 
ASEAN-Indochina Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 8. 
China had a similar interest but directed its energies 
against Vietnam and the Soviet Union while still wanting a 
regional role.
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Vietnam for its actions ASEAN nevertheless kept the way open 
to Vietnam, fostering dialogue and conflict resolution.48
At the United Nations, ASEAN vociferously supported the 
preservation of Democratic Kampuchea's seat in the General 
Assembly. While neither the Phnom Penh regime nor the Khmer 
Rouge, as Nair points out, were truly representative of the 
Khmer people, in ASEAN eyes the worst of two evils had to be 
chosen.49 On 21 September 1979, the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) accepted the UN's Credential Committee 
report which recommended that Democratic Kampuchea retain 
its seat by a vote of 71 in favour, 35 opposed, and 34 
abstentions. ASEAN as a whole now joined China in toting 
the blame for prolonging the sadistic Khmer Rouge's 
survival. As Chanda opines: "the Pol Pot regime might have 
been reduced to a band of guerrillas in the hills, but it 
was voted in as the only legitimate representative of the 
Cambodian people."50
With Vietnam urging the other ASEAN states, such as 
Indonesia, to put pressure on Thailand, thereby undermining 
Chinese influence, and with China coalescing with ASEAN to 
push Vietnam out of the region, ASEAN realized that it had
48. Nair, 125-131; S. Bilveer, The Development of Moscow- 
Hanoi Relations Since the Vietnam War: The View from 
Singapore (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, Working Paper No. 54, 
June 1982), 42-46.
49. Ibid., 131.
50. Chanda, 377-378. As we shall see in Chapter Four, the 
existence of a mere handful of guerrillas does not 
necessarily mean it is easier to maintain political 
stabi1ity.
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to take a firm stand between both Vietnam and China.51 For 
this reason, in Kuantan on 27 March 1980, Malaysian Premier 
Datuk Hussein Onn and Indonesian President Suharto put forth 
what became known as the Kuantan Principle. Essentially the 
declaration called for both the Soviets and Chinese to leave
the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese alone. In exchange for
western economic aid and a recognition by ASEAN of
Vietnamese security interests in Kampuchea, Hanoi was to
maintain a neutral position between Moscow and Beijing. The
proposal was not adopted as it was unacceptable to the PRC,
Thailand and for the moment, Vietnam.52
While the June incursion by Vietnam into Thai territory 
brought together Malaysia and Indonesia within the ranks of 
ASEAN, where they jointly condemned Vietnam, one would see 
in mid-1980 an ASEAN still very much concerned with 
maintaining a balanced position between the contending 
regional powers. While a partial pullout by the Vietnamese 
in recognition of the Heng Samrin regime was considered, a 
united ASEAN still called for a complete Vietnamese 
withdrawal. Also, direct alignment with the Chinese 
according to ASEAN, while weakening Vietnam through 
protracted war, would increase the scope of Soviet 
involvement, and in the view of Malaysia and Indonesia,
51. Vietnam's view was that China was using ASEAN against 
the Indochinese countries, weakening them and at the same 
time destabilizing ASEAN, thereby leaving room for Beijing's 
own expansion into the region. See Chang, Kampuchea between 
China and Vietnam, 141.
52. Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 54-55; Pilch, 38; Nair, 
143-144; and Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 
99.
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could leave the door open to a greater regional role for 
China.53
Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union
While Thailand and ASEAN played pivotal roles specifically 
in the Sino-Khmer Rouge relationship and in the Kampuchean 
imbroglio in general, it was Vietnam's position supported by 
the Soviet Union, and China's stance as the regional great 
power, which were the most important determinants in 
ensuring the existence of the Khmer Rouge as a force to be 
reckoned with.
In attacking Vietnam, China having made its point, but 
essentially having accomplished little else, moved from a 
strategy of teaching Vietnam a lesson to one where she would 
"bleed Vietnam white." Following the February-March 1979 
Sino-Vietnamese border dispute China would frequently make 
border attacks on Vietnam, with Vietnam initiating its own 
incursions.54
Attempting to have Vietnam overextend itself, Beijing hoped 
that Hanoi would exhaust its resources and so not be able to
continue its occupation of Kampuchea. Vietnam in turn
further fanned the flames when in April and May the
Vietnamese purged Kampuchean Chinese causing a mass exodus
53. Nair, 148.
54. By November, Hanoi charged China with over 1,000 armed 
provocations in the six month period following the 
conclusion of the border war. The PRC blamed Vietnam for 
over 330 military incursions in the August-October period 
alone. See Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over 
Kampuchea," 206.
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to flee to Thailand. In May, more than 40,000 Kampuchean 
Chinese fled their homes in a single week.55
In what was becoming a tit-for-tat match between Vietnam and 
China, in September 1979, Beijing announced four danger 
zones in the disputed Hainan island area, warning foreign 
airlines not to enter into the newly proclaimed Chinese 
airspace. As well, the Chinese released photos of Chinese 
missiles and troops in training operations while rumours 
circulated that China’s 42nd army was being moved to the 
Sino-Vietnamese border. China’s actions incensed Vietnam 
which perceived Beijing as provocative with the Chinese 
challenging the Vietnamese in yet another area, the South 
China Sea.56
As Simon observes, ”It cost Beijing little to sustain 
resistance in Cambodia [and in rallying against Vietnam] 
particularly since the 500,000 refugees along the Thai- 
Cambodian border form a potential Palestinian-type 
resistance.”57 For this reason China could promote a policy 
of bleeding Vietnam white. Speaking to Japanese Prime 
Minister Ohira on 9 December 1979, Deng affirmed: ”It is
55. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 106. Also 
see Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over Kampuchea," 
203.
56. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 71. 
Also see Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict Over 
Kampuchea," 205.
57. Ibid.. 70. The exception to this would of course be 
the costs incurred in the February-March 1979 Chinese 
lesson.
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wise for China to force the Vietnamese to stay in Kampuchea 
because that way they will suffer more and more..."58
Vietnam, rather than submit to Chinese pressure, dug in its 
heels. With an initial 100,000 Vietnamese troops used to 
invade Kampuchea, by May the number of troops in Kampuchea 
had reached 150,000 and by October there were some 200,000 
men stationed there. By August, practically every 
Kampuchean province was ruled by a Vietnamese counterpart 
under a special "sister province" arrangement. Finally, by 
November some 250,000 Vietnamese were settled in Kampuchea 
under a Vietnamization programme.59
While trying to make Vietnam suffer, China at the same time 
attempted to make the Khmer Rouge more acceptable to the 
international community. As Chanda suggests, China was 
convinced that Vietnam would eventually seek peace, 
therefore the Chinese leadership had to prepare the way 
internationally whereby a repentant and reformed Khmer Rouge 
would be permitted to come to power.60 It was international 
relief, according to Chanda, which "revived the Khmer Rouge 
[but] Chinese supplies [with the help of the Thai] 
reequipped them to full strength."61 Prince Sihanouk goes
58. Chanda, 379, and Anthony Barnett, "Between Vietnam and 
Pol Pot" in eds. John Pilger and Anthony Barnett, 85.
59. Chang, 203.
60. Chanda, 378. However, it is not at all evident that in 
the long term China would actually promote the coming to 
power of the Khmer Rouge. China’s real intentions are 
difficult if not impossible to surmise.
61. Ibid., 382; and Nair, 140.
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further when he credits the Khmer Rouge success entirely to 
China. In 1979, he stated:
The People's Republic of China, which is 
sincerely and authentically anti­
colonialist and anti-imperialist, has 
had to take charge in so-called 
"Democratic Kampuchea" of finance, the 
pretended "national" economy, industry, 
national defence, river and maritime 
ports, diplomacy et cetera. All this 
could only satisfactorily function 
thanks to the many sided and massive aid 
and extremely generous "cooperation" 
granted by Peking....
Pol Pot and Ieng Sary try to cover 
themselves with glory by claiming a 
total independence without precedent for 
over 2000 years. What a mockery! The 
reality is that whether China wanted it 
that way or not...the "foreign" policy 
of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary government has 
always been, in fact, in the tow of the 
Chinese government.62
Sihanouk's assertions although acceptable for the 1979-1982 
period, did not give enough credit to the Khmer Rouge over 
the 1975-1978 period when they held power. It was true 
however, that the Khmer Rouge were now becoming part of the 
same life line as the Chinese - China was their source of 
oxygen.
Yielding to PRC pressure the Khmer Rouge announced, in 
September 1979, a new political programme under which they 
would consider uniting with other forces to struggle against 
Vietnam. In December, Khieu Samphan replaced Pol Pot as 
Prime Minister, requesting Sihanouk to resume his former
62. Cited in Burchett, 178.
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position of Head of State.63 Khieu Samphan began to promote 
a more conciliatory Khmer Rouge. He called for the holding 
of UN sponsored elections, as did China, after a total 
Vietnamese withdrawal. As well, at China's behest he 
offered to establish amicable relations with Vietnam once a 
troop withdrawal occurred. The Chinese assured the 
international community that any future coalition of forces 
would not be led by Khieu Samphan.64
The new Chinese and Khmer Rouge initiatives were deplored by 
the Vietnamese. At a January 1980 conference of Indochinese 
Foreign Ministers in Phnom Penh, the ministers demanded that 
China stop using Thai territory to aid the Khmer Rouge and 
bring down the PRK government. They also denounced China's 
role in the region as one whereby Beijing sought hegemony 
and expansion. As well, they stated that there was "no room 
among the Khmer people for Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary 
and other traitors including Sihanouk. "65
63. Pol Pot, however, retained his position in the Party's 
Politburo and the post of Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Supreme Committee of the National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea (NADK). See Jacques Bekaert, "Very Sick Pol Pot 
leaves HQ for China, Nov. 19, 1986," Kampuchea Diary 1983- 
1986 (Bangkok: DD Books, 1987); Chang, Kampuchea between 
China and Vietnam, 120; and Nair, 133.
64. See Nair, 33; Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional 
Security. 98; and Chang, 121, respectively. A similar 
promise as to the coalition leadership's composition was 
made in January 1979, see p.64 of this work.
65. Pilch, 37-38, and "Phnom Penh 5 January 1980," 
Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985 (Bangkok: 
Department of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs).
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Although China's programme of presenting a new Khmer Rouge 
was gaining ground, the Vietnamese were no closer to 
withdrawal than they were the day they invaded. Vietnam 
according to China, much to its chagrin, had become a 
puppet of the Soviet Union. Hanoi, in fact, openly declared 
its reliance on "the military solidarity, friendship and 
cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union as a firm 
guarantee for their victory in the socialist construction 
and nationalist defence."66 Since 1978, the Soviet Union 
provided an estimated US$3 million per day to aid the 
Vietnamese war effort in Kampuchea. According to Western 
estimates, Soviet aid to Vietnam by mid-1979 provided sixty 
per cent of Vietnam's development budget, one-third of rice 
imports and numerous occasional loans.67
However, as with China and the Khmer Rouge in the 1975-78 
period, from 1980 onwards there were some differences in 
approach to the Cambodian crisis taken by the Vietnamese and 
the Soviets. As Leif Rosenberger indicates, in early 1980 
Moscow appeared to cut back aid to Hanoi and was annoyed at 
the way the Vietnamese were handling the aid granted them. 
In 1981 the Soviets would try through bilateral 
consultations to foster better relations with the PRK and 
would take a more conciliatory attitude towards the Khmer
66. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 108.
67. The figures were taken from Nair, 145. Klintworth 
offers an amount of $1-2 billion in Soviet aid per annum 
since 1978. See Gary Klintworth, "Vietnam's Withdrawal from 
Cambodia," (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, Working Paper 117, 
January 1987), 18.
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Rouge - emphasizing the need for Hanoi to consider the Khmer 
Rouge in any peace process.68 China would nevertheless see 
the Soviets as conniving with the Vietnamese, intending to 
gain control over Southeast Asia and strategically contain 
China.69
With Soviet and Vietnamese power projection in the region, 
China on 6 March 1980, perceiving the ongoing negotiations 
with the Vietnamese over the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict 
as futile, called off the peace talks. Now, the Chinese 
offensive turned to creating a stable and reorganized 
government-in-exile which would most definitely include the 
Khmer Rouge - China's tentacles in Southeast Asia.
The negotiation process and a new Khmer coalition
The Chinese wanted to follow the same process that they had 
undertaken in late 1979. While appearing ready to negotiate 
a peace settlement for Indochina, Beijing would continue 
remoulding the Khmer Rouge, making the Khmer communists 
within a coalition of anti-Vietnamese forces more 
presentable to the world.
68. Due to limitations of space suffice it to say that 
Rosenberger's argument casts doubt on any illusion that the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam were continuously walking hand in 
hand down the Kampuchean road. See Rosenberger, 208-226. 
For a short discussion of Moscow's quest for bilateral 
relations see Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 
52.
69. Simon, 60. As well, the PRC believed the Soviets would 
try to position themselves in such a way that they could 
stop the flow of European and Japanese energy sources by 
cutting off the sea-1ines-of-communication (SLOC) between 
the Persian Gulf and East Asia. See fn. 21 this chapter.
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ASEAN, as the principal initiator of the Kampuchean peace 
process, in a UN General Assembly resolution on 23 February 
1980, called for a neutral Kampuchea and non-alignment of 
anti-Vietnamese forces with the PRC, and a stop to 
Vietnamese threats against Thai security.70 This resolution 
triggered a long and arduous peace process which would last 
to the decade's end.
Hanoi did not approve of the ASEAN proposals and in a 
statement of Indochinese Foreign Ministers issued in 
Vientiane on 18 July 1980, the ministers blamed China for 
the existing turmoil:
China's perfidious policy is to turn the 
problem between Kampuchea, Laos and 
Vietnam with China into one between the 
three countries and Thailand, to pit the 
ASEAN countries against the Indochinese 
countries in order to weaken the latter, 
cause instability to the former and thus 
facilitate the carrying out of Peking's 
expansionist and hegemonist designs in 
Southeast Asia.71
Hanoi put forth its own peace proposal, most notably calling 
for the disarming of the Cambodian resistance and greater 
cooperation between the PRK, Vietnam, Thailand and ASEAN.72
70. Pilch, 39.
71. "Vientiane Statement July 18, 1980," Documents on the 
Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985, 148.
72. For a listing of the proposals see Huxley, ASEAN and 
Indochina, 61. It is worth mentioning that the ministers 
were probably also responding to the July Carter meeting 
with Hua Guofeng in Tokyo where the US President stated that 
there was mutual agreement between the US and the PRC 
concerning the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. See John 
Pilger, "Only the allies are new" in Pilger and Barnett, 93- 
94.
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Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach reaffirmed that 
Vietnamese forces would remain in Kampuchea as long as the 
threat from the Khmer Rouge and China existed.73 By 
September however, at the 35th UN General Assembly debate on 
Kampuchea, Vietnam had changed its tune. Undoubtedly 
fearful that ASEAN would side with the PRC, Hanoi announced 
readiness to make a partial withdrawal and endorsed the 
March 1980 Kuantan proposal which would free Indochina from 
Sino-Soviet influence.74
ASEAN pressed forward when in October it called for a United 
Nations sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea 
(ICK). Initially China was opposed to the conference, 
however by December the Chinese indicated a willingness to 
attend while insisting on a partial Vietnamese withdrawal. 
By the end of December China dropped its demand for partial 
withdrawal as a prerequisite to the holding of the ICK. 
However, the Chinese stressed that a complete pullout would 
be necessary to attain a political solution. Beijing's 
concession proved to no avail as Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union disapproved of the conference mandate which dealt 
solely with Kampuchea. The two allies recommended 
discussion on the more fundamental issues concerning the 
region's security.75
73. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 68.
74. Nair, 154-55.
75. Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 63; Nair, 170; and Chang, 
Kampuchea between China and Vietnam. 121-22.
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It was Vietnam's turn to take the initiative. On 28 January 
1981, at a gathering of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers in 
Ho Chi Minh City, the ministers called for the signing of a 
treaty of peaceful coexistence between the Indochinese 
states and China. Again Vietnam reaffirmed that it would 
withdraw its troops only when the Chinese threat dissipated. 
In the interim, Vietnam would undertake a partial withdrawal 
if Thailand took on a neutral position, not making Thai 
territory available to anti-Vietnamese forces. In April, 
Vietnam explicitly stated that it would only pull out all 
its forces if China concluded a non-aggression treaty with 
the Indochinese states.76 Again on 29 May 1981, Vietnam 
offered a partial withdrawal pending Thai compliance with 
Vietnamese demands.77 A stern warning to Thailand followed 
in mid-June, declaring that Vietnam would not hesitate to 
take military action against Thailand if it continued to 
repatriate Khmers to Kampuchea.78
The Vietnamese proposals had some effect. On 16-17 June 
1981, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers decided not to follow 
China's policy of bleeding Vietnam white.79 The ministers 
stated that: there would be no return to Khmer Rouge rule 
unless the Kampuchean people so desired; there would be no
76. Nair, 162 and 169; and "Vietnamese proposal, Ho Chi 
Minh, 28 January 1981," Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 
1979-1985.
77. Buszynski, 71.
78. Nair, 171. Concerning the repatriation question see 
pp. 77-79 of this work.
79. Ibid., 172.
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time limit for Vietnamese withdrawal; all Cambodian factions 
would be disarmed; and a neutral interim-administration 
would preserve law and order until UN supervised elections 
could be held. The Chinese responded negatively to the 
proposals, stating that they were opposed to any disarming 
of the various factions, the dispatching of a UN peace­
keeping force, or the establishment of any interim 
government in Kampuchea.80
The negotiation process which had begun in early 1980 came 
to a head when the ICK convened at the United Nations on 13 
July 1981. ASEAN sought to reduce regional tension rather 
than make Vietnam suffer, the PRC wanted a wholesale 
condemnation of Vietnam forcing its withdrawal, and Vietnam 
and the Soviet Union looked to blacklist China and the Khmer 
Rouge as the true regional villains. Neither party gained 
all that it desired out of the ICK. Both Vietnam and China 
were partially found at fault for the continued existence of 
the Kampuchean problem. ASEAN, because of Chinese 
objections, could not offer aid to Vietnam. The PRK was not 
present at the discussions nor was there any official 
proposal calling for the disarming of the Khmer Rouge - thus 
the Vietnamese were displeased.81
80. Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 62-63, and Justus van der 
Kroef, "Kampuchea: Patterns of Factional Conflict and 
International Confrontation," Asien 5 (October 1982) :58, 
respectively. For further delineation of PRC/ASEAN 
differences see Nair, 172-174.
81. Chanda, 387; Huxley, 60-64;and Pilch, 40. For the 
Chinese ICK position see Chang, Kampuchea between China and 
Vietnam. 123. For an outline of the ICK 17 July 
declaration, see "ICK Declaration 17 July 1981," Documents 
on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985. See Nair, 176-77 for
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The ICK revealed how complex the Kampuchean conflict had 
become and how it was a part of a larger game between many 
regional and non-regional actors. As well, the watering 
down of the ICK resolution disclosed the influence China 
still wielded over its neighbouring states. Beijing's 
desire to preserve the Khmer Rouge and the legitimacy of 
Democratic Kampuchea was as strong as ever.
Running parallel to the negotiation process, calling for the 
withdrawal of Vietnam from Kampuchea, was the attempt to 
reconstruct the Khmer Rouge into a more credible and stable 
power. On Thai Premier Prem Tinsulanond's 27-31 October 
1980 Beijing visit, he asked that the Khmer Rouge leadership 
be transformed into something more acceptable. Beijing 
agreed with him, urging the Khmer Rouge to join forces with 
Prince Sihanouk and/or Son Sann. However, neither non­
communist anti-Vietnamese faction wanted to associate with 
the Khmer Rouge.82
In Jakarta, Ieng Sary at a 23 November 1980 press 
conference, called for Sihanouk to play a more active role 
in a Democratic Kampuchea coalition, on the condition that 
he accept that expulsion of the Vietnamese was of primary 
importance.83 Sary's invitation was probably hastened at
China's success in keeping the Khmer Rouge virtually 
unscathed during the ICK.
82. Buszynski, 68; and Nair, 159. Sihanouk's disdain for 
the Khmer Rouge is evident in a statement made in November 
1980 cited in Nair, 166. Weatherbee discusses Thailand's 
and Singapore's plea for a new Khmer Rouge leadership, see 
Weatherbee, 4.
83. Nair, 160.
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the request of the Chinese, but the fact that Sary placed a 
condition on Sihanouk’s entrance into a coalition revealed 
the significance of Khmer nationalism within the ranks of 
the Khmer Rouge, and an uneasiness with its dependency on 
China.
Essentially China had agreed to the coalition so as to ease 
ASEAN anxiety of the Khmer Rouge. As Nair appropriately 
indicates, China's predicament was ”how to accommodate 
support for the Khmer Rouge with support for Son Sann and 
any others, and ensure that the addition of the new elements 
would not hamper the Khmer Rouge resistance in Kampuchea."84 
ASEAN viewed the formation of a coalition as the foundation 
for a settlement with Vietnam. However as Huxley states, 
the Chinese and perhaps the Thai "saw the main potential 
vitality of a resistance coalition as a means of maintaining 
international support for Democratic Kampuchea rather than 
as a basis for a settlement with Vietnam."85
In February 1981, Sihanouk announced that he would be 
willing to participate in a united front coalition. In 
fact, Sihanouk's tooth had been sweetened by military aid 
from China. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang voiced open support 
for either Sihanouk or Son Sann to lead a united front anti- 
Vietnamese movement in Kampuchea.86 This call for
84. Son Sann had travelled to the PRC in December 1980, but 
left China with no assurance of aid. See Nair, 164.
85. Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina, 64.
86. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 122; and 
van der Kroef, 66.
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leadership was contrary to Khmer Rouge demands which had 
stated that in any coalition the other factions would have 
to find themselves subordinate to the Khmer Rouge.87 China, 
the greater power, dominated the game.
In April, the Chinese again set the bait, luring the non­
communist members further towards the idea of an anti- 
Vietnamese coalition, this time offering arms shipments to 
Son Sann and more to Sihanouk on the condition that the 
weapons not be used against either Son Sann's forces or the 
Khmer Rouge.88
At a meeting between Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan, 
the three failed to reach an agreement on the coalition. 
Son Sann had demanded complete control of the coalition and 
called for the exile to China of the Khmer Rouge top 
leaders. As Simon suggests, the Chinese applied little 
pressure on the Khmer Rouge to comply with the non- 
communists’ demands and thus the talks failed.89
In December, ASEAN pledged its support for the idea of a 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). As 
Nair indicates, ASEAN's acceptance of the coalition 
coincided with China’s realization that support for the 
Khmer Rouge seat in the United Nations was eroding. China
87. van der Kroef, 62.
88. Chang, 122.
89. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security, 103.
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would be more forceful demanding greater flexibility on the 
part of the Khmer Rouge.90
In a February meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Khieu 
Samphan, Sihanouk declared that an agreement had been 
reached on a future alliance. Although China maintained a 
low profile during the talks, two days later on 23 February 
1982, the Prince announced that China would supply his 
FUNCINPEC-Moulinaka forces with modern infantry weapons.91 
China's hand was at play again - it was definitely not the 
Khmer Rouge who had convinced Sihanouk to participate in the 
new grouping.
In Tashkent, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev on 22 March 
1982, proposed a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. 
The same month, China's Vice-Premier Han Nianlong stated 
that China's interest in the Khmer Rouge was not
ideological.92 This confession confirms that China was now 
formulating its policy according to the power politics 
school whereby the Khmer Rouge were used as a means to gain 
influence in a region which China saw as important to its 
security. Both the Tashkent speech and the Vice-Premier's 
comments undoubtedly signalled to the Khmer Rouge that they 
might become a puppet of China and that they, under the 
right conditions, could be disposed of. However, for the
90. Nair, 182-183. As well see Weatherbee, 4; and Pilch, 
41.
91. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: Patterns of Factional
Conflict," 63; also see Chang, 124.
92. Chang, 124-125. For Han's 1980 position regarding 
China's view of the Vietnamese see Chanda, 129.
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moment Beijing still needed the Khmer Rouge to help prevent 
Vietnamese and Soviet hegemony and expansion.
Early in 1982, the Vietnamese were very active militarily 
gaining control of the Laotian and Thai frontier. Although 
they lost the Cardomome and Elephant mountains, the gains 
made were impressive.93 As well, an unprecedented 
compliment was paid to the Chinese in May 1982 by Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach for having decreased the 
number of border incidents.94 Therefore, it is possible 
that the Khmer Rouge became more cooperative in forming an 
anti-Vietnamese coalition as they too recognized the force 
of realpolitik.
On 22 June 1982, in Kuala Lumpur, the three anti-Vietnamese 
factions declared the formal establishment of the CGDK. 
Sihanouk would hold the post of President, with Khieu 
Samphan as Vice-President in charge of foreign affairs and 
Son Sann as Prime Minister. The continuance of aid to the 
various factions would be permitted.95
The coalition was viewed with hostility by the Soviets and 
the Vietnamese. Moscow labelled it aggressive and
93. Martial Dasse, "Cambodge: La Tutelle Vietnamienne," 
defense nationale 39e annee (avril 1983), 103. Nair 
suggests that the Vietnamese were conciliatory because of 
Soviet and internal Vietnamese Communist Party pressure to 
better relations with the PRC, see Nair, 187.
94. Rosenberger, 227. The number of incidents dropped to 
30 per month versus 100 per month in 1981. However, there 
were conflicts over the Paracels in March 1982, see Nair, 
180.
95. "Declaration of the Formation of the CGDK" in Documents 
on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985.
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provocative, and Hanoi claimed its creation was the work of 
Beijing and Washington for the purpose of serving their 
selfish interests.96 It is certain that the formation of 
the coalition perpetuated the Khmer Rouge’s existence as a 
thorn in the side of Vietnam and the PRK.
If we recall from Chapter One, when a power moves from being 
a buffer towards a position whereby it becomes dependent on 
one ally's support, the sovereign power’s ability to make 
independent decisions diminishes. The Khmer Rouge had, in 
the latter part of the 1975-1978 period, moved towards a 
specific power. However, the Khmer Rouge sliding further 
along the continuum from being a buffer state to one in a 
proxy-client relationship with the PRC, a move stemming from 
the Khmer communists’ previous dependency on China, also 
approached a third power, Thailand. Bangkok, desired as did 
the Khmer Rouge, the preservation of the status quo which in 
effect would ensure the existence of Democratic Kampuchea.97
Michael Handel's conditions for a proxy-client relationship 
are evident in the Sino-Khmer Rouge amity of 1979-1982. The 
association existed between two unequal powers, and was 
relatively evenly balanced between voluntarism and coercion, 
although Chinese pressure often did prevail. The patron, 
China, clearly had greater bargaining power over its client,
96. Nair, 186.
97. See p.6 of this work.
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the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge had to be content with 
Chinese support as they had no other patron to turn to.98
Ironically, it was fortunate for the Khmer Rouge that 
Kampuchea was only a small part of a greater regional power 
struggle. The Khmer Rouge undoubtedly thrived on the 
prolongment of Sino-Vietnamese tensions, for as long as the 
hostilities continued China would see fit to support a 
Kampuchean resistance which would ensure a Kampuchea 
independent of Vietnam. As well, China having committed 
itself to the Kampuchean cause could not ignore Vietnam for 
fear of losing face and international credibility - another 
plus for the Khmer Rouge.
While initially Thai assistance to the Khmer Rouge and Thai 
cooperation with the PRC helped the Khmer communists, later 
calls by Thailand and ASEAN for a reformed Khmer Rouge would 
work against them. ASEAN’s demand for a more balanced 
approach to Vietnam effectively pushed China to consider a 
united front coalition of anti-Vietnamese forces, and paved 
the way for the 1982-1989 negotiation process which called 
for Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea.
China's decision to support Sihanouk as head of the CGDK, 
although largely ceremonious, could in the longer term have 
negative implications for the Khmer Rouge. It would remain 
uncertain whether the Chinese leadership would not in the 
long run, if the option remained and the Khmer Rouge
9 8. Ibid., 7.
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appeared weak, be content in reinstating Sihanouk in office, 
using him as their lever in Indochina.
Clearly China's assertion that ideology was no longer a 
factor in the Sino-Khmer relationship, while indicating its 
prior importance, revealed that pragmatic power politics was 
to be the norm in the conduct of Chinese international 
relations.
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CHAPTER 4: Dependency or Breaking Loose?
In the 1979-1982 period the Khmer Rouge had moved into a 
position of mutuality where they had given up some of their 
autonomy, permitting the People's Republic of China to 
influence how the Khmer communists should pursue their 
domestic and foreign policy. As the Third Indochina War 
continued the Khmer Rouge became entangled in a proxy-client 
amity verging on a relationship whereby there was a growing 
dependence on China.
In this chapter we will examine the 1982-1989 period: a time 
whereby the Sino-Khmer Rouge relationship would come under 
increasing strains with international pressures and threats 
of shifting balances of power questioning the role the Khmer 
Rouge would be allowed to play in the Kampuchean conflict. 
Would the Khmer Rouge be under the complete shadow of the 
PRC with only the smallest of rumblings heard from a 
dissatisfied Khmer Rouge leadership? Had the Chinese 
recognized that supporting the Khmer Rouge was a faux pas, 
with China leaving them by the wayside or would China find
it difficult to extricate itself from assisting its
Kampuchean allies? What could the Khmer Rouge and the
Chinese do pending more conciliatory gestures on the part of
Vietnam and increased pressure by all parties involved in 
the conflict to find a resolution to hostilities?
With the formation of the CGDK Vietnam would continue to be 
condemned as the aggressor in the Kampuchean conflict. At 
the same time as the declaration on Kampuchean soil of the
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CGDK’s creation, Indochinese Foreign Ministers were meeting 
in Ho Chi Minh City where they quickly denounced the 
coalition and those parties involved in its founding. They 
declared:
...the rigging up of the so-called 
"Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea" is a farce aimed at 
concealing the evil face of the Pol Pot 
clique, an attempt to reimpose the 
genocidal regime on the Kampuchean 
people just saved from death, and a plot 
hatched by reactionaries in the Chinese 
ruling circles and the ASEAN countries 
to interfere in the Kampuchean internal 
affairs and to continue creating tension 
in Southeast Asia.l
While condemning China and ASEAN, the Indochinese ministers 
once again offered a partial withdrawal from Kampuchea, 
expressing a willingness to find a political solution. The 
offer however, could also be perceived as an effort to 
weaken the newly formed coalition and the influence of 
China.
Essentially the proposal was identical to ones made since 
January 1981. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from 
Kampuchea was to be taken as a gesture of goodwill. A 
partial withdrawal was based on the condition that China no 
longer use Thai territory to help Khmer reactionaries, and 
that Pol Pot troops and other groups be disarmed. The 
ministers reiterated their desire for an international 
conference on Southeast Asia. As well, they called for a 
safety zone along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Radio Beijing 
in turn criticized the proposal for a partial troop
1 . "Documents on the Kampuchea Problem 1979-1985," 163.
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withdrawal as 'a trick played to divide people' with the 
security zone being declared a 'fraud'.2
Other than China's support of the CGDK the Vietnamese had 
another reason to be wary of recent Chinese actions. China 
had entered into dialogue with Vietnam's backer, the Soviet 
Union. Moving on from Brezhnev's March 1982 Tashkent speech 
and a similar speech made in Baku in September of that year, 
the Chinese officially announced commencement of the first 
round of Sino-Soviet normalization talks.
The October negotiations disclosed three Chinese conditions 
for the normalization of relations between China and the 
Soviet Union. One condition was a halt to Soviet support of 
Vietnam's military occupation of Kampuchea.3 The Chinese 
also offered the prospect of Sino-Vietnamese normalization 
talks which would be linked to a progressive, but 
unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from 
Kampuchea.4 Negotiations with the Soviets could on the one 
hand shut out the Vietnamese, diminishing any opportunity 
for Vietnam to play regional hegemon. On the other hand the 
talks could remove a principal reason for continued Chinese 
support of the Khmer Rouge - that of preventing Soviet
2. Nair, 190. Regarding the July 1982 proposal also see 
Nair, 87-88; Rosenberger, 226; Weatherbee, 7; "Documents on 
the Kampuchea Problem 1979-1985," 163.
3. The other two conditions were a reduction of Soviet 
forces along the Soviet-Mongolian border, and a withdrawal 
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
4. Weatherbee, 16.
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encroachment into a region China deemed its own sphere of 
influence.
The Chinese proposal for Sino-Vietnamese negotiations was 
based on secret low-level talks held between the two 
protagonists in mid-1982. In this period the Vietnamese had 
proposed a truce from early August to October, which the 
Chinese rejected. Nevertheless the truce was unofficially 
observed allowing both sides to celebrate their national 
days undisrupted.5
The Vietnamese and probably the Khmer Rouge were concerned 
about ongoing discussions between their respective 
supporters. These in turn could lead to a diminution of the 
smaller powers’ support. In October, at a high level 
Soviet-Vietnamese meeting in Moscow, the Vietnamese were 
urged to reach a settlement with ASEAN and find a solution 
to the Indochina conflict. Concurrently the Khmer Rouge 
would probably not only fear that a Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement would leave them without financial and 
material assistance to continue on in their struggle to 
regain power, but also the beginning of Sino-Vietnamese 
dialogue could conceivably reduce China's concerns about 
Vietnamese hegemony and a loss of Southeast Asia to Vietnam. 
Such sentiment would diminish China's need for the Khmer 
Rouge - the PRC's regional tentacle.6
5. 
6 .
Rosenberger, 227.
For the Sino-Vietnamese meeting see ibid., 226.
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China’s overtures should be seen in the context of the 
prevailing international scene and China's own domestic 
developments. While in the 1970s relations between the PRC 
and the United States were healthy, by the early 1980s they 
had deteriorated. Controversy over the American association 
with Taiwan, bilateral trade disputes such as that 
concerning textiles, and a number of minor issues clouded 
the Sino-American relationship.
At the same time one saw an increasing demand by Chinese 
policy makers for China to take an independent position in 
world politics - remaining aloof of any particular power. 
In September 1982, Deng Xiaoping declared:
Independence and self-reliance have 
always been and will always be our basic 
stand. We Chinese people have our 
friendship and co-operation with other 
countries and peoples. We value even 
more our hard-won independence and 
sovereign rights.7
Calls for a more independent posture combined with 
conciliatory moves on the part of the Soviets and China's 
disillusionment with the United States (particularly under 
the leadership of Ronald Reagan), led to a repositioning of 
China situating itself somewhere between the two 
superpowers.8 Increased contact with Vietnam was part of
7. Allen S. Whiting, China and the World: Independence and 
Dependence Paper presented to the 46th George Ernest 
Morrison Lecture in Ethnology (Canberra: The Australian 
National University, 1985), 21.
8. For a discussion of China's relationship with the 
United States see Steven I. Levine. "China and the United 
States: The Limits of Interaction," in China and the World: 
Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era ed. Samuel S. Kim
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the same game plan: the Chinese undoubtedly anticipated 
better relations with the Soviets because of China's 
friendly gestures towards a Soviet ally.
Even while the Vietnamese were making substantial gains in 
the 1982-83 dry season offensive, defeating the Khmer Rouge 
at Phnom Chat and entering several kilometers into Thai 
territory, Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese negotiations continued.9 
There were reports of Sino-Vietnamese meetings in Romania in 
early 1983, while in February Vietnamese officials attended 
a Beijing dinner given by prominent Chinese diplomat Zhang 
Dewei - their first since the 1980 breakdown in Sino- 
Vietnamese relations. The officials offered a second 
partial withdrawal with the promise of annual troop 
withdrawals and the Chinese dropped their demand to total 
withdrawal as a prerequisite to negotiations.10
Nevertheless, while some Vietnamese were dining in China, a 
grouping of Vietnamese with their Laotian and Kampuchean 
counterparts in Vientiane condemned China and the Khmer 
Rouge in a Statement on Vietnamese Volunteers in Kampuchea,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 113-134. Also see Harry 
Harding, "Change and Continuity in China's Foreign Policy," 
Problems of Communism XXXII (March-April 1983): 1-19. To 
appreciate China's views on US-Taiwanese defence cooperation 
see Gerald Segal and Wm. T. Tow eds. , Chinese Defence Policy 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 202.
Other statements concerning China's desire to remain 
independent can be found in: Harding, 18. A later statement 
is by Zhao Ziyang in his article, "The objectives of China's 
foreign policy: for lasting peace, increased friendly 
cooperation and co-prosperity," International Affairs 61, 
no. 4 (London: Royal Institue of International Affairs, 
Autumn 1985):578.
9. Weatherbee, 40.
10. Ibid♦, 54; and Rosenberger, 228.
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accusing the PRC of using the Khmer puppets to further its 
goal of regional expansionism.il
On 1 March 1983, China put forth what became known as its 
Five Point Proposal, calling for:
1) unconditional Vietnamese withdrawal 
from Kampuchea
2) a cessation of Soviet assistance to 
Vietnam
3) normalization negotiations following 
the withdrawal of Vietnam's first batch 
of troops
4) a promise by China to take practical 
steps to normalization of relations with 
Vietnam and the Soviet Union
5) an independent, neutral and non- 
aligned Kampuchea. 12
Chinese overtures seemed for nothing because at the
resumption of Sino-Soviet talks in March 1983, in a move to 
reassure the Vietnamese, the Soviets refused to discuss 
Kampuchea stating that it was an issue to be settled 
directly between the Chinese and the Indochinese peoples.13 
Soviet intransigence was to the Khmer Rouge benefit as it
11. Statement on Vietnamese Volunteers in Kampuchea, 
February 23, 1983, in Weatherbee, 114-117. Also see the 
statement on the 6th Summit Conference of Indochina in 
Documents on the Kampuchea Problem 1979-1985.
12. Weatherbee, 118-119. Also see van der Kroef, "Dynamics 
of the Cambodian Conflict," Conflict Studies. 183 (1986), 
18.
13. Rosenberger, 229.; and Chang, Kampuchea between China 
and Vietnam, 125-26. The Soviet position was identical to 
the Vietnamese; see Pilch, 42.
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ensured that Chinese suspicion of the Soviet's regional 
intentions would persist.
Thailand's relationship with China was undoubtedly also of 
concern to the Khmer Rouge. In December 1982, Thai Deputy 
Foreign Minister Arun Phanupong visited Moscow for talks 
with his Soviet counterpart. The security of Thailand would 
be determined by the results of the Sino-Soviet dialogue. 
Should a warming of relations occur between China and 
Vietnam, because of Soviet pressure on Hanoi, Bangkok could 
hope for a reduction of hostilities on the part of Vietnam 
against Thailand.
Fortunately for the Khmer Rouge the warming trend was 
progressing slowly and China was not about to let the 
Soviets become too intimate with the Thai. In February 
1983, on a nine day visit to Thailand, Chinese Chief of 
Staff Yang Dezhi renewed China's pledge of military 
assistance to Thailand in the event of Vietnamese 
aggression. As long as the Thai were assured of Chinese 
support and the Soviet Union and Vietnam loomed suspiciously 
in the corners of Indochina, Thailand would remain in the 
Chinese camp and thus supply lines and camps of refuge would 
be assured to the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Rouge had to be extremely careful as it seemed 
that Chinese sentiment in their favour, at least at the 
declaratory level, was on the wane. Although the Chinese 
had not stopped aiding the Khmer Rouge they, as previously 
done in late 1981 and early 1982, stated that the Khmer
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Rouge had not been the ideal leaders of the Kampuchean 
nation. Chinese officials stated:
Yes, the Khmer Rouge made mistakes, 
serious mistakes,...They failed to form 
a proper united front in 1975, after 
victory. They forced people out of the 
city, which was a stupid move. They 
suppressed money and they have abused 
their own people....
Since 1979 the Khmer Rouge have 
recognized their mistakes. The 
Communist Party was dissolved in 
December 1981. The Khmer Rouge have 
fundamentally changed their politics.14
Beijing, nevertheless, was quick to point out that the Khmer 
Rouge had a new outlook and were reforming themselves, thus 
tacitly indicating that the Khmer Rouge were still needed by 
the Chinese in the carrying out of Beijing's regional 
politics.
However, on 31 January 1983, Prince Norodom Sihanouk met 
with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and was hosted at a banquet 
by Deng. Although a member of the coalition, the Khmer 
Rouge must have found it disquieting to see Sihanouk, 
China's old friend, on such cordial relations with Beijing. 
The idea of the Khmer Rouge returning to power on their own, 
according to China's declaratory policy, was an 
unlikelihood. Zhao Ziyang avowed: "We will never let the 
Khmer Rouge come back in power alone."15 The statement was 
telling on two counts. First it was an admission by China
14. "How China's hand was shown in Kampuchea," 9 June 1983, 
of the Bangkok Post in J. Bekaert, Kampuchea Diary.
15. Ibid.
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of its influence over the political situation in Kampuchea, 
and second it was an affirmation of support for the other 
partners in the CGDK.
Sihanouk ran with the Chinese criticisms of the Khmer Rouge. 
In an interview with the Bangkok Post he stated that China 
and the Soviet Union were looking towards a neutral 
Kampuchea. Sihanouk boasted: "The Chinese promised me
they have no intention to dominate Kampuchea but would like 
a neutral country with Norodom Sihanouk as its effective 
leader."16 In addition, the Prince mentioned the
possibility of civil war unless a disarming of the various 
factions occured or a peace-keeping force was created. The 
Khmer Rouge were under seige. By Sihanouk's account it was 
the circumstances that had changed not the Khmer Rouge.17 
The Prince's comments broadened a schism where mistrust and 
ill feelings predominate within the CGDK to the present day.
In June 1983, China asserted that the combined forces of the 
members of the CGDK could militarily defeat the
Vietnamese.18 Khieu Samphan contested in a 1986 interview, 
promoting Khmer Rouge might, that 1983 was a crucial year 
for his followers. He affirmed:
It was the year we started launching 
long-range missions inside the country.
We started to operate in bright
16. "Sihanouk: China has no designs on Kampuchea," 5
October 1983, of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
17. Ibid.
18. van der Kroef, "Dynamics of the Cambodian Conflict,"
12 .
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daylight, and not at nights as before.
In 1983 we started moving towards the 
Tonk Sap (military zone number 1) and 
other far away areas of the country.19
Sihanouk disagreed with the Chinese position indicating that 
force perceptions differed among the ranks of the contending 
parties . 20
Political manoeuvering continued throughout 1983. In 
September, the Soviets shot down the Korean Air Lines (KAL) 
jet. At the United Nations the Chinese abstained from a 
vote which condemned the Soviet action.21 Only a year 
earlier China would have probably jumped at the opportunity 
to find fault with the Soviet rival. Moscow, although 
undoubtedly appreciative of the Chinese gesture, would not 
renew a friendship with the Chinese at the exclusion of 
Vietnam. On 31 October, the 3 November 1978 Soviet- 
Vietnamese treaty of friendship and cooperation was 
renewed.22
In early 1984 it became evident that the Khmer Rouge were 
gaining on the offensive. In addition to their regular 
attacks on various convoys and isolated areas, the Khmer 
Rouge actually carried out successful raids on a number of 
urban areas: Kampong Thom (January 19), Siem Riep (January
19. "Mr. Khieu Samphan looks to tomorrow," 4 April 1986, 
of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
20. van der Kroef, 12.
21. Rosenberger, 229.
2 2 . Ibid.
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27), Purset (February 6), and Battambang (February 17).23 
The successes can be, as Karl D. Jackson suggests, 
accredited to a "positive relationship between money, 
military supplies, and successful recruiting.... "24 A 
factor in the Khmer Rouge success was, largely due to 
Chinese assistance, their growth in numbers from a November 
1982 strength of 20,000-35,000 troops to 40,000-50,000 men 
in early 1984.25
While Beijing’s support for the Khmer Rouge continued, the 
Khmer Rouge were not the only ones to gain Chinese 
assistance. On a 1984 visit to the United States, Premier 
Zhao Ziyang stated:
...the surest way to force Vietnam to 
pull out of Kampuchea is to support the 
resistance forces in Kampuchea and exert 
political and moral pressure on 
Vietnam.26
C.Y. Chang best epitomizes the Chinese position at the time. 
He indicates that,
In order to avoid the political 
justification for the preservation of 
Khmer Rouge power, China has been forced 
to adopt a military approach to the 
solution of the Kampuchean crisis.27
23. Karl D. Jackson, "Indochina in Early ’84: Doves of
Peace or Dogs of War," in Weatherbee, 41.
24. Ibid., 39-40.
25. Ibid.
26. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 129. My 
ital ics.
27. "Enigma of the Khmer Rouge," of the Bangkok Post, 18 
February 1984, in Bekaert, Kampuchean Diary.
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China’s military approach included minimal support to the 
non-communist factions and was coupled with diplomatic 
initiatives involving Vietnam, the Soviet Union and ASEAN.28
In Vientiane in January 1984, the Indochinese Foreign 
Ministers complained that China was using the Kampuchean 
issue and the CGDK as cards in its global strategy for 
hegemony.29 In the Vientiane proposals the ministers put 
forth six possible outcomes to the conflict. The scenarios 
were disregarded by China and the Khmer Rouge as mere 
propoganda.30
In July 1984, the Khmer Rouge were again under attack. This 
time it was ASEAN’s turn to take a jab at them. At an 
ASEAN ministerial meeting, members suggested the retirement 
of some of the Khmer Rouge leadership. China quickly came 
to the Khmer Rouge defence. Deng threatened to cut off aid 
to the entire CGDK if one partner of the coalition were to 
be removed.31 The Chinese continued to publicly insist 
that it was the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance that was the root 
cause of tension, not the Khmer Rouge.32
However, as Jacques Bekaert points out, behind the scenes 
the Chinese did urge the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to
28. This will be expanded upon throughout this chapter.
29. ’’Vientiane Communique 30 January 1984," in Documents on 
Kampuchea, 178.
30. For the six scenarios see Pilch, 43., and Weatherbee, 
123-126.
31. Chanda, Brother Enemy, 394.
32. Chang, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam, 132.
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accept a more flexible line.33 The Khmer Rouge nevertheless 
resisted such calls, going so far as to provoke serious 
incidents against the soldiers of the National Sihanoukist 
Army (ANS) - whose leader was a member of the CGDK.34 
Bekaert indicates that privately Chinese officials stated 
that the Khmer Rouge were relics of the past, remnants of 
the Gang of Four era. Yet a leader of Son Sann's KPNLF 
found the Chinese position difficult to fathom. He 
complained:
If everybody believes we are the good 
guys how come we get so little compared 
to the Khmer Rouge. And if everybody 
claims they never want to see the Khmer 
Rouge back in power how come the Khmer 
Rouge get so much.35
China's declaratory policy differed from its actual policy.
In October, the three leaders of the CGDK - Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan and Son Sann - visited Beijing. In 
addition to suggesting that if necessary China would be 
willing to teach the Vietnamese another lesson, Deng came to 
the defence of Pol Pot. He remarked:
People want Mr. Pol Pot to stop his 
activities. We do not deny that Mr. Pol 
Pot has made mistakes but we cannot
33. "Prelude to changes in the Democratic Kampuchea
organization?" 9 August 1984, of the Bangkok Post in
Bekaert.
34. "Kampuchean leaders meet to thrash out differences," 17 
August 1984, of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
35. "Mr. Son Sann goes to Peking," 7 July 1984, of the 
Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
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accept that he has to go. His army is 
fighting hard.36
Sihanouk in a turn around to 1983, when he disagreed with 
China's opinion that the combined forces of the CGDK could 
defeat the Vietnamese, now claimed that Beijing was not 
taking the military capabilities of the non-communist 
resistance seriously enough.37
China's upholding of the CGDK and then its focus on the 
Khmer Rouge to the neglect of the non-communist factions can 
be seen through another of Bekaert's revelations. In 1984, 
there was a suspected internal reform of the Khmer Rouge. 
Several members, including Thioun Mumm, Thioun Thioun and 
Keat Chuon left the organization. They were recognized as 
the progressive elements within the Democratic Kampuchean 
Party. Bekaert suggests that although Pol Pot, Ieng Sary
and Ta Mok were the powerful leaders of the party, Son Sen 
and Khieu Samphan were those that led the way for the 
progressives. From this one perceives a two-prong approach, 
calculated or not, to the Khmer Rouge and Chinese policies. 
Escapees who fled the Khmer Rouge camp of Klong Wah in 
October 1984, claimed that,
The CGDK is something between Khieu 
Samphan, Son Sann and Sihanouk. The 
other Khmer Rouge leaders have nothing 
to do with it.38
36. "Sihanouk not ready for Hanoi's overtures," of the 
Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
37. Ibid.
38. "Would you buy a used car from Pol Pot?,
1985, of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
ti 2 August
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Therefore, for external purposes, one had the CGDK which 
gave Democratic Kampuchea legitimacy on the political front, 
with China offering little more than moral support to the 
other members. On the military plane China principally 
backed the less "progressive" elements of the Khmer Rouge 
led by Pol Pot and his lackeys. It is not yet clear 
however, how progressive one could claim Khieu Samphan to 
be; he no doubt was not in disagreement with China's and Pol 
Pot's military strategy.39
December 1984 brought with it a couple of initiatives on the 
part of the Soviet Union and Vietnam. For the first time in 
fifteen years a senior official of the Soviet Union visited 
Beijing. Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov went to 
China despite Beijing's objections to Moscow's Vietnam 
policy.40 Shortly after Arkhipov's visit Vietnam's Thach, 
in an unprecedented letter to Chinese Foreign Minister Wu 
Xueqian, wrote:
We will never forget what China did for 
us during the Vietnamese war and the 
assistance we have received from you.
Now we would like to engage in secret 
talks to restore the friendship of the 
old days.41
39. Remember that Khieu Samphan's position vacillated 
between the moderates and the more hard liners. See pp. 15- 
16, 25-26 of this work.
40. Gary Klintworth, "Mr. Gorbachev's China Diplomacy" 
(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working 
Paper 111, October 1986), 2.
41. "Sihanouk highlights Vietnam's diplomatic 'tricks'," 19 
February 1985, of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
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China's obduracy was revealed in Beijing's reply: there 
would be no talks until Vietnam withdrew its troops from 
Kampuchea.42 The Soviet Union undoubtedly encouraged 
Vietnam to try and reconcile its differences with China. 
Interesting however, was the December refusal by Hun Sen, 
while in Paris, to meet with Sihanouk because he was allied 
to Pol Pot.43 It would seem odd that Vietnam should wish to 
negotiate with China and yet the PRK would not meet with the 
Prince. Perhaps Vietnam's influence over the PRK regime was 
not as great as assumed, or maybe Vietnamese intentions had 
not yet been relayed to the PRK leaders as an accommodation 
was to be reached by the greater powers first.
At a conference of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers held in 
Ho Chi Minh City in January 1985, the ministers while 
censuring the Chinese and Thai "reactionaries" for 
supporting the Khmer Rouge, nevertheless offered a warm hand 
to the Chinese. They stated:
...the three Indochinese peoples 
invariably treasure their honoured 
friendship with the Chinese people and 
always look forward to an early 
restoration of their friendship.44
Among a number of other proposals the ministers insisted 
that Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn if the Pol Pot
4 2. Ibid.
43. "No cutting up the Kampuchean pie, says Sihanouk," 28 
December 1984, of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert.
44. Pilch, 46.
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clique was excluded from any negotiated settlement.45 As 
Justus van der Kroef suggests, Vietnam's goal was to split 
the CGDK by offering the prospects of Vietnamese withdrawal 
and a new regime for Kampuchea thereby removing their 
greatest thorn, the Khmer Rouge, from any sanctioned 
political participation in a future Kampuchea.46
The Vietnamese had good reason to fear the Khmer Rouge. In 
April, while the Chinese and Vietnamese were holding private 
talks in Beijing, the Khmer Rouge were increasing their 
guerrilla attacks; they were even thought to be threatening 
Phnom Penh. In fact, a member of the Khmer Rouge revealed 
to a Khmer nationalist: "We have such quantity of ammunition 
in the interior we won't have problems for long."47
Nevertheless the Khmer Rouge, under pressure from China and 
the Vietnamese diplomatic offensive, opted to proclaim a 
number of their own proposals and their vision of a future 
Kampuchea. On 14 and 24 July 1985, Democratic Kampuchean 
radio, Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, broadcast statements 
from a meeting of the leadership of the "National Army of 
Democratic Kampuchea," held 6 July. A future Kampuchean 
government would be "a liberal capitalist regime,
45. The Indochinese five-point proposal can be found in "Ho 
Chi Minh 18 January 1985 5 Point Proposal," in Documents on 
the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985.
46. van der Kroef, "Dynamics of the Cambodian Conflict" 
Conflict Studies 183 (1986): 3. I emphasize 'sanctioned 
political action' because war is the extension of politics 
by other means.
47. "Sihanouk seeks room for manoeuvering" of the Bangkok 
Post, 26 April 1985, in Bekaert. Also see van der Kroef, 5; and Pilch, 64.
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economically, and a parliamentary regime, politically." 
Cambodia should promote an "independent, peaceful, neutral 
and non-aligned policy." As well, "through elections the 
party may or may not participate in the responsibility of 
national government." The future president of Kampuchea 
would be "Samdij" Norodom Sihanouk.48
Sihanouk was not impressed with the announcement, 
complaining to Western reporters that the Khmer Rouge were 
killing a large number of ANS forces and seizing their 
weapons, underlining the contradictions in the Khmer Rouge 
statement.49 The Vietnamese and the PRK regime maintained 
that the Pol Pot clique had to be eliminated. This could be 
accomplished through the cessation of Chinese and Thai aid 
to the Khmer Rouge.50 The Beijing Review on the other hand 
argued that the Khmer Rouge were searching for a political 
solution.51
On the surface it appeared that the Khmer Rouge responded to 
some of Vietnam's and the PRK's concerns. On 24 August, 
considered progressives Son Sen and Khieu Samphan were
48. van der Kroef, 21; and "In Search of the moderates" 9 
August 1985, of the Bangkok Post in Bekaert. Note that the 
use of 'Samdij' is a sign of respect.
49. van der Kroef, 4. As van der Kroef indicates the 
significance here is that the announcement was made in 
Beijing, undoubtedly a signal to the PRC that Sihanouk was 
unpleased with Khmer Rouge policy. See Peter Carey, 
"Prospects for Peace in Cambodia," FEER (22 December 1988): 
17-18.
50. Ibid.
51. van der Kroef, 22; and "Phnom Penh 16 August 1985," 
Documents on the Kampuchea Problem.
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promoted within the ranks of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot was 
retired. Son Sen was appointed Secretary General of the 
Supreme Committee of the National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea (NADK), and chairman and commander in chief of the 
NADK. Pol Pot's resignation as military commander was 
cosmetic in nature, for he assumed the post of "Chairman of 
the High Technical Office for National Defence," a post 
concerned with analysis and exploration of strategies in the 
national defence field. In addition, as van der Kroef 
indicates, although the National Army's Supreme Commission 
which Pol Pot headed was said to be abolished, there was no 
evidence that its principal function of overseeing overall 
strategic leadership and the training of DK forces had 
ceased or been taken over by another organ.52
China applauded the change in leadership indicating that it 
would help unite the Khmer people in their opposition to 
Vietnamese aggress ion.53 However it would be premature to 
suppose, as Bekaert did, that China "no longer saw Pol Pot 
so important from a military point of view," for Pol Pot was 
never far in the background.54 As well, contrary to Khmer 
Rouge statements other radical elements, such as Ta Mok, who
52. van der Kroef, 10; "How deep is the change in the DK?," 
4 October 1985 of the Bangkok Post, in Bekaert; "Pol Pot 
rides into Chinese sunset 'on a white horse,'" in Bekaert.
53. van der Kroef, 9-10.
"How deep is the change in the DK?"54.
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were also thought to have declined in power, would be a 
major force in the late 1980s.55
The Vietnamese were sceptical about Khmer Rouge reforms. As 
van der Kroef reasons:
...the Vietnamese have some grounds for 
their scepticism as they view the Pol 
Pot demotion and the DK's July 
declaration. History shows that in 
their struggle for power, various 
Communist parties, including the 
Vietnamese party, have for tactical 
reasons been quite ready not just to 
drop from leadership [or appear to have 
done so] those who have become an 
embarrassment, but also to play down 
their formal Communist affiliates by 
changing their name and objectives, so 
as to attempt to acquire a broader, 
including 'bourgeois capitalist’, 
appeal.56
Khieu Samphan although toning down the traditional Khmer 
Rouge rhetoric, vowed to continue fighting the Vietnamese. 
In September, he opined:
It will not be the same as in 1975-78. 
The situation is different today. 
Facing us is a clear well-identified 
enemy. Vietnam is ready to swallow 
Kampuchea. We are today fighting for 
the survival of our country, not to 
establish a certain type of regime. We 
have always fought for Kampuchea. This
55. Ibid. It is plausible that the retirement of Pol Pot 
was only a temporary measure allowing him to regain his 
health after having visited doctors in Beijing in June for 
treatment of malaria and high blood pressure. See ’’Very 
sick Pol Pot leaves HQ for China," 19 November 1986 of the 
Bangkok Post, in Bekaert.
56. van der Kroef, 23.
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is today our true policy: the survival 
of our nation.57
A reformed Khmer Rouge seemed a dubious assertion even if 
for the moment the once long term goal of complete social 
transformation was of lesser importance.
The Chinese did not give up their regional military strategy 
which included supporting the Thai who had been assisting 
Democratic Kampuchean forces. In November, China gave 24 
Chinese type-59 main battle tanks to Thailand as part of a 
military grant-in-aid. Later they were to supply the Thai 
with 18 130mm guns, 37mm anti-aircraft guns and 85mm anti­
tank guns.58 Obviously Beijing still believed that a 
military solution might be the way to achieve a Kampuchean 
settlement.
The stated transformation of the Khmer Rouge had some effect 
on the cohesion of the CGDK. On 25 January 1986, ANS and 
Khmer Rouge troops joined forces in an attack on Vietnamese 
positions east of Battambang.59 Then on 28 March, all three
57. "The 'Gang of Four,’" 6 September 1985 of the Bangkok 
Post, in Bekaert.
58. S.S. Bhattacharya, "Big Powers' Interests in Southeast
Asia," in ed. Parimal Kumar Das. At about the same time the 
United States signed an agreement to supply Thailand with 12 
F-16 Falcon jet-fighters and promised more lethal weapons. 
See Gonganath Jha, "Thailand-Vietnam: A Frontline State's 
Perception of an Adversary," in ed. Parimal Kumar Das, 276.
In February 1986 the Reagan administration planned to sell
military hardware to China as part of the US Far Eastern
strategy to keep the Soviet Union and Vietnam at bay. See
Bhattacharya, 167.
59. "Who is winning the war in Kampuchea?," 7 February
1986, of the Bangkok Post, in Bekaert.
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parties to the CGDK participated in another attack on 
Battambang.60
On 17 March, the CGDK launched their own eight point peace 
proposal. The initiative called for:
1. CGDK-Vietnam negotiations based on a 
phased withdrawal by Vietnam from 
Kampuchea
2. UN supervision of the withdrawal and 
a ceasefire
3. CGDK--PRK negotiations to establish a 
quadripartite coalition government with 
Sihanouk as President and Son Sann as 
Prime Minister
4. free elections with United Nations 
supervision
5. restoration of an independent, 
neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea with a 
liberal democratic regime
6. UN guarantees of Kampuchean neutra­
lity
7. reconstruction of Kampuchea
8 a non-aggression and peaceful 
coexistence treaty between Kampuchea and 
Vietnam.61
The PRC supported the new initiative, stating that 
"consultations on an equal footing, free from external 
influence," should occur between the various Kampuchean 
political groupings. China also offered a more congenial 
relationship between Hanoi and Beijing providing that 
Vietnam withdraw its troops and give up its anti-China
60. "A 'premiere' in Battambang" of the Bangkok Post, 25 
April 1986, in Bekaert.
61. CGDK, Kampuchea under Foreign Occupation, 1986, 7.
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policy.62 Vietnam rejected the CGDK proposal on the grounds 
that it did not call for the disarming of the coalition 
forces, particularly the Khmer Rouge.63
In his famous Vladivostok speech of 28 July 1986, Mikhail 
Gorbachev opened the door to more serious negotiations 
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. 
In a call for a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations he 
stated that the resolution of the Kampuchean imbroglio 
rested with the improvement of relations between the 
sovereign nations of China and Vietnam.
In September, Deng Xiaoping insisted that the Soviets had to 
take a firmer, more influential, step vis a vis the 
Vietnamese.64 Perhaps they had, for in that same month 
Hanoi announced a willingness to negotiate with China.65 
The Soviets also pointed out that Heng Samrin and others of 
the PRK regime were once Khmer Rouge members and therefore 
an accommodation with the more progressive elements of the 
Khmer Rouge should occur.66 Hence, in an October proposal 
put forth to the Austrian delegation of the United Nations, 
the Vietnamese offered to accept a Khmer Rouge presence 
under the leadership of Khieu Samphan in talks with the
62. See the statements made by Wu Xuequian in ’’China: Hanoi 
must quit Kampuchea," 26 October 1986 of the Bangkok Post, 
in Bekaert.
63. Pilch, 48-49.
64. Gary Klintworth, "Mr. Gorbachev's China Diplomacy," 5.
6 5. PiIch, 6 4.
66. Ibid., 67.
126
CGDK.67 Finally, in December, Hanoi called for the meeting 
in Bucharest of all four Kampuchean factions.68
Recognition of the Khmer Rouge right to participate in the 
negotiation process can be seen as a victory for them. 
However, by including the Khmer Rouge into the process they 
would have to give up their objective, at least on the 
declaratory level, to exclusively hold power. They were now 
one of many factions which staked a claim to mould the 
future of Kampuchea. In fact, the Chinese, according to 
Gary Klintworth, were now discussing the neutralization of 
the Khmer Rouge rather than allow them to act freely.69 In 
addition to the restraints imposed on the Khmer Rouge by 
China, the Khmer Rouge power base was also eroding because 
of inroads made by the PRK regime on the domestic economic 
front. These reduced the woes of the Khmer people which the 
Khmer Rouge exploited to gain support.70
In a 2 December 1986 internal document, Khmer Rouge 
consternation was evident. They claimed that calls for the
67. Ibid.; and "Sihanouk reveals Hanoi peace initiative," 
13 November 1986 of the Bangkok Post, in Bekaert.
68. Pilch, 67.
69. Klintworth states that Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had,
since 1986, stated that the Khmer Rouge should be 
neutralized. See Klintworth, "China’s Indochina Policy" 
Paper presented to the Department of International Relations 
and North East Asia Programme (Canberra: The Australian
National University, 13 April 1989), 19. Klintworth's
assertion is interesting but as recent events show the 
Chinese had not yet "neutralized" the Khmer Rouge to prevent 
them from attempting to take power. Nor is it certain that 
this was the Chinese intention at the time.
70. For a discussion of the PRK's economic reforms refer to 
"Avoid the train," The Economist (19 April 1986) : 4 4.
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resignation of Khmer Rouge leaders were causing low morale 
and confusion in the ranks. Admitting that the Khmer Rouge 
were "somewhat excessive" during their rule, they maintained 
that the time of their reign was the best period in Khmer 
history. They would oppose any moves to remove their 
leaders from power and would make all efforts to preserve 
party solidarity. Although there were inclinations towards 
a capitalist phase in post-Vietnam Kampuchea, the Khmer 
Rouge admitted to having a separate policy agenda.71 
Despite external pressure, it seemed that internally the 
Khmer Rouge were planning on preserving the bulk of their 
previous positions.
The 1987 to 1989 period witnessed increased efforts at 
reaching a political settlement parallel to a Vietnamese 
withdrawal. Prince Sihanouk positioned himself at the fore, 
appealing to most interested parties as a moderate.
In early 1987, Sihanouk refused to comply with Vietnam's 
request to meet with Hun Sen. His rejection stemmed from 
objections by the other members of the CGDK.72 However by 
the spring of 1987, the Prince was whistling a different 
tune. Rather than working with the CGDK he announced on 7 
May, his one year leave of absence from the coalition to 
protest recent killings of his soldiers by the Khmer Rouge.
71. Nayan Chanda provides us with this valuable evidence, 
see "Support for Sihanouk," FEER (14 July 1988 ) : 14. 
Movement towards a capitalist type economy was promoted by 
the Khmer Rouge 6 July 1985, see pp.119 & 120 of this work.
72. Gareth Porter, "Cambodia: Sihanouk's Initiative," 
Foreign Affairs (Spring 1988):820.
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In a telegram to his son, Prince Norodom Ranaridh, Sihanouk 
stated:
...my conscience does not allow me to 
serve as a pawn - even if a pivotal one 
on the chess board of confrontation 
between two antagonistic power
blocs ... 73
China promptly pointed out that the Prince was only on a 
leave of absence and that he still headed the CGDK. 
Presumably fearing a loss of the CGDK's credibility without 
the Prince, the Khmer Rouge appealed for him to stay on as 
the CGDK's leader. Sihanouk replied that he would not be:
...content with the beautiful words of 
Khmer Rouge propoganda. It is necessary 
that they give irrefutable proof that 
they have changed. Otherwise I shall 
not put an end to my leave of absence.74
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach capitalized on Sihanouk's 
move, annunciating:
I think if he [Sihanouk] can contribute 
to reconciliation he could have a very 
good role.... But when he made a 
coalition with Pol Pot he merely 
committed suicide. Now he must make 
some distance between himself and Pol 
Pot. Otherwise the Cambodian people 
will never accept him. 75
73. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987: Sihanouk on Centre Stage," 
Asian Survey XXVIII, no. 1 (January 1988):112.
74. This last section and Sihanouk's quote were taken from 
Chanda, "The Prince makes waves," FEER (18 June 1987):48.
75. "Hopes dashed in Cambodia," Guardian (9 September 
1987): 11.
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At the same time as Sihanouk's resignation, Soviet Secretary 
General Gorbachev suggested in talks with Nguyen Van Linh 
that Vietnam not be too harsh on the Khmer Rouge. Gorbachev 
propounded the "unification of all [Cambodia's] national 
patriotic forces", urging the Vietnamese to accept some 
Khmer Rouge in the negotiation process.76 Following 
consultations between the Soviet Union, the PRK, Vietnam and 
Indonesia, a call was made in July by Jakarta and Hanoi for 
the holding of talks between the Heng Samrin regime and the 
CGDK .
On 27 August, the PRK government stated that it would meet 
with the "other groups of Khmers and their leaders, except 
the criminal Pol Pot and some of his close collaborators." 
In early September, Hun Sen announced that the Khmer Rouge, 
excluding Pol Pot or Ieng Sary, could have a role in the 
negotiations and in a political accommodation. The Khmer 
Rouge forthrightly rejected the offer to meet with Hun 
Sen.77 Their argument and that of the KPNLF was that any
76. Chanda asserts that this offer refers to the Sihanouk 
and communist forces which were allied against the Lon Nol 
regime. See Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 112; and "Peace 
Offensive," Asiaweek (9 October 1987), 17. The latter 
article incorrectly suggests that the Khmer Rouge were not 
included in Gorbachev's coalition. Pilch absurdly 
postulates that Gorbachev may have wanted to tie the PRK and 
Khmer Rouge regime together thereby forcing out the non­
communist elements of the coalition. See Pilch, 51.
77. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 113. Chanda gives a number 
of reasons for Hun Sen's conciliatory disposition: the PRK 
inability to secure domestic legitimacy and political 
support, Moscow pressure on Vietnam, the political costs of 
a continued Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea, and the 
opportunities provided by Sihanouk's leave of absence. See 
Chanda, 110-11.
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meeting of the various Khmer political factions with the 
Heng Samrin regime would imply that the Kampuchean crisis 
was the result of civil war, not Vietnamese intervent ion.78
The Khmer Rouge and KPNLF denunciation of the proposed 
talks, or 'cocktail party1 as it became known, did not stop 
the PRK nor Sihanouk from forging ahead with their own game 
plan. In what a western diplomat declared as "an attempt to 
woo Sihanouk and destroy the coalition," Phnom Penh on 8 
October, offered a five point plan which tempted Sihanouk 
with a high position in any future government, and promised 
elections which would be scrutinized by foreign observers. 
Any future Kampuchean government would be peaceful, 
independent, democratic, neutral and non-aligned.79
China recognized Sihanouk’s determination to go his own way 
in the event that his other coalition partners did not agree 
with him. In a snub to the Khmer Rouge the Chinese 
leadership, perhaps hoping to prevent a Sihanouk-PRK 
alliance, told Sihanouk that they wanted him to lead a
78. Hiebert, "Mochtar cocktail party," FEER (13 August 
1987 ) : 34.
79. "Phnom Penh woos the Prince," Asiaweek (23 October 
1987):31. Elections would follow a complete Vietnamese 
withdrawal with a cessation of foreign aid to all the 
resistance groups. The PRK proposal was similar to one made 
at a meeting of the Indochinese governments in 1983. As 
well, the PRK proposed negotiations which would lead to the 
establishment of the Thai-Cambodian border as one of "peace 
and friendship." This had been rejected by the Thai when 
proposed in 1980; see Hiebert, "Peace or Propoganda" FEER 
(22 October 1987 ) :35; and Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 113.
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future Cambodian government where neither the Khmer Rouge 
nor Hun Sen would have a dominating influence.80
Sihanouk, putting China's offer aside, opted to meet Hun Sen 
at Fere-en-Tardenois 2-4 December. The two leaders agreed 
that a political solution through negotiations with all the 
Kampuchean parties was the only way of resolving the 
conflict. For the first time Hun Sen stated that he had no 
difficulties accepting Khieu Samphan as a coalition 
partner.81 Following the attainment of an accord an 
international conference would be held to ensure its 
maintenance and the independence of Kampuchea.82
At the diplomatic level the Khmer Rouge were outshined by 
the Prince. In the short term they would try and compensate 
for ground lost to Sihanouk, by placing less emphasis on 
military initiatives. This change of heart not only stemmed 
from the flurry of activity on the diplomatic scene, but 
also came from an internal reality imposed upon the Khmer 
Rouge because of disunity in the ranks, a higher desertion 
rate and low morale among the forces. As Chanda indicates, 
the Khmer Rouge generally estimated at approximately 35- 
50,000 troops, was seen in 1987 as having force numbers in 
the environs of 15-20,000 troops.83 The 1984-85 Vietnamese
80. Chanda, 114. Also see "Cambodia peace talks under 
'Soviet blessing'," The Age (28 November 1987):9.
81. Chanda, "The train starts here," FEER (12 December 
1987): 14.
82. Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 114.
83. Ibid. 105-106. Refer back to page 113.
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dry season offensive which disrupted many Khmer Rouge border 
camps and logistics, had a prolonged effect on the Khmer 
Rouge. They had to adopt another strategy rather than 
deplete valuable resources in military combat. By bribing 
villagers with American funds donated by the PRC, or paying 
higher prices for crops, the Khmer Rouge embarked on a 
"village strategy" whereby they would try and win the hearts 
and minds of the peasantry rallying anti-Vietnamese 
support.84 The Khmer Rouge change in position was clearly 
tactical. Within a few years one would again see them on 
the military offensive.
Especially at a time when the Khmer Rouge were considered to 
be weak, it would be in their interest to promote as 
vigorously as possible a Vietnamese withdrawal from 
Kampuchea. With China's diplomatic assistance such a move 
would leave a vacuum into which the military arm of the 
Khmer Rouge could enter, trying to regain what it had lost 
on the political front. Moreover, not only was the 
withdrawal of the Vietnamese necessary but also there should 
follow a purge of any Vietnamese sympathizers. Cryptically 
one Khmer Rouge cadre told a group of peasants: "When the 
water rises, fish eat ants, but when the water recedes ants 
eat fish."85
84. Porter, 812; Ross H. Munro, "Facing a Grim Reality," 
Time (5 June 1989):27-28; and Mary K. Magistad, "Back to 
Zero?," New Statesman and Society (24 February 1989 ) : 21 .
85. Porter, 821.
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The Vietnamese had promised a complete withdrawal by 1990 
regardless of whether a political solution had been 
reached. 86 On 29 November the Vietnamese withdrew an 
estimated 20,000 troops from Kampuchea. However western 
intelligence sources in Bangkok claimed that within a few 
weeks of the withdrawal an additional 12-15,000 new men were 
brought in. While China and the Khmer Rouge said that the 
withdrawal was a propaganda trick to gain international 
prestige, the PRK regime warned that if any external forces 
took advantage of Vietnam's withdrawal to create further 
instability Phnom Penh would, "discuss with our Vietnamese 
friends new measures to adopt...."87
Following some political juggling Sihanouk agreed to meet 
with Hun Sen in early January 1988.88 At St. Germain-en- 
Laye 21-22 January, although invited, neither the Khmer 
Rouge nor the KPNLF participated in talks held between 
Sihanouk and Hun Sen. Sihanouk called for the withdrawal of 
Vietnam from Kampuchea, the dismantling of the PRK regime 
leading to the establishment of a provisional government,
86. The Vietnamese were pressured by the Soviets to drop 
their demand for a political solution before a full 
withdrawal would occur. See "Peace Offensive," Asiaweek (9 
October 1989):17; and John Schidlovsky, "War has crippled 
the people and the economy," Sydney Morning Herald (17 
December 1988 ): 18.
87. Hiebert, "That annual exercise," FEER (10 December 
1987): 23. Also refer to Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 107; 
and Klintworth, "China's Indochina Policy," 15.
88. For Sihanouk's manoeuvering with him putting pressure 
on China and the Khmer Rouge to compromise in the 
negotiation process see Chanda, "Stop-go-train of peace," 
FEER (12 December 1987) :10; and Becker, "The Progress of 
Peace in Cambodia" Current History (April 1989):170.
134
and the holding of general elections under international 
supervision. An international peace keeping force (IPKF) 
would not only safeguard free elections but would also 
protect the new regime against overthrow by the Khmer Rouge. 
Hun Sen responded favourably, however he would not 
relinquish control over Kampuchea until elections were 
held.89
In a Pravda editorial, Vsevolod Ovchinnikov acknowledged 
that f,both the [Soviet Union and China] have the possibility 
to facilitate the success of the negotiations - to promote 
contacts between the opposing sides."90 Chinese 
journalists, however, were not as keen to admit their 
governments *s ability to influence events in Indochina. In 
the Beijing Review, while the Chinese previously called for 
the Soviet Union to apply greater pressure on the 
Vietnamese, Wan Guong stressed: "As a matter of principle, 
issues in all parts of the world should mainly be resolved 
through consultation among the concerned countries in the 
region."91
89. Michael Field, "Sihanouk - ACT II," FEER (4 February 
1988):30-31. Concerning Hun Sen not making way for a 
quadripartite coalition see Rodney Tasker and Robert Delfs, 
"Sweetening the cocktail," FEER (14 July 1988 ) : 13.
90. Sophie Quinn-Judge, "A Sino-Soviet summit offer," FEER 
(4 February 1988):30-31.
91. Wan Guong, "Road to the Elimination of Hot Spots," 
Beijing Review (25-31 January 1988):5. On 12 January, Deng 
stated that "without Soviet assistance, Viet Nam could not 
fight a single day in Kampuchea," thereby indicating the 
Soviets could do more to influence the Vietnamese. See 
"Talks Still Conditional," Beijing Review (1-7 February 
1988):13.
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The Chinese, Khmer Rouge and KPNLF feared that Sihanouk 
would goes his own way, forging an alliance with Hun Sen, 
leaving the others behind.92 The groups fears were 
exacerbated by the resignation of Sihanouk as President of 
the CGDK at the end of January. Sihanouk reproached the 
Chinese for their refusal to disarm all Khmer factions, 
accusing them of wanting to keep the Khmer Rouge armed.93 
The Khmer Rouge, probably realizing that because they 
continued to be the strongest force militarily, claimed that 
the Prince would return to the CGDK.94
While the Chinese and their allies were mistrustful of 
Sihanouk, the Prince and the PRK were themselves fearful of 
the Khmer Rouge. In a People's Republic of Kampuchea Armed 
Forces (PRKAF) March 1988 confidential report, the PRK 
government revealed its frustration at the army's inability 
to prevent the Khmer Rouge from "infiltrating remote areas, 
building its underground network and collecting information 
and foreign villagers to join the Khmer Rouge."95 With the
92. Robert Thomson, "Premier Sihanouk has strategic fit of 
political pique," The Age (2 December 1988):13.
93. Pilch, 51, and Becker, 17.
94. Becker, 170.
95. Bekaert, "Cambodia: A nasty little war," in
International Defence Review 3 (1989):290. Also see Tom 
Fawthrop, "Cause for Optimism," FEER (3 March 1988):18. The 
Chinese had armed the Khmer Rouge with AK-47 and SKS rifles, 
B-40 rocket launchers, RPGs, 12.7mm heavy machine guns, and 
mortars from 60 to 120mm. See Bekaert, 290, who puts NADK 
forces at 25,000 regulars. The number of Khmer Rouge range 
from Chanda's estimate of 15-20,000 troops (see p.131 of 
this work), to 30,000 as proposed by Field,"Sihanouk-ACT 
II," 31. There is general consensus that the Khmer Rouge 
outnumber the combined forces of the KPNLF and ANS. It
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Khmer Rouge working in small, undetectable groups, they 
engaged in the military assassination of PRK cadres and were 
believed, according to East European sources, to have "vast" 
networks of informers and agents within the PRK 
administration.96
Even though the Heng Samrin regime recognized that the
inclusion of some elements of the Khmer Rouge in the
political process was necessary, the disbanding of the
powerful NADK was imperative. When asked what type of
solution could be reached without the participation of the
Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen replied:
We can negotiate a general solution or a 
partial solution. A partial solution is 
the People's Republic of Kampuchea and 
Sihanouk agreement.97
Any complete solution to the Kampuchean crisis would entail 
the Khmer Rouge as participants within the peace process. 
One should note however that their inclusion in negotiations 
would not preclude compliance by the Khmer Rouge to the 
demands of the other parties. While Khieu Samphan was wary 
of the peace process itself, labelling it as an attempt "to 
make sure the Vietnamese continue occupying" Kampuchea, the 
Khmer Rouge used negotiations as a means to maintain a
should be noted however that even a small number of 
guerrilla type forces can cause havoc.
96. Bekaert, 291.
97. Fawthrop, 18-19. In addition, Hun Sen stressed the 
PRK's independence from Vietnam. Also see Jon Swain, 
"Kampuchea and the turning back of the clock to...Day 1, 
Year 0," The Australian (28 June 1988):13.
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certain powerhold over the process.98 The crux of the 
matter truly lay with the Khmer Rouge military might 
something that neither they nor the Chinese would dare 
weaken.
Calling for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops 
from Indochina, Beijing argued that the Vietnamese position 
was flawed. Vietnam's estimation of troop numbers did not 
take into account "volunteer forces" and according to the 
Chinese:
As the aggressor Viet Nam has no right 
to make the exclusion of the Khmer 
Rouge, which has been fighting against 
its invasion, a precondition for the 
withdrawal of its troops from 
Kampuchea.99
In June, China's allegiance to the Khmer Rouge was again 
attacked with accusations of China promising asylum to Pol 
Pot should it help bring about a political settlement. On 
24 June, Beijing categorically denied the allegations which 
had been put forth in the Washington Post.100
The Thai were also sceptical about the Vietnamese offer to 
withdraw. They argued that it would be easy for Vietnam to 
retain its Khmer speaking soldiers in Kampuchea and claim
98. Becker, 171.
99. "Partial Withdrawal: Same Old Trick?," Beijing Review 
( 20-26 June, 1988 ) ill. Also see concerning China's position 
on the Vietnamese withdrawal, "China's Stand on 
Disarmament," in Beijing Review (13-19 June 1988).
100. "Kampuchean peace hopes rise as China offers refuge to 
Pol Pot," Sydney Morning Herald (20 June 1988); Becker, 171; 
Swain, 13.
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that they are part of the PRKAF.101 In a move to diminish
Thai influence Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach asked for
the help of his old foe, the United States . He argued that
the,
United States should try and persuade 
Thailand to deny sanctuary to the Khmer 
Rouge and cut Chinese supply lines in 
return for a total Vietnamese withdrawal 
and a coalition government in Cambodia 
under Sihanouk.102
The Vietnamese had their own incentives to consider 
withdrawal. On 3 July, in an unprecedented move, Vietnam’s 
rulers admitted the loss of more than 55,000 men in the 
Third Indochina War. As well, Vietnam's own economy needed 
a complete overhaul to avoid its collapse.103
On 1 July, to coincide with the ASEAN Foreign Minister's 4-5 
July meeting, China advanced another peace proposal. 
China's initiative included measures to ensure that the 
Khmer Rouge would not regain exclusive power, the 
establishment of a provisional government before the 
withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops, and a freeze on all the 
factions military activities prior to the holding of free
101. Rodney Tasker, "Cambodia quandary," FEER (16 June 
1988): 26.
102. Chanda, "Help from old enemies," FEER (23 June 
1988):13.
103. Bruce London, "Vietnam plan to settle 700,000 in 
Kampuchea," The Australian (4 July 1988):5. The Thai 
concern of Vietnamese moles remaining in Kampuchea still 
persists. China's policy of bleeding Vietnam white may be 
assumed to have had an effect on Vietnam's decision to 
withdraw. See Ch. 3.
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elections. In addition, China agreed to consider the 
implementation of an IPKF.104
Nevertheless, while stating that they would disallow a 
predominant role for the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese continued 
to arm their communist ally. The Khmer Rouge not only 
possessed arms to immediately wage war, reportedly they had 
arms caches which would allow them to continue making war 
should the Chinese withdraw their support.105 Hence, 
Sihanouk argued that any IPKF had to remain in Kampuchea at 
least five years to ensure that the Khmer Rouge did not 
’'maltreat” the other forces. 106
At their meeting, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers aware of the 
threat Vietnam posed to regional security, also appreciated 
the concerns of Sihanouk and the PRK with respect to the 
Khmer Rouge.107
On 10 July, Sihanouk demanded that China stop assisting the 
Khmer Rouge and that Thailand cease giving sanctuary to
104. Tasker, "Sweetening the cocktail," FEER (14 July 1988): 
12; and Becker, 171. Having been accused of agreeing to 
harbour Pol Pot should the need arise, China found itself in 
basic agreement with the United States that the Chinese 
would not support the return of the Khmer Rouge to a 
dominant role in Kampuchea. See Catherine Sampson, "US and 
China vow to block comeback by Khmer Rouge," Time (16 July 
1988 ):9 .
105. Mike Steketee, "Khmer Rouge arms caches threaten talks 
on Kampuchea," Sydney Morning Herald (11 July 1988 ) : 8; 
Chanda, "Support for Sihanouk," FEER (14 July 1988):13; and 
Peter Carey, "Prospects for Peace in Cambodia," FEER (22 
December 1988):117.
106. Steketee, 8 .
107. "Foreign Ministers Focus on Kampuchea," Beijing Review 
(18-24 July 1988 ) :11-12.
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them, arguing that only China and Thailand could prevent the
return of the Khmer Rouge to power. He stated:
They [the Khmer Rouge] live and grow 
thanks only to the (aid) of China and 
thanks to the (delivery) of that aid by 
Thailand. As long as China and Thailand 
do not drop the Khmer Rouge, the 
problem...will never be resolved.108
Sihanouk also called for the vacating of the Democratic 
Kampuchean seat at the United Nations. He was later 
persuaded by China to drop the demand. As well, the Prince 
resigned as president of the CGDK, stating that he believed 
the Khmer Rouge were a greater threat than the Vietnamese. 
He hoped that his resignation would isolate the Khmer Rouge 
and thereby weaken them. Sihanouk also argued for an IPKF 
citing Khmer Rouge opposition to it as proof of its 
effectiveness.109
What was heralded as an important conference on the path to 
a political settlement appeared to only offer the usual 
rhetoric. On 25 July, the four Kampuchean factions, 
together with Vietnam, Laos and ASEAN, participated in the 
Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM I). Although each faction, 
except the Khmer Rouge, submitted peace proposals, each 
party proved as intransigent as ever. One positive result 
of the conference nevertheless, was that it did stimulate 
further negotiations.
108. ’Sihanouk Warns Against Return of the Khmer Rouge,” The 
Guardian Weekly (31 July 1988):17.
109. Ibid.; Becker, 172; Tasker, ’Prince on the Loose," 26.
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It was obvious that the Khmer Rouge had wanted to see what 
was proposed at JIM I before making their own initiatives to 
try and discredit both Sihanouk’s disapprobation of them and 
demands for a cessation of Thai and Chinese assistance. On 
15 August, the Khmer Rouge disclosed their own ideas for a 
settlement.
On the surface the Khmer Rouge seemed quite generous. They 
agreed to the establishment of a quadripartite government 
headed by Sihanouk who, following a dismantling of both the 
Heng Samrin regime and the CGDK, would organize elections 
for a new government. As well, they sanctioned the 
convening of an international conference which would adopt 
measures ensuring "the [Khmer Rouge] does not abuse other 
parties and that all other Cambodian parties do not abuse 
one another and, at the same time, to ensure that [Vietnam] 
cannot return to commit aggression against Cambodia."110 
Following a political settlement the Khmer Rouge consented 
that they would reduce their force numbers to the same level 
as other parties forming a quadripartite national army. A 
ceasefire would be ratified once it was established that all 
the "forces of aggression from Cambodia" had been 
withdrawn.111
110. Hiebert, "Khmer Rouge ruse?," FEER (1 September 
1988):32.
111. Bekaert, "New search for peace in Cambodia," Guardian 
(8 August 1988):14; Simon Long, "China and Kampuchea: 
Political Football on the Killing Fields," Pacific Review 2, 
no. 2 (1989):153; and Hiebert, 32. At roughly the same time 
as the Khmer Rouge proposal, NADK forces overran pro- 
Vietnamese forces in the Pailin area indicating that the 
military offensive was still important to the Khmer Rouge. 
See Bekaert, 14. On other Khmer Rouge gains see Paisal
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Perhaps due to the American pressure that Thach had called 
for, or a realization that the Khmer Rouge image was 
tarnishing even more, the Thai decided to reevaluate their 
own position. Kraisak Choonhaven, son of Thailand’s Prime 
Minister, announced that: ’Thailand must take the initiative 
if China doesn’t change its stand toward the Khmer 
Rouge.”112
In another challenge to the Khmer Rouge both the Soviet 
Union and China were now discussing Kampuchea at the Deputy 
Foreign Minister level. The Soviets and Chinese still 
differed over whether Sihanouk should head a provisional 
organ, as Moscow suggested, or a provisional government, as 
Beijing proposed, both with quadripartite representation; 
but, at least there was progress towards a healthier 
dialogue. China reiterated that there would be no return to 
the policies and practices of the recent past.113 While the 
talks were going on, Xinhua News Agency reported that the 
Vietnamese were insincere in their plan to withdraw, 
disguising their troops in the uniforms of Cambodian 
soldiers. A Soviet Southeast Asia specialist in response to 
the Chinese allegation and despite Chinese claims to the 
contrary about supporting the Khmer Rouge, stated:
Sricharatchanya, "On the offensive again," FEER (22 
September 1988):23.
112. Becker, 172.
113. Long, 153. Zhao Ziyang told a Japanese delegation that 
the Khmer Rouge would not be allowed to assume exclusive 
power, and that the Heng Samrin regime must not be allowed 
to continue on in power. See Robert Delfs, "Passing the 
test," FEER (3 November 1988):36.
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The Chinese obsession with the troop 
withdrawal raises certain doubts...In 
fact, they have put their stake on the 
return of the Khmer Rouge to Phnom 
Penh.114
The important outcome of the Sino-Soviet dialogue, as Robert 
Delfs observes, was the Soviet Union's willingness to 
acknowledge China's right to play a regional role in 
Southeast Asia.115
However, as Chanda suggests, the game was getting tougher. 
While in the summer of 1988 American aid was pegged at US$35 
million per annum in covert CIA assistance (non-lethal), and 
US$3 million in official humanitarian aid to the non-
communist factions of the CGDK, Sihanouk hinted that this
might be increased and expanded to include lethal aid. A
United States House of Representatives and Senate joint
resolution called for the United States to "use all
appropriate means available to prevent a return to power of 
Pol Pot, the top echelons of the Khmer Rouge, and their 
armed forces."116 The augmented concern over Indochina by 
the United States was partially due to Sihanouk's 
lamentations that China had decreased its aid to the non­
communist factions. As well, according to one American 
administration source:
114. "Talk and more talk," FEER (15 September 1988):17-18.
115. Delfs, 36-37.
116. Chanda, "Tougher game as Moscow cleans up its act," 
FEER (29 September 1988):28; Chanda, "Support for Sihanouk," 
FEER (14 July 1988 ): 13; and "Sihanouk hints at US as aid 
source," Sydney Morning Herald (15 October 1988 ) : 2 3 . For a 
number of American views see Tim Colebatch, "Cambodia is 
facing a 'fate worse than death,'" The Age (3 March 1989).
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The big difference now and earlier years 
is that now there is discreet 
cooperation between the ANS and the Heng 
Samrin regime and the US aid is going to 
strengthen Sihanouk against the Khmer 
Rouge.117
Arguably, American assistance could do more harm than good 
by strengthening the non-communist forces to a point where 
civil war between the various factions could go on in 
perpetuity. In effect, one might assume an American loss of 
confidence in the political process.
Probably sensing increasing international concern about the 
Khmer Rouge, on 3 November 1988, one would see China support 
for the first time a United Nations resolution which tacitly 
condemned the Khmer Rouge. The resolution on Kampuchea 
stated that there must be no return to "the universally 
condemned policies and practices of the recent past."118
However, a Peking based diplomat noted the Chinese concern 
that too much emphasis was placed on the Khmer Rouge role 
and not enough on the Vietnamese withdrawal.119 At a 
November meeting between Sihanouk, Hun Sen and Son Sann, at
117. Chanda, "A lethal boost," FEER (27 October 1988 ) : 17 . It 
was claimed that what little amount of aid given to the 
KPNLF by the United States was being "creamed off" by 
corrupt Thai intermediaries. See "Kampuchea deserves a 
democratic future," The Australian (26 December 1988):6.
118. Phillip McCarthy, "Vote condemning Pol Pot passed,"
Sydney Morning Herald (5 November 1988 ): 24; Richardson notes 
that the Chinese did object to the wording, see his, 
"Cambodia and the Bangkok-Beijing connection," Pacific
Defence Reporter (February 1989 ):3 8 .
119. Delfs, "Khmer Rouge green light," FEER (3 November 
1988 ) : 17.
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Fere-en-Tardenois, the Khmer Rouge were again absent. The 
Prince against Hun Sen's call for a disbanding of the Khmer 
Rouge conceded, in a statement similar to the Chinese 
position, the right and necessity of Khmer Rouge 
participation in the negotiation process. He stated: "You 
cannot push the Khmer Rouge to the wall without beginning a 
new and vicious civil war..."120
Reacting to the negative climate enveloping the Khmer Rouge, 
Li Peng on a visit to New Zealand stressed that China would 
most certainly not support the Khmer Rouge once the 
Vietnamese had withdrawn from Kampuchea. In addition, Li 
suggested China might consider cutting aid to the Khmer 
Rouge if a definitive timetable for the Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Kampuchea could be set. 121 Yet, the Beijing 
Review reported that Li supported a quadripartite coalition 
and opposed any single party "to be excluded or to take 
power exclusively."122
Perhaps sensing Li's and other PRC leaders' disgruntlement 
with the Khmer Rouge, not having participated in previous 
meetings between the various factions, on 25 November
120. Chanda, "Three men in a boat," FEER (17 November 1988): 
16-17.
121. John Pedler, "Cambodia:danger and opportunity for the 
West," The World Today 45, no. 2 (February 1989 ) :20; and 
Becker, 200.
122. The Beijing Review article in which this is cited also 
reaffirms China's support for the Khmer Rouge July 18 peace 
proposal. Note my italics, stressing that Khmer Rouge 
inclusion in the process is imperative. See "Li: Principles 
on Kampuchea and ASEAN," Beijing Review (21-27 November 
1988):5.
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following calls by China for the Khmer Rouge to be more 
flexible, Khieu Samphan sent a cable to Sihanouk stating his 
willingness to participate in a meeting of all the factions 
at the Prince's earliest convenience.123
At another level of the diplomatic game, during the first 
visit of a Chinese Foreign Minister to Moscow since 1957, 
Qian Qichen helds talks with the Soviets in early December, 
with Kampuchea dominating the agenda.124
Probably fearing a Sino-Soviet rapprochement which could 
diminish the Khmer Rouge role in Southeast Asia, Khieu 
Samphan attempted to appease Sihanouk. Meeting with the 
Prince on 15 December, Khieu Samphan agreed to accept 
Sihanouk's peace plan and stated that Pol Pot had stepped 
back from the leadership of the Khmer Rouge.125
123. Chanda, "The Cambodian Chameleon," FEER (15 December 
1988 ) : 16 .
124. Becker, 200; "Chinese-Soviets gear for Summit," The 
Australian (5 December 1988 ) :6; and "Clearing the Peking 
Road," FEER (15 December 1988):16.
125. Becker, 200; and "Pol Pot has 'stepped back'," The 
Australian (16 December 1988 ) :8. John Hayes however claimed 
that Pol Pot remained in power, directing military 
operations from a base near the western province of Ko Kong. 
Hayes also states that the Khmer Rouge fear of a warmer 
Sino-Soviet relationship led them to try and gain as much 
ground as possible before a Vietnamese withdrawal. See 
Hayes, "Thailand to police Khmer Rouge camps," The Age (12 
December 1988):8. Lindsay Murdoch reported that Pol Pot was 
operating from within Thailand's Trat province. See 
Murdoch, "Old Enemies get together in search of Cambodian 
peace," The Age (19 January 1989):3. James Pringle in "Pol 
Pot to be dumped by China," The Australian (2 February 
1989):8, claims that a special unit of the Thai army, Task 
Force 838, is responsible for Pol Pot's security and that of 
Ieng Sary and Ta Mok.
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On 21 December 1988, at a meeting of all the Cambodian 
factions in Fere-en-Tardenois little was accomplished. This 
time a stalemate arose because of Sihanouk's insistence that 
all participants had to agree to his peace plan.126
Thailand's position also wavered following the Sino-Soviet 
meetings. In January, Hun Sen was received in Thailand and 
Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila travelled to Hanoi to 
meet with his counterpart. The Thai Foreign Minister 
indicated that his and Thach's positions were approximating 
each other. Shortly after the Thai-Vietnamese announcement 
the Chinese agreed to meet with Hanoi officials.127
The first round of Sino-Vietnamese normalization talks were 
held 13-17 January 1989, between Vietnamese Vice-Foreign 
Minister Dinh Nho Liem and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Liu 
Shuqing. Then on 20 January, Liem met with Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian.128 In early February, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze held talks with Qian and Deng 
Xiaoping primarily discussing Kampuchea. On 5 February, in 
a joint statement, both parties appreciated the need, 
following the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, for a halting of
126. Becker, 200.
127. Ibid.; and Simon Long, "China and Kampuchea: Political 
Football on the Killing Fields," Pacific Review 2, no. 
2:151-154. According to Thai Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhaven, Thailand would now concentrate on the "market 
place" as opposed to the battlefield; see Long, 155.
128. Klintworth, "China's Indochina Policy," 14; and "New 
progress claimed in China-Vietnamese talks," The Age (23 
January 1989).
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arms assistance to the warring parties of Kampuchea and a 
freezing of the armed forces.129
Undoubtedly fearing the cessation of arms aid, the Khmer 
Rouge having concentrated on the political initiative over 
the past few years were again preparing themselves 
militarily. There were reports of the Khmer Rouge 
conscripting villagers to plant land mines and act as 
ammunition porters. As well, Khmer Rouge rocket sites had 
been found very near Phnom Penh and in an effort to keep out 
external influence at the O ’Trao camp there was the savage 
burning down of a United Nations hospital. Of the 50-60,000 
refugees being held in United Nations sponsored camps in 
Thailand under Khmer Rouge control, more than 6,000 of these 
were reported to have been forcefully taken into the 
interior of Kampuchea to act as a bulwark against the 
Vietnamese.130
129. Klintworth, 16; and Klintworth, "The Fantasy of 
Peacekeeping in Kampuchea," Canberra Times (18 March 
1989 ) :9. For an overview of the joint statement see "Sino- 
Soviet Summit in Sight," Beijing Review (13-26 February 
1989 ) :7-8 . This statement differed from the 15 August 1988 
Khmer Rouge proposal in that it called for a halt to arms 
aid. See p.141-42 of this work.
130. Tim Colebatch, "Breakthroughs bring hope for Cambodia," 
The Age (14 January 1989); Jim Pringle, "Kampuchea alert as 
party begins," The Australian (3 January 1989):4; and 
Shepard C. Lowman, "The Khmer Rouge’s captive thousands," 
International Herald Tribune (24 January 1989 ) :4. Thailand 
which administers the refugee camps denies that they are 
used as recruiting grounds for the Khmer Rouge. Yet Thailand 
agreed in late 1988 to allow international detachments to 
provide protection for the refugees. The Khmer Rouge 
control approximately 12 camps with 100,000 occupants. See 
Alan Boyd, "Khmer Rouge readies for..." The Australian (17 
February 1989 ): 14. Gwen Robinson states that the Khmer 
Rouge control five camps; see her article "Thai repatriation 
plan reflects confidence in Kampuchea," Canberra Times (21 
February 1989):6.
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In early February, Sihanouk had realized that the meetings 
between Vietnam, China and Thailand could lead to his 
political demise. On 2 February, he complained that recent 
diplomatic activity will turn Kampuchea into a "Thai- 
Vietnamese condominium” with China acting as overseer.131 
Probably fearing isolation, Sihanouk closed ranks with the 
other members of the CGDK at the Jakarta Second Informal 
(JIM II) meeting held 21-22 February. The Prince was 
reinstated President of the CGDK, arguing for a continued 
Khmer Rouge presence in the negotiation process.132 However 
all the Khmer factions demanded that measures be taken to,
prevent the recurrence of genocidal 
policies and practices of the Pol Pot 
regime and the resumption of armed 
hostilities... 133
As well, all the Khmer factions called for, in tandem with 
Vietnamese withdrawal, a stop to interference and the 
external supply of arms. They however refused to sign a 
final joint statement and meet at a closing news conference, 
hinting that some personal differences remained.134
131. "Kampuchea faces Asian carve-up says Sihanouk,” The 
Australian (3 February 1989):6.
132. Long, 156, argues that Sihanouk called for a continued 
military and political presence for the Khmer Rouge. John 
Pedler, 19, states that Sihanouk wanted the Chinese and Thai 
to drop their support for the Khmer Rouge thereby weakening 
them.
133. "Kampuchea peace settlement 'on horizon' Secretary 
General reports," UN Chronicle (June 1989 ) :26; "Call for 
factions to meet," The Australian (23 February 1989 ) :8.
134. Long, 156; and Sarah Sargeant, "Cambodia still in the 
hands of foreigners," The Australian Financial Review (23 
February 1989 ) :9; and Sargeant, "Jakarta talks make 
progress," The Australian Financial Review (21 February
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Khieu Samphan at JIM II had refused to rule out a future 
role for Pol Pot.135 And earlier on a Khmer Rouge cadre 
warned that: "If there is a quadripartite government, we 
will disband. If not, we will fight on."136 While having 
stated that they would lay down their arms if the Vietnamese 
withdrew their forces, doubting Vietnamese sincerity, Khieu 
Samphan urged the Thai and Chinese to continue assisting the 
Khmer Rouge. He stated: "We believe Thailand and other
countries will not be so naive as to cease support for the 
resistance forces now [that] the situation is bleak for 
Vietnam."137
The Khmer Rouge hesitancy to make firm, concrete endeavours 
to disarm and concentrate solely on the political arena 
would indicate that a metamorphosis of the Khmer Rouge was 
not occuring but rather the apparent change of heart was a 
tactical manoeuver. When Khmer Rouge United Nation's 
representative Thioun Prasith was asked, "What you are 
saying is that the transformation is not really deep or 
sincere but that it has to be done?," he replied, "Yes I 
agree."138 Pol Pot was now thought to be operating from
across the Oddar in what was known as camp V4. He
1989) :12. For Hun Sen's demands prior to JIM II see "War of 
words rages on eve of Cambodian peace talks," The Age (20 
February 1989):7.
135. Long, 155.
136. Boyd, 14.
137. "Kampucheans call for arms," The Australian (25 
February 1989):6; and Boyd, 14.
138. Sargeant, "Khmer Rouge shows new face," Australian 
Financial Review (23 February 1989):3.
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reportedly told commanders to prepare to occupy one half of 
Battambang Province once Vietnamese troops pulled out.139
In one of the greatest threats to the Khmer Rouge, Deng and 
Chatichai in a 17 March meeting, stated that:
a political settlement must be 
accompanied by the elimination of 
elements who may cause civil war.140
According to Chinese and Thai declaratory policy a 
political settlement could mean the disbanding of the Khmer 
Rouge. Of course, even if concrete steps were taken by 
Thailand and China to weaken the Khmer Rouge, this would not 
necessarily mean that the Khmer Rouge could not "hold their 
own" with the benefits of material and territorial 
acquisition.
On 5 April, the Vietnamese pledged the unconditional 
withdrawal of their troops from Kampuchea by 30 September 
1989. Within a few days on 7 April, Sihanouk asked France 
to organize an international conference on Kampuchea. By 
May, it was both Sihanouk and more significantly Hun Sen who 
regained the diplomatic initiative. Now that Vietnam had 
decided on a withdrawal date, the PRK had to prepare itself 
for a period when Vietnamese forces would not be present to 
support the Vietnamese installed regime.
139. Lindsay Murdoch, "The Ogre Who Stalks Cambodia’s 
Future," The Age (25 April 1989):11.
140. For the entire statement see "Sino-Thai Talks on 
Kampuchea," Beijing Review (2 April 1989):7.
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On 1 May, in a move to assuage Sihanouk, Hun Sen renamed the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea, the State of Cambodia (SOC). 
In talks held between Sihanouk and Hun Sen 2-3 May, the two 
leaders agreed to the formation of an International Control 
Commission (ICC) which would oversee the Vietnamese 
withdrawal. Sihanouk would also consider returning to 
Cambodia as head of state in a coalition which would 
effectively pit itself against the Khmer Rouge following 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. The Prince announced 
his willingness to break ranks with the Khmer Rouge if they 
refused his peace plan. However, Phnom Penh first had to 
amend the Cambodian constitution and form a quadripartite 
coalition government. While Hun Sen revised the 
constitution he reiterated his opposition to any Khmer Rouge 
participation in an interim government. The Khmer Rouge 
would only be allowed to participate in a commission which 
would set up and ensure free elections. Because of this 
stumbling block, Sihanouk warned that there would be no 
support from the Khmer Rouge.141
141. For the various May initiatives refer to: "Sihanouk 
makes concessions in Jakarta talks," Asian Bulletin (July 
1989):84-85; Steven Erlanger, "An Alliance Against an Old 
Threat in Cambodia," Asian Bulletin (July 1989):16-17; 
Pringle and Mark Baker, "Sihanouk signals split with Khmer 
Rouge," The Australian (4 May 1989):8; Pringle, "Sihanouk to 
go home if doors stay open," The Australian (5 May 1989 ) : 8; 
"Cambodia Once Again," New Zealand Herald (2 May 1989):7; 
"Phnom Penh claims accord with Prince," New Zealand Herald 
(3 May 1989):7; "Some key breakthroughs," Asiaweek (12 May 
1989):34-35; Louise Williams, "War 'inevitable' despite 
progress at peace talks," Sydney Morning Herald (6 May 
1989):21; "Cambodians 'agree on watchdog group,'" The Age (8 
May 1989):9; and Daniel Benjamin, "An Odd Waltz," Time (15 
May 1989):16-17.
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Meeting with Hun Sen 6 May, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai 
proposed a ceasefire agreement which would remove any 
pretext the Vietnamese might use to return to Cambodia. 
Khieu Samphan rejected the proposal which would restrain any 
military manoeuvres the Khmer Rouge might be engaged in. As 
well, Khieu Samphan in a joint press conference with 
Sihanouk declared that the Khmer Rouge would only recognize 
the Vietnamese withdrawal once a quadripartite government 
was established.142
Thailand, having halted artillery support to the Khmer 
Rouge, had promised that it would no longer aid the 
resistance forces once the Vietnamese had withdrawn. In a 
meeting of the Vietnamese and Chinese Deputy Foreign 
Ministers, China also announced that it would cut the flow 
of aid once the Vietnamese withdrew.143
While the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge were said to be 
mounting new offensives and the Khmer Rouge were shifting 
refugees further into the Cardamomes, away from the Thai and 
international relief agencies, the Khmer Rouge leadership 
released a revised peace proposal.144 On 12 May, the Khmer
142. Hiebert and Paisal Sricharatchanya, "Peace on hold," 
FEER (18 May 1989):35; and "Sihanouk Makes Concession in 
Jakarta Talks," 85.
143. Refer to Sricharatchanya, "Wait and See", FEER (11 May 
1989):21; "Sihanouk Makes Concession in Jakarta Talks," 85- 
86; Pringle, "Cambodia: minuet of manoeuvre," The Australian 
(5 May 1989):8. The Thai according to Western and Cambodian 
sources were ignoring PRK and Vietnamese incursions into 
Thai territory in pursuit of the Khmer Rouge, see Chanda, 
"Going it alone," FEER (10 August 1989):11.
144. The various military manoeuvres can be found in, "The 
menace in the mountains," The Economist (20 May 1989):28; 
Sricharatchanya, 24; "Sihanouk Makes Concession in Jakarta
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Rouge accepted that supervision was necessary not only for 
the Vietnamese withdrawal but also for a ceasefire following 
the withdrawal and for the disarming of all the factions. 
Following withdrawal there would be a reduction of forces 
to an agreed level.145
Hun Sen contested that even if a settlement was reached the 
Khmer Rouge would continue fighting a guerrilla war.146 Son 
Sen of the Khmer Rouge however argued that following a 
Vietnamese withdrawal, an illusory action as he perceived 
the Vietnamese offer a trick, the Khmer Rouge would create a 
nationalist political party and compete in general 
elections. He went on to state that the Khmer Rouge would 
abide by any election results and would not wage civil war 
to solve Cambodian differences.147
The present battle, according to Son Sen, had been
transformed from a revolutionary war into a guerrilla war as
it was now “waged by the population to liberate the
country."148 General Tran Cong Man, editor of Vietnamese
Talks,” 85-86; Hiebert, "Standing alone," FEER, (29 June 
1989 ): 18; and Chanda, "Going it alone,":10-11.
145. "Sihanouk Makes Concession In Jakarta Talks," 86.
146. Williams, "War 'inevitable1 despite progress at peace 
talks," 21.
147. Pringle, 8; and Pringle, "Sihanouk to go home if doors
stay open," 8. Khieu Kanarith, editor of the Cambodian 
weekly, Kampuchea, predicted in a free election the Khmer 
Rouge would win 5-10 per cent of the vote. See William 
Stewart, "The Shoots of Renewal," Time (15 May 1989 ): 30. 
Concerning Son Sen on Vietnamese intentions see, Robert 
Karmiol, "Khmer Rouge: no plans to seize power," Jane * s
Defence Weekly (6 May 19 89 ): 78 4.
148. Karmiol, 784.
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Quart Doi Nhart Dan stated that the Khmer Rouge now occupied 
between 10-20 per cent of Cambodia. "Of course," he stated, 
"once they hold 20% in remote areas, then guerrilla warfare 
could last a long time."149
Meeting in Paris 30 July-1 August, nineteen countries plus 
the four Khmer factions tried to find a political solution 
to the Cambodian quagmire. Even though China appeared more 
flexible, undoubtedly not wanting to appear intransigent 
following the massacre in Tienanmen Square of 4 June, and 
was reluctant to give its resolute support to the Khmer 
Rouge, there would be no radical change of policy and thus 
no political settlement.
The major problem to be resolved was how to contain the 
Khmer Rouge in a future quadripartite government. While on 
the political front China had unsuccessfully pressured the 
Khmer Rouge to consider a smaller, less proportionate role 
in a future coalition regime, militarily there was little 
movement on the establishment of an IPKF.150 One Western 
diplomat stated: "The bottom line is that [the establishment 
of an IPKF] looks discouraging - in fact it looks 
increasingly like suicide to send our soldiers in to fight a 
desperate Khmer Rouge..."151
149. Hiebert, 18.
150. Field, Tasker and Hiebert, "No end in sight," FEER (7 
September 1989):14-16; Field, "Starting to tango," FEER (10 
August 1989):10-11; Delfs, "Repeating the lesson," FEER (28 
September 1989 ):23; and Patrice de Beer, "La conference sur 
le Cambodge tente de mettre fin a dix-neuf ans de guerre," 
Le Monde (30-31 July 1989):1 and 5.
151. Robinson, 18 and 33.
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As one analyst contends, in order to arrive at a political 
settlement the various factions had to agree to a scheme for 
power sharing, and both China and Vietnam had to remove 
Cambodia out of their "balance of power calculations."152
Vietnam was calling for an Afghanistan type situation 
whereby external forces would withdraw and leave the 
existing regime to rebuild itself. As no surprise, China 
and the Khmer Rouge rejected such a suggestion which would 
leave the PRK regime in power. Vietnam’s proposed 
withdrawal was seen as a way of keeping the PRK regime 
intact or enhanced by Sihanouk's participation.153 Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing stated:
We don't believe that this is a real and 
complete withdrawal because Vietnam 
showed no sincerity at the conference.
Without sincerity and effective 
supervision, the withdrawal is 
unbelievable.154
Not only would the Vietnamese have to withdraw their troops 
but the Khmer Rouge and Chinese also called for the 
expulsion of a claimed 1.2 million Vietnamese settlers. Hun 
Sen bitterly responded by demanding the complete disbanding 
of both the political and military wings of the Khmer 
Rouge.155
152. Michael Leifer, "Resolving a four-way split," The 
Dominion (22 August 1989):4.
153. Ibid.
154. Delfs, "Repeating the lesson," 23.
155. Chanda, "Ancient enmities," FEER (7 September 1989 ):14 — 
15.
i
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All the Khmer factions were militarily preparing for the 
withdrawal of the Vietnamese. State of Cambodia forces had 
expanded the size of the militia with a build up in regional 
forces as well. It was claimed that at its current level 
the SOC could hold its own in a guerrilla war.156
There was some speculation as to disunity among the ranks of 
the Khmer Rouge. Ta Mok, it was believed, wanted to fight 
to the death, whereas Ieng Sary took a more conciliatory 
approach.157 It appeared that the more radical approach 
prevailed, as Khmer Rouge forces were being ordered to fight 
until the last Vietnamese soldier and civilian was driven 
from Cambodia.158 While there were threats that Thailand 
would drop its assistance to the Khmer Rouge, NADK forces 
were storing arms caches for just that eventuality.159 As 
well, according to Thai sources, despite Chinese rhetoric, 
all three Cambodian factions were receiving increasingly 
large amounts of aid from the PRC.160 The fact that China 
was assisting all three factions might lead one to conclude 
that China may want a civil war. For as long as Cambodia
156. Robinson, 18 and 20.
157. Field, Tasker and Hiebert, 16.
158. Tasker and Hiebert, MA test of arms," FEER (28 
September 1989):21.
159. The Thai said that they were waiting for the United 
States to act against the Khmer Rouge before they closed the 
Chinese supply route. See Robinson, 20; and Field, Tasker 
and Hiebert, 15. For the American position see Susumu 
Awanohara, "Spreading the bets," FEER (28 September 
1989):24.
160. Tasker and Hiebert, "A test of arms," 20.
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was in the throws of war China would not have to fear a 
Soviet-Vietnamese condominium in the region.
As proposed, the Vietnamese did withdraw their troops at 
the end of September, with the final 26,000 troops leaving 
Cambodia 26 September. Vietnamese withdrawal has not meant 
peace. There are still the displaced Vietnamese living in 
Cambodia which are seen suspiciously by China and the Khmer 
Rouge. The Khmer Rouge and some East European diplomats 
suggested that several thousand Vietnamese troops and 
military advisers had returned to Cambodia at the end of 
October. Indeed Vietnamese Ambassador to Phnom Penh, Ngo 
Dien admitted that an undisclosed number of military 
advisers had returned on the PRK's request to help with 
logistical problems in Cambodia’s north-west, repair tanks 
and other military vehicles, and train recruits and 
officers. Allegations by the Khmer Rouge that there were at 
least 5,000 Vietnamese troops around Battambang and Sisophon 
were denied by Cambodia’s First Deputy Foreign Minister Dith 
Munty.161 By February 1990 the Khmer Rouge claimed that 
there were some 17,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in 
Cambodia.162 What is most important is not whether the 
troops are there or not, or whether the Vietnamese are 
merely advisers, the Khmer Rouge statement clearly indicates 
that they will use any Vietnamese presence as a way of
161. ’Vietnamese return to battlefront, ” Sydney Morning 
Herald (24 February 1990):21.
162. Williams, ’Khmer Rouge, Evans in talks,” Sydney Morning 
Herald (27 February 1990):12.
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blocking a resolution to the Cambodian imbroglio through 
diplomatic means.
China's support for the Khmer Rouge has not diminished 
following the Vietnamese withdrawal. On the 40th 
anniversary of the PRC on 26 September, newly selected 
Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced that 
China would continue following a leftwing political orthodox 
outlook.163 This in turn would probably mean a continuation 
of support for the Khmer Rouge if considerable pressure 
could not be exerted on China to discontinue its support for 
them.
The Khmer Rouge were found to be testing their might in a 
number of areas. Reports that they were concentrating on 
getting their political machine in order, leaving military 
initiatives to Sihanouk and Son Sann, seemed to be unfounded 
as Ta Mok had moved troops under his command into the 
Western provinces of Pursat and Kompong Speu. While there 
were continued reports of severe brutality, reminiscent of 
the 1975-78 era, it was said that in the refugee camps a 
more civil Khmer Rouge, promoting education and worldly 
knowledge, reigned.164
Nevertheless, by 22 October, the Khmer Rouge had captured 
the town of Pailin, and were moving towards the city of 
Battambang with the Khmer Rouge reportedly destroying two
163. Delfs, "Stuck in the groove," FEER (5 October 1989):14- 
15.
164. Tasker, "Order in the Camps," FEER (2 November 1989): 
32-33.
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bridges on the main Battambang to Phnom Penh road by January 
1990. As well, there were unconfirmed reports of the Khmer 
Rouge seizing Samlot province at the end of October.165
A number of analysts recognize that the dry season offensive 
of 1989-90 was crucial for the Khmer Rouge.166 In the 
October to May period there has been a testing of Hun Sen's 
will and strength, which will no doubt help the Khmer Rouge 
launch a more effective attack next year. However, there is 
a danger in such a strategy for the Khmer Rouge. As Delfs 
indicates the international community will become:
increasingly uncomfortable if the 
results of the dry season fighting 
suggest that resistance coalition leader 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk is indeed only a 
figleaf and that the Khmer Rouge is the 
only militarily viable resistance 
force.167
Fearing a Khmer Rouge comeback, various supporters of the 
Khmer resistance could drop any assistance to them, doing an 
about face by supporting the Hun Sen regime as the 
legitimate government of Cambodia. What has been labelled 
the "Australian initiative" has in many ways attempted to do 
just that.
165. "Khmer Rouge say city on fire," Sydney Morning Herald 
(8 January 1990 ) :6; "Cambodia: new hope for peace," Sydney 
Morning Herald (11 January 1990 ) :11. Hiebert, "Going it 
alone," FEER (5 October 1989):16-17; Tasker, "Fighting for 
turf," FEER (26 October 1989):10; and Tasker, "Another Year 
Zero?," FEER (9 November 1989):12-13. Hiebert also mentions 
that a growing gap between the peasants and cities in 
Cambodia could be used to mobilize support for the Khmer 
Rouge as was done in the 1970s.
166. Tasker and Hiebert, 21.
167. Delfs, "Repeating the lesson," 23.
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The proposal put forth by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans on 24 November 1989 was yet another attempt at 
reaching a political solution to the Cambodian crisis.168 
The proposal's premise was that rather than seek a power 
sharing formula which would undoubtedly fail, the United 
Nations should be directly involved in seeking a solution 
to the Cambodian problem and encourage an appropriate change 
in the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. The goal of 
the initiative was to facilitate the holding of free and 
fair elections setting in place a framework which would 
facilitate the establishment of a neutral, sovereign, non- 
aligned and independent Cambodia.
Evans, having had assistance from US Congressman Stephen 
Solarz in formulating the proposal, recommended that a 
Supreme National Council (SNC), which would act as the 
repository of Cambodian sovereignty in a transitional 
period, that time between the implementation of a 
comprehensive agreement and the holding of national 
elections, be established. The Council could either 
comprise: the four factions, be bipartite with 
representatives of the CGDK and the SOC, have prominent 
members of the four factions in an individual capacity, or 
have non-party officials in addition to party officials.
168. Unless otherwise stated the details about the 
Australian initiative in this next section have been taken 
from an address made by Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, to Sydney Institute 13 March 1990; and 
Cambodia: Issues for Negotiation in a Comprehensive 
Settlement. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
February 1990. Initial reactions to the Australian 
initiative are noted, even though they extend slightly 
beyond the cut-off date of this thesis.
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Any of the four options provided for the composition of the 
SNC are based on the belief that an accommodation can be 
reached and that there is general compatabi1ity, something 
which unfortunately has not been witnessed for quite some 
time. While it is true there is dialogue between Sihanouk 
and Hun Sen and Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, the various 
alliances whether they be by individuals or parties, 
vacillate frequently depending on the political gains which 
can be made at any given moment.
Even though the five members of the UN Security Council, 
including China and the Soviet Union agreed in February 1990 
to the goal of a transitional government and UN peacekeeping 
role, there were serious flaws in such a composition 
according to both the SOC and the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen 
fearful of relinquishing power and of military defeat by 
CGDK forces while agreeing on a SNC, suggested that there be 
a temporary division of the SOC into two administrative 
zones to be controlled separately by his government and the 
Khmer Rouge resistance forces. While the United Nations 
could have a role in the organizing of elections and 
monitoring of a ceasefire, administration of Cambodia would 
have to be divided. For the other factions, the dismantling 
of Hun Sen’s government was a prerequisite to any solution. 
Allowing the Hun Sen regime to operate alongside a UN 
administration would give it de jure versus de facto 
recognition.169 The Khmer Rouge have stated that they would
169. Louis Williams, "PM proposes country be split in drive 
for peace," Sydney Morning Herald (26 January 1990 ) :7; 
Williams, "Khmer Rouge faces isolation," Sydney Morning
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accept a substantial role for the UN, however they insist on 
a quadripartite provisional government which would be 
installed prior to the calling of a ceasefire and the 
holding of national elect ions.170
If a SNC were created the chance that the Khmer Rouge would 
voluntarily give up its seat in the UN is almost non- 
existant. As Ben Kiernan indicates, even if there were a 
schism between Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, the 1982 
coalition agreement stipulates that the Khmer Rouge would 
remain Cambodia's UN representative. As Carlyle A. Thayer 
and Kiernan suggest the only way to remove the Khmer Rouge 
from the UN seat would be to convict them of Genocide, thus 
allowing outside powers to force them out.171 Evans' own 
proposal suggests that a change in status of the UN seat 
could be done in letter to the Secretary General from the 
SNC, or along Kiernan's lines by the Credentials Committee 
and the General Assembly, which again would rest with the 
SNC, the cyclical flaw in Evans' plan. Although the removal 
of the Khmer Rouge from the UN seat is highly desirable this 
does not preclude that they will not continue to wage civil 
war. It is even more probable that the Khmer Rouge will be 
less cooperative in any political undertakings.
Herald (26 February 1990 ) : 12; and "Hun Sen gives diplomatic 
efforts fresh urgency," Sydney Morning Herald (13 January 
1990) : 21.
170. Williams, "Khmer Rouge rejects Evans peace plan," 
Sydney Morning Herald (28 February 1990):10.
171. See Carlyle A. Thayer, "Pros and cons of genocide 
tribunal," Canberra Times (1 August 1986 ) :6 and Ben Kiernan, 
"Time is ripe for Evans to dump the Khmer Rouge," Sydney 
Morning Herald (12 January 1990 ) :9 respectively.
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If the UN were to have a role in a transitional period there 
is the problem of the substitution of authority. According 
to the Australian proposal one could have wholesale 
replacements brought in or substitutions of those in either 
leadership or administrative positions. The difficulty 
again rests with Hun Sen’s desire to remain in control. 
With respect to the Khmer Rouge, which has been reluctant 
to reveal anything about its leadership and administrative 
organs in the past, it is doubtful that it would now expose 
its own authoritative and administrative arms to the 
scrutiny of the UN, for such a move would make any guerrilla 
campaign vulnerable.
Evans did make provisions for additional authority which 
would have jurisdiction above or alongside existing 
administrations. While such a proposal would be more 
ammenable to Hun Sen (he and Sihanouk endorsed such a plan 
in February 1990) the Khmer Rouge concerns are still not 
dealt with.172 Monitoring of the various administrations is 
another possibility but a very risky one with no guarantees 
that all parties will respect, or for that matter give total 
access to, UN administrators.
There is also the difficulty of policing. Evans proposed 
the partial or total disbanding of existing police forces 
with the replacement of them by UN forces. However once 
again there are no assurances that the UN forces could
172. Concerning Hun Sen's and Sihanouk's February agreement 
see Williams, "Sihanouk and Hun Sen agree on UN role," in 
Sydney Morning Herald (23 February 1990):15.
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maintain control over guerrilla forces which know the 
terrain better than any other occupying force.
Indeed as is often the complaint about UN peace-keeping 
operations, there are little or no means of enforcing any 
abrogations in the agreement other than those stipulated 
under the UN Charter. The Australian proposal itself states 
that the agency in charge of policing Cambodia, the United 
Nations Cambodia Task Force Control (UNCTFC), role is "to 
supervise, monitor and verify agreements made by all 
Cambodian parties, not to enforce them...."173
Some military measures would have to be taken to ensure that 
there would not be a recurrence of hostilities during a 
ceasefire. While the military branches of the four 
factions would remain intact, weapons custody measures have 
been proposed. However with the Khmer Rouge having arms 
caches in unknown areas there are no assurances that these 
arms could not be used at a time of their choosing. The 
rooting out of guerrilla detachments would also be 
problematic. In addition there would have to be a 
withdrawal of foreign troops, with a commitment to their 
non-return. The presence of Vietnamese advisers and even 
Vietnamese residents in Cambodia could prove a problem as in 
the past.
While the prospects for peace in Cambodia have exacted a 
very high price already, one cannot ignore the enormous
173. Working Paper IV, "The Control Function in the 
Transitional Period," in Cambodia: Issues for Negotiation in 
a Comprehensive Settlement.
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complexities and costs involved in mobilizing such a UN task
force. With a minimum of some 2500 UN police, 5,500 UN
troops and 5,000 administrative staff the cost of
implementing the Australian campaign for 12 months would be 
US$1.3 billion or US$1.7 billion for 18 months.174 If we 
recall, Sihanouk himself has said that any UN presence would 
require at least five years before the Khmer Rouge threat 
would be diminished to a manageable level.175 Even if the 
costs were met, with the Khmer Rouge estimated at a higher 
number than that of the UN forces, it is most improbable 
that they could be kept under control. Having ruled 
Cambodia for eleven years, the SOC forces would have the 
greatest opportunity to restrain the Khmer Rouge. It would 
appear that international recognition, not necessarily
meaning support, coupled with a cessation of external
assistance to the various factions, would be the optimal
choice.176
China is the key to the solution. If Beijing were willing
to cease its assistance this would help anti-Khmer Rouge 
forces gain the upper hand. For China to support the Hun 
Sen regime would require a reevaluation of the new political 
realities in Southeast Asia - a thing the PRC leaders are 
hesitant to do. Nevertheless, Evans’ proposal has gained 
favourable response from the PRC which has labelled it as
174. Williams, "KR, Evans in talks," Sydney Morning Herald 
(27 February 1990):12.
175. See p.139 of this work.
176. These ideas are commensurate with those of Ben Kiernan, 
stated in "Time is ripe for Evans to dump the Khmer Rouge."
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'•positive" and "realistic," promoting an increased UN role. 
In addition Beijing is no longer insisting on a 
quadripartite transitional government.177 One is not 
certain whether the slight change in attitude is to gain 
political advantage or whether this is a true change in 
policy, although the former is more plausible.
The utility of Evans' plan is that it provides a number of 
options for consideration. As well, the plan has mobilized 
the support of the international community, through the 
workings of all five members of the Security Council. 
Unfortunately at the peace conference held in Jakarta 27 
February 1990, the four Cambodian participants could not 
come to an agreement. The stated reason for failure was 
that the Khmer Rouge would not allow any reference made to 
its genocidal practices of the past, something that the 
other factions insisted on. The real reasons for failure no 
doubt relate to the complexities of the proposal already 
discussed.
177. John Edwards, "China supports 'positive' plan," Sydney 
Morning Herald (19 January 1990 ) :7; and Anna Grutzer, "UN 
plan may end Cambodia's agony," Sydney Morning Herald (18 January 1990):1.
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CHAPTER 5: Along the Continuum of Small and Great Power
Relations
For the small power the game of great power politics is a 
very precarious one to play. As Vital noted, the small 
state is dispensable, and is a non-decisive increment to a 
primary state’s powers.l The Khmer Rouge wavered between 
success and failure in this game.
In the 1975-1978 period when they ruled Kampuchea, Khmer 
Rouge policies were guided by a strong nationalism with 
ideological underpinnings. Impassioned chauvinism ensured 
that the Khmer Rouge prided themselves in maintaining an 
independent posture. They wanted to be the masters of their 
own destiny.
In their programme of social reconstruction the Khmer Rouge 
erred in turning to China for assistance. Increasingly 
insulated from the rest of the world, rejecting Vietnamese 
offers of friendship, the Democratic Kampuchean leaders 
coaxed China to stand firmly on their side. Internal purges 
of the Democratic Kampuchean party made certain that China 
would associate itself with the more radical elements of Pol 
Pot and Ieng Sary.
Convincing the PRC to assist the Khmer Rouge however was not 
very difficult. Beijing found a friend which could now help 
in thwarting any Vietnamese or Soviet regional hegemonial
1 . See p.2 of this work.
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aspirations. The Khmer Rouge would help break the chain 
which the Chinese believed was trying to encircle them.
Approaching China for material assistance to build a new 
Kampuchea encroached on the sovereignty of the Khmer 
leaders. While traditionally a buffer, the realignment of 
forces led Kampuchea to lean towards one ally thereby 
placing itself in a patron-client framework. China would 
now become the principal external policy maker in the 
Kampuchean conflict.
Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Khmer 
Rouge would heavily rely on China's military and political 
clout to defend Khmer Rouge interests. In an association 
where the patron, China, had greater bargaining power than 
the client, the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese would promote the 
creation of a united front of anti-Vietnamese Khmer 
factions. The Khmer Rouge had little choice but to comply 
with China's wishes, for they had now not only leaned to one 
power but had in fact adopted a neighbour, Thailand, and 
another power, the PRC, as their guarantors.
China, not interested in easing regional tensions, was 
instrumental in formulating a coalition of forces which 
would defend her client's interests. ASEAN with Thailand in 
particular, and the newly formed CGDK, perpetuated the 
continued existence of the Khmer Rouge. When either of the 
latter parties grumbled about the Khmer Rouge, the Chinese 
convinced them that continued support of the Khmer Rouge was
imperative.
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Internationally, couched within legalistic arguments, 
Democratic Kampuchea was comfortably enshrined in the 
community of nations, to the chagrin of the Vietnamese 
backed PRK regime. In order to fortify the political 
legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk was promoted as 
chief of the CGDK, while militarily Beijing concentrated on 
strengthening the Khmer Rouge. A placating amount of aid 
was given to the non-communist factions.
By 1982, the Khmer Rouge found themselves in what Chong Li 
Choy labels a reward-recipient relationship.2 Both China 
and the Khmer Rouge needed each other for their own 
political reasons. China continued to assert that it would 
not abandon the Khmer Rouge, with Chinese assistance helping 
them grow in numbers.
To mollify the other members of the CGDK and the 
international community a cosmetic face-lift of the Khmer 
Rouge was undertaken. Nevertheless Khmer Rouge attacks on 
their anti-Vietnamese coalition partners continued, helping 
to weaken them, thereby lending force to the Khmer Rouge’s 
own power.
Due to a number of political initiatives instigated by 
Prince Sihanouk, the rules of the game changed. China no 
doubt feared greater collusion between the Heng Samrin 
regime and the Prince, for if this occurred China would have
2 . See p.7 of this work.
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great difficulty, if not find it impossible to influence 
events in Indochina.
Stemming from the changing political scene, the PRC 
leadership talked of neutralizing the Khmer Rouge. In a 
dependency relationship where A, the Khmer Rouge, is 
dependent on B, China, B can be cast aside if A does not 
feel it is gaining enough in its reward-recipient 
association.
Choosing the Khmer Rouge rather than siding with the PRK, 
may have decreased the duration of the Indochina conflict 
but, the benefits accrued to China might not have been as 
great. If Beijing had supported the Heng Samrin regime, and 
not assumed that it was completely in the tow of Vietnam, 
there could have been a rebuilding of the Cambodian state. 
This state might have accepted China's hand of friendship, 
needing economic assistance to grow - something that Vietnam 
could do less ably then the PRC. However the solution was 
not so simple for it was obvious Beijing had its own game 
plan.
Because of the Cambodian crisis China gained a strong ally 
in the way of Thailand, improved relations with ASEAN member 
states, taught her old tributary power Vietnam a lesson, and 
gained a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, all at very 
little cost to herself. China's support of the Khmer Rouge 
was then not a faux pas, but rather a pragmatic assessment 
of what China might gain in supporting the Khmer Rouge.
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With Thailand stating that a political solution is needed, 
Bangkok following an American initiative, might move on its 
own without China. Even as the post-4 June 1988 Chinese 
leadership continues to support the Khmer Rouge, a Thai 
reevaluation of the Indochinese conflict would mean a 
cutting of the supply lines from the PRC to the Khmer Rouge. 
Thailand, being a smaller state, can be more readily 
influenced by international pressures than China. A case in 
point would be the January 1990 demands by 90 members of the 
Thai Lower-House of Parliament urging Prime Minister 
Choonhaven to block foreign arms shipments to the Cambodian 
resistance - an encouraging initiative.3
In the earlier years of the CGDK the Khmer Rouge more often 
than not followed on the coat-tails of China's leadership. 
With the probable realization by the Khmer Rouge that their 
fate was dictated too much by their Chinese mentors, they 
began preparing for a period wherein they could be a 
guerrilla force very much on its own. Too much dependency 
on China would hamper the growth of the Khmer Rouge.
While in a reward-recipient relationship the recipient can 
threaten to collapse in order to gain further gifts from the 
donor, this only works if the donor believes it can exact 
more from the friendship, and also if the provider has the 
ways and means to continue support.
3. John Edwards, "China supports positive plan," 
Morning Herald (19 January 1990): 7.
Sydney
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China still needs the Khmer Rouge as a bargaining chip in 
extracting concessions out of Hanoi. Knowing this the Khmer 
Rouge has some room to manoeuvre. Moreover, with 
significant forces on the ground and substantial arms caches 
it can, to an extent, disregard China's directives, or can 
gain further concessions from Beijing. Undoubtedly the 
Chinese leadership realizes that the Khmer Rouge have the 
men and material to disrupt any agreement which is 
unfavourable to them. With the military situation in 
Cambodia still very unstable it would not be in the PRC's 
interest to "sanction" the Khmer Rouge out of existence. 
The Australian initiative even if salvageable would not 
preclude a peaceful resolution to the Cambodian crisis. 
What is needed is confidence, with mistrust dominating any 
framework cannot work, with or without Chinese support or 
international pressure. The explicit will of all four 
Cambodian parties is imperative in order to spell peace.
In the meantime another option for the Khmer Rouge is to try 
and regain some of its own independence. Hence, to avoid 
stagnation, arms were stored and political programmes to win 
over the peasantry were implemented. One can now perceive 
the Khmer Rouge attempting to return along the continuum to 
a place where greater autonomy and political power may be 
had. Following the Vietnamese withdrawal of 1989 the SOC has 
demanded that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from the political 
process altogether. For the Khmer Rouge only the military 
option remains. The road to regaining power would be a long 
and arduous one with the Khmer Rouge, in the interim
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rebuilding and gaining ground as a guerrilla force. It 
would appear that the Khmer Rouge believe that they have 
more to lose through compromise than by fighting.
While neutrality has been suggested as a possible future 
programme for Cambodia, (e.g. in the Australian proposal) at 
present it is simply not feasible. The external conditions, 
especially China's explicit consent to the idea, do not 
exist. Nor is the concept a credible one with continuing 
belligerent attitudes among the various Khmer factions. The 
aims of regional and global actors must be compatible with 
those of a neutral state. Increasingly it is becoming 
evident that the Khmer Rouge continue to present a threat to 
a peaceable Cambodia.
Even if elections were held in Cambodia, there is no 
guarantee that there will be stable government. For this to 
occur there would have to be international support with the 
various backers of the PRK and the resistance forces, 
ceasing all aid. Again, however, with arms caches the 
conflict could continue for at least a couple of years if 
not longer. The Cambodian healing process, having to cure 
deep historical wounds, will be a lengthy one.
What we are left with therefore, is a bleak picture for 
Cambodia. Amidst negotiations, peace is not imminent, as 
the Khmer Rouge continue to move back and forth along the 
continuum of great power-small power relations.
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Appendix I
Chinese agreement of arms to the Khmer Rouge for the 1976-78 
period discussed on a visit by Ieng Sary to Beijing in April 
1975.
In 1976, we will deliver first of all necessary arms and 
equipment to give basic training to cadres on-the-spot. 
This will include:
(1) Part of the equipment of an anti-aircraft artillery 
regiment, part of the equipment for a radar regiment and 
equipment for a military airfield.
Four escort vessels and four fast torpedo boats for the 
naval forces.
Part of the equipment for a tank regiment, part of the 
equipment for a liaison regiment, part of the equipment for 
three artillery regiments and the equipment for a battalion 
of pontoon bridges for infantry use.
Other equipment and arms to be delivered are the following:
(2) Anti-aircaft guns for the Air Force will be delivered in 
1977. Radar equipment will be delivered in 1977-78. Combat 
planes, including bombers, will be delivered according to 
the rhythm of the training of plane crews and the building 
of new airfields. Another part of airfield equipment will 
be delivered in accordance with the tempo of new airfield construction.
As for the six further naval escort vessels, four will be 
delivered in 1977 and two in 1978. As for the additional 
eight fast torpedo boats, four will be delivered each year 
in 1977-78.
The equipment for the three artillery regiments, except for 
130mm cannons, will be delivered from the beginning of 1977, 
the other equipment will be delivered during the last six 
months of 1976. Equipment for the tank regiment will be 
successively delivered in 1977-78. Equipment and arms for 
the liaison regiment will be delivered in 1977. Three 
hundred kilometers of overhead communication cables will be 
delivered in 1976, so there remains another 1,000 
kilometers. Please let us have your concrete requests about 
this and we will make arrangements accordingly....
(3) Regarding the procedure and methods of delivery:
The major part of such equipment can be transported by boat 
and unloaded at Sihanoukvi1le (Kompong Som) port. The 
planes will have to be dismantled and crated for the 
transport and will be reassembled in Kampuchea. Submarines 
and tankers can proceed directly to Kampuchea, but what has
176
to be done to guarantee the navigation and security of the 
vessels is a relatively complex question which will require 
later discussions on the concrete details.
Source: Burchett, Wilfred. The China-Cambodia-Vietnam
Triangle. London: Vanguard Books, 1981, 166-167.
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